Themes in linguistic understanding. Cognition and epistemology by Grodniewicz, Jędrzej Piotr
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Themes in linguistic understanding 
 
Cognition and epistemology 
 
Jędrzej Piotr (J.P.) Grodniewicz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aquesta tesi doctoral està subjecta a la llicència Reconeixement- NoComercial 4.0. Espanya de 
Creative Commons. 
 
Esta tesis doctoral está sujeta a la licencia  Reconocimiento - NoComercial 4.0.  España de 
Creative Commons. 
 
This doctoral thesis is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0. 
Spain License.  
 
Themes in linguistic
understanding
Cognition and epistemology
Jędrzej Piotr (J.P.) Grodniewicz
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the
University of Barcelona
Supervisor: Manuel García-Carpintero
Co-supervisor: Josep Macià
University of Barcelona
Faculty of Philosophy
PhD Program: Cognitive Science and Language
(EEES: HDK08 Ciència Cognitiva i Llenguatge)
Line of Investigation: Analytic Philosophy (101133 Filosofia Analítica)
September 2020
Abstract
This thesis investigates the nature and epistemic role of linguistic under-
standing. It consists of five largely autonomous chapters. Chapter 1 focuses
on the dynamic and temporal aspect of linguistic understanding. It argues
that linguistic understanding can be appropriately characterized as a process
and offers such a characterization. Chapter 2 argues that the process of lan-
guage comprehension generates multiple interdependent representations (and
metarepresentations). Only by taking into account all these representations
and relations between them, we will be able to describe how linguistic un-
derstanding contributes to our acquisition of beliefs and knowledge. Chapter
3 argues that the justification of comprehension-based beliefs, i.e., the beliefs
about what other people say, is non-inferential. In particular, it defends a
version of process-reliabilism about the justification of comprehension-based
beliefs. Chapter 4 examines the effectiveness of the filtering of information
we acquire through comprehension. It argues that the filtering is not real-
time effective, but it is long-term effective; it does not allow a particular
hearer on a particular occasion to respond discriminately to a particular in-
stance of testimony, but it shapes our social environment in such a way that
untrustworthy testimony is relatively uncommon. As a result, the chapter
supports a version of strong anti-reductionism about testimonial entitlement.
Finally, Chapter 5 argues that linguistic understanding differs from the so-
called understanding of a proposition. The latter is a kind of what contempo-
rary epistemologists characterize as objectual understanding. Nevertheless,
i
in most cases of successful linguistic communication, linguistic understand-
ing, and understanding of a proposition jointly contribute to understanding
a communicated thought.
ii
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Introduction
Przytłaczająca obfitość, powiązań, skojarzeń. . . Ileż
zdań można utworzyć z dwudziestu czterech liter
alfabetu? Ileż znaczeń można wyprowadzić z setek
chwastów, grudek i innych drobiazgów?
An overwhelming abundance of connections,
associations. . . How many sentences can one create
out of the twenty-four letters of the alphabet? How
many meanings can one glean from hundreds of
weeds, clods of dirt, and other trifles?
— Witold Gombrowicz, Cosmos1
If we examine the traditional borders of the philosophical sub-disciplines,
we readily realize that linguistic understanding is, to some extent, terra nul-
lius — nobody’s land. It lies no more in the domain of the philosophy of
language than the philosophy of mind. It is hard to imagine anyone safely
crossing its treacherous paths without the equipment provided by epistemol-
ogy and cognitive sciences. And yet, it is a central and strategically important
territory. Whoever investigates human social activity will, sooner or later,
arrive at its borders. Will they have maps precise enough to navigate it
without distress?
1English translation by Danuta Borchardt.
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This thesis is an attempt to fill in some of the blank spots on our maps
of linguistic understanding. It consists of five essays. Each of them can be
considered a separate expedition to a specific problem area. Each required
a slightly different toolkit and preparation. Nevertheless, all the explored
territories adhere to one another, and everything that I have discovered along
my way allowed me to later move more confidently into the yet unknown.
Chapter 1 starts with a simple but significant observation: spoken lin-
guistic communication is very fast. Right after one person finishes their ut-
terance, another starts theirs. Is there even time to understand each other?
Fast communicative turn-taking — as this phenomenon is called in conver-
sation analysis and psycholinguistics — draws our attention to the dynamic
and temporal aspect of linguistic understanding. I argue that we will not
be able to accommodate this data if we focus exclusively on understanding
characterized either as a state of grasping the content of a given utterance
or as a disposition to reach these states, i.e., linguistic competence. Drawing
from both metaphysics of temporal entities and psycholinguistics, I develop
an account of the process of linguistic understanding. I argue that linguistic
understanding, just like other processes, unfolds over time. Understanding of
an utterance begins right after we hear the first sounds of this utterance and
continues until the final state of understanding of this utterance is produced.
In Chapter 1, I also propose the following stipulative definition combining
all aspects of linguistic understanding:
(LU) Linguistic understanding is a cognitive process that typ-
ically takes place on hearing an utterance in a language one
disposition-understands and which typically results in a set of
mental states via which the hearer represents the content and
force of the utterance or what the hearer identifies as the content
and force thereof.
Chapter 2 focuses on the products of the process of understanding, i.e.,
states of understanding. It starts with a comparison of the five most influen-
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tial philosophical theories of states of understanding. Three of them, I call
them indirect, characterize understanding as a state which meta-represents
the content of an utterance as said by a given speaker, e.g., that Anne said
that p. Two others, I call them direct, characterize understanding as a state
which represents just the content of the utterance (p). I argue that both
these approaches are only partially right. Instead of developing another
single-state characterization of linguistic understanding, I offer a model of the
representational structure of linguistic understanding consisting of multiple
interdependent representations (some of which are direct, some indirect).
In this model, language comprehension runs in two streams: faster, which
contains only direct representations of the content of an utterance, and
slower, which contains metarepresentations of the content as said by a given
speaker. Each of these streams is equipped with a dedicated filter. The
representations in the faster stream are filtered by validation, i.e., a purely
content-oriented filter, which checks comprehended contents for consistency
with our active or easily accessible background knowledge. The representa-
tions in the slower stream, on the other hand, pass through a source-oriented
filter, which monitors whether the comprehended information comes from a
reliable source.
Most importantly, the model I offer in Chapter 2, establishes a middle
ground between the so-called Spinozan model of comprehension (according to
which we, by default, believe everything we comprehend), and the so-called
Cartesian model of comprehension (according to which we first entertain the
comprehended content and then either accept or reject it). I argue that we do
not accept everything we comprehend, but we accept everything that passes
validation, i.e., the filter localized in the faster stream. This conclusion is
crucial for my discussion of the effective filtering of testimony in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 3, I take a closer look at the so-called comprehension-based
beliefs, i.e., the beliefs whose contents are meta-representations of the form
that the speaker said that p. The question is: how are these beliefs justified?
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According to epistemic non-inferentialism, the justification of these beliefs
does not depend on the justification of any other beliefs. The most influential
version of epistemic non-inferentialism is language comprehension dogmatism
— a view that comprehension-based beliefs are prima facie justified by expe-
riential states, i.e., seemings or quasi-perceptions that the speaker said that
p (Fricker, 2003; Brogaard, 2018). Recently, this position has been attacked
by Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2019), who provided three counterarguments
against language comprehension dogmatism. Moreover, Balcerak Jackson
took these arguments to constitute an abductive argument for epistemic in-
ferentialism — a view according to which comprehension-based beliefs are
justified by other beliefs, e.g., beliefs about what words the speaker uttered.
I argue that Balcerak Jackson’s arguments may be effective against lan-
guage comprehension dogmatism (even though they are much less damaging
than he thinks), but do not constitute a successful abductive argument for
epistemic inferentialism. I develop another non-inferentialist position, i.e.,
comprehension-process reliabilism, which deals with Balcerak Jackson’s ar-
guments.
Chapter 4 goes one step further into the territory of the epistemic role
of language comprehension. It takes up the question of whether our ability
to filter out unreliable testimony is effective. My answer has two parts.
First, I argue that filtering of testimony is not real-time effective, i.e., we are
not able to effectively detect untrustworthy testimony while (or right after)
comprehending it. This claim, already defended by Michaelian (2010) and
Shieber (2012), has been recently contested by Fricker (2016). I argue, not
only that Fricker’s critique of Michaelian and Shieber fails, but also that real-
time effective filtering is impossible if the model of language comprehension,
which I offered in Chapter 2, is correct.
Second, I argue that filtering is long-term effective. The fact that all, at
least all adult members of our linguistic communities are routinely vigilant
(i.e., monitor incoming testimony) and that being caught on a lie triggers
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social retribution, puts pressure on speakers who are then much less inclined
to produce false testimony. Therefore, filtering is effective not as an ability
to detect falsehoods on the spot, but as a force shaping our social reality.
In the last section of Chapter 4, I argue that these considerations support
a version of strong anti-reductionism about testimonial entitlement, i.e., a
view according to which we are prima facie entitled to believe whatever we
are being told.
The final chapter (Chapter 5) is another exploration of almost virgin
land. It examines the phenomenon of what I and coauthors of this chapter:
J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon call understanding of a proposition.
We argue that understanding of a proposition (often identified with linguistic
understanding) is a kind of what contemporary epistemology characterizes as
objectual understanding. Even though linguistic understanding and under-
standing of a proposition are distinct phenomena, in everyday communica-
tion, they often jointly contribute to understanding a communicated thought.
To understand a communicated thought, one has to, first, recognize which
content has been expressed in a given utterance (linguistic understanding),
and second, understand this content itself (understanding of a proposition).
x
Chapter 1
The process of linguistic
understanding
1
Abstract. The majority of our linguistic exchanges, such as every-
day conversations, are divided into turns; one party usually talks
at a time, with only relatively rare occurrences of brief overlaps in
which there are two (or more) simultaneous speakers. Moreover,
conversational turn-taking tends to be very fast. We typically
start producing our responses before the previous turn has fin-
ished, i.e., before we are confronted with the full content of our
interlocutor’s utterance. This raises interesting questions about
the nature of linguistic understanding. Philosophical theories typ-
ically focus on linguistic understanding characterized either as an
ability to grasp the contents of utterances in a given language or
as outputs of this ability—mental states of one type or another.
In this chapter, I supplement these theories by developing an ac-
count of the process of understanding. I argue that it enables
us to capture the dynamic and temporal aspect of understanding
1Material from: Grodniewicz, J.P., “The process of linguistic understanding.” Synthese
(2020), doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02807-9, Springer Nature.
1
and reconcile philosophical investigations with empirical research
on language comprehension.
1 Introduction
According to conversation analysis studies, the majority of our linguistic
exchanges, such as everyday conversations, are divided into turns (Sacks et
al., 1974). That is to say that one party usually talks at a time, with only
relatively rare occurrences of brief overlaps in which there are two (or more)
simultaneous speakers. This observation would not be striking if it were not
juxtaposed with another empirical result provided by psycholinguistics: the
gaps between subsequent turns are very short, only about 0.2 s (Stivers et
al., 2009). Given that language production requires a minimum of around 1 s
for an unprimed single-word utterance to around 1.5 s for a simple clause, we
have to conclude that subsequent turns are planned, and that the production
process begins before the end of the previous turn (Levinson and Torreira,
2015; Garrod and Pickering, 2015; Levinson, 2016). Consequently, speakers
typically start responding not to the whole content of an utterance they have
heard, but to their prediction of the full content of the utterance on the basis
of only that part of the content they have actually heard.2 To account for
these data, we need a theory of linguistic understanding more versatile and
of a broader scope than those already available in the philosophical debate.3
2Of course, to say that 0.2 s is the length of a typical gap in conversation is a vast
generalization. A lot depends on such factors as the type of the upcoming turn. For
example, Kendrick (2015) observes that turns involving repair appear approximately 0.7
s after the preceding ones. However, even 0.7 s is still a short enough gap to support the
argument presented in what follows.
3It is important to keep in mind that linguistic understanding that is the subject of this
chapter should not be identified with communicative success. Arguably, communicative
success may, in specific situation, be achieved despite the lack of linguistic understanding
(or in the case of only partial understanding). Thus, linguistic understanding is not
identical with the communicative success, although might (and typically does) contribute
to it.
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Philosophical theories typically focus on states of understanding, i.e.,
“outputs of exercises of one’s ability” to understand (Longworth, 2018). They
look for an answer to a very specific question: What is the hearer’s atti-
tude towards the content or what is said through an utterance which that
hearer understands? Most influential theories characterize understanding ei-
ther as a kind of: knowledge (e.g., Evans, 1982; Dummett, 1993; Davies,
1989; Heck, 1995; Campbell, 1982; Higginbotham, 1992), belief (e.g., Mil-
likan, 1984, 2004), perception-like state of direct awareness of the content
(and force) of the utterance (Hunter, 1998; Fricker, 2003), or a state through
which the hearer entertains the content of the utterance (Longworth, 2018).
Research on turn-taking shows that we start producing our responses
before the turn in progress at the time has finished, i.e., before we are con-
fronted with the full content of our interlocutor’s utterance. Certainly, it is
quite natural to assume that a hearer is in a state of understanding an ut-
terance as soon as the last word of that utterance has been heard. However,
short turn-taking gaps simply do not provide enough time for a hearer to pro-
duce a response only when already in a state representing the content of the
previous turn. Thus, apparently, in the vast majority of communicative situ-
ations we produce our conversational turn without being in one of the states
typically characterized by philosophers as the state of understanding (I come
back to this matter in Section 4). In result, to account for the role it plays
in fast communicative exchanges, we have to extend our characterization of
linguistic understanding beyond the most popular state-sense. The authors
enumerated above do not claim that being in a state of understanding is
all there is to linguistic understanding. However, none of them provide an
elaborated account of the dynamic aspect of linguistic understanding. This
chapter is meant as an attempt to provide such an account.4
It is important to keep in mind that the current chapter is not meant as
4In this essay, I focus on the understanding of speech (spoken linguistic input). I think
that it will be relatively easy to extend my proposed account to the written word, although
I do not undertake this task here.
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a critique of the available theories of linguistic understanding listed above.
The states of understanding that they focus on are independently interesting.
We want such states to play various roles in our cognitive enterprises. For
example, states of understanding figure as partial reasons for action (e.g.,
I have run away because I knew that what you have said was that there
is a tiger behind the rock), and belief formation (I believe that there is a
tiger behind the rock because this is what you have told me). Some theory
of states of understanding has to be a part of a more versatile theory of
linguistic understanding I am about to offer.5
My plan is the following. In Section 2, I present three senses of linguistic
understanding. In Section 3, I discuss the relation between these senses
and develop an account of the process of understanding. In Section 4, I
respond to a possible objection according to which we can account for the
dynamic aspect of linguistic understanding without characterizing linguistic
understanding as a process. Finally, in Section 5, I outline additional benefits
of my account for the philosophical debate about linguistic understanding.
2 Three senses of “linguistic understanding”
There are at least three senses in which we pre-theoretically grasp the idea
of linguistic understanding (Hunter, 1998; Longworth, 2010). I have already
mentioned the first: we often think of understanding as a mental state in
which a subject represents the content of a heard utterance. In the second
sense, we consider understanding to be a disposition or stable ability to
decode sentences of a certain language (I will be sometimes referring to it as
disposition-understanding of a given language). This is what we mean when
we talk of understanding (or simply “speaking”) a given language, such as
English, Kashmiri, or Northern Sotho.
5I outline my view on states of understanding in Chapter 2. Moreover, in Section 4,
I discuss the hypothesis that the process of understanding is constituted out of states of
(partial) understanding.
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It is worth noting that we expect states of understanding (the first sense
of understanding given above) to be grounded in a disposition (this second
sense of understanding). Fricker (2003) highlights the fact that to have an
understanding of a particular utterance of a sentence, S, is to enjoy a correct
representation of the content of the utterance “as a result of one’s disposi-
tional understanding S—that is, through the exercise of a stably possessed,
internally constituted reliable capacity” (p. 346). It is not enough to simply
grasp the content of an utterance. As Fricker shows through her example, I
might effectively grasp the contents of Russian utterances if there is a reliable
translator by my side who translates from Russian to English for me. Does
that mean that I understand Russian? In a sense, I do; in a sense, I do not.
If, asking about understanding, we ask whether I can communicate with my
Russian monolingual friend, it may seem that I understand Russian (thanks
to my Russian translator!). However, we might be concerned with a more
profound matter: whether I myself as a speaker with such and such biological
cognitive setting, such-and-such experience and language acquisition history
understand Russian. In this latter case the answer would be “no”. It is ob-
vious that what is of primary importance for our research into the nature of
linguistic understanding is the latter question, and the sense in which I do
not understand Russian. At least when trying to refine the basic sense of
linguistic understanding (which could, later on, be used to set up standards
for possible derivative senses such as “I don’t know any Russian but I could
understand him because I had Google Translate on my phone.”), we need
to focus on a disposition to understand a language which is common to al-
most all human beings and which is internalized in a very specific way. It is
grounded in our language faculty (e.g., Hauser et al., 2002; Jackendoff and
Pinker, 2005) consisting, among others, of an appropriate biological setting of
a language-ready brain (e.g., Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco, 2014; Friederici,
2012), some form of internalization of the grammar of a given language (e.g.,
Pinker and Bloom, 1990), a mental lexicon (e.g., Jackendoff, 2002; Patterson
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et al., 2007), etc. Due to the lack of space, I will leave a discussion of the
exact nature of that disposition for another occasion. However, I agree with
Fricker that possession of such disposition is necessary for being in states
of understanding of particular utterances. States of understanding of utter-
ances of sentences in a given language result, at least in part, from exercising
the disposition to understand this language.
The third way in which we can think of understanding is to think of it
as an “event” (Hunter, 1998, 561), “process” (Fricker, 2003, 330), “episode”
or “achievement” (Longworth, 2010, 4) of one’s coming to the state of under-
standing of a given utterance.6 Notably, there is relatively little discussion
about this sense of understanding, either in the philosophy of language or
the philosophy of mind. Someone might even assume, that the nature of
processes, events, or episodes of understanding lies outside the area of philo-
sophical considerations; it is the task of psycholinguistics to study time-spans
and the mechanisms of language comprehension, and that of neurolinguistics
to study the neural pathways recruited for the processes, etc. However, as I
argue in the next section, focusing on the dynamic and temporal character of
linguistic understanding opens a rich and interesting avenue of philosophical
research.
3 Linguistic understanding as a cognitive pro-
cess
3.1 The metaphysics of processes
How do the three senses of linguistic understanding mentioned above hang
together? Are they all pointing at entirely distinct phenomena or rather
different aspects of the same complex phenomenon? Finally, is it possible
that careful examination of any one of these senses will help us to better
6I will discuss the differences between these notions in the next section.
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understand the remaining two?
I think that the three senses of linguistic understanding indicate different
aspects of the same phenomenon, and as such, they are strongly interdepen-
dent. I will now propose a stipulative definition of linguistic understanding,
which outlines the relations between them. Given that my primary interest
in this chapter is the dynamic and temporal aspect of linguistic understand-
ing, my definition puts the process sense of linguistic understanding to the
foreground. Crucially, the definition is, at least prima facie, compatible with
a variety of views about the nature of state-understanding and disposition-
understanding available in the debate.
(LU) Linguistic understanding is a cognitive process that typ-
ically takes place on hearing an utterance in a language one
disposition-understands and which typically results in a set of
mental states via which the hearer represents the content and
force of the utterance or what the hearer identifies as the content
and force thereof.
LU assumes very little about the nature of the process of understanding.
In principle, it is possible that, e.g., Cyborgs or Martians were capable of per-
forming the same process, even if they were equipped with different cognitive
and perceptual mechanisms than these possessed by humans. Independent
of a specific implementation, a process that is based on a disposition to un-
derstand a given language and produces mental states representing contents
of utterances of sentences in this language, qualifies as a process of under-
standing.
Moreover, LU specifies what triggers the process of linguistic understand-
ing. Just as the process of watching a particular material object requires a
particular material object that is being watched (Crowther, 2009), the pro-
cess of linguistic understanding requires some linguistic input that is being
understood. However, restriction to typical cases is important here. Not
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always when a subject possessing a disposition-understanding of a given lan-
guage encounters utterances in this language, the process of understanding
is being triggered. If the hearer is cognitively impaired or if their cogni-
tive system has been tinkered with or, finally, if their attention resources
are insufficient it is possible that they would encounter an utterance but the
process would not be triggered or the process would be triggered but the
state would not be produced (more on this below). As is the case with other
types of processes dependent on the working of our cognitive mechanisms,
we should restrict our predictions about linguistic processing to broadly con-
strued normal conditions.
But is it appropriate to think about linguistic understanding as a process?
To answer this question, I will draw from a rich tradition of philosophers who
investigated the nature of temporal entities, often in the context of the dis-
cussion about grammatical aspect (cf. Vendler, 1957; Verkuyl, 1972; Moure-
latos, 1978; O’Shaughnessy, 2000; Rothstein, 2004; Crowther, 2009, 2011,
2018; Steward, 1997, 2012, 2018; Galton, 2018; Soteriou, 2013, 2018; Stout,
2018). Different authors use different classifications but I will distinguish
four basic categories: states, achievements, accomplishments, and activities.
My goal in this section is to argue that there are senses of “linguistic under-
standing” belonging to each of these categories. Is it even possible? It is. As
indicated by Vendler:
[it is not the case that] a verb exhibiting a use fairly covered
by one schema cannot have divergent uses, which in turn may
be described in terms of other schemata. As a matter of fact,
precisely those verbs that call for two or more time schemata will
provide the most interesting instances of conceptual divergence
in this respect—an ambiguity which, if undetected, might lead to
confusion. Thus my intention is not to give rules about how to
use certain terms but to suggest a way of describing the use of
those terms. (Vendler, 1957, 143-4)
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As I have already mentioned, there is an obvious sense in which “linguistic
understanding” denotes a state. Depending on which theory we favor, we can
characterize the state of understanding of an utterance either as knowledge
that what was said was so and so, a belief that what was said was so and so,
a state of entertaining the content of this utterance, etc. Crucially, “states
such as knowledge and belief do not have temporal duration in the sense of
having temporal parts or successive temporal phases over which they unfold.”
(Crowther, 2011, 5). The same state of my understanding of your utterance
that p may obtain now and in an hour, and it does not make sense to say
that in an hour I am in a different phase, or at a different stage of this state.
Importantly, disposition-understanding which we pick out when we say
“Anne understands Italian” is also a state, although different than a state
of understanding of a particular utterance. As I said above, disposition-
understanding of a given language is a state of a subject’s cognitive system,
which enables the system to respond to linguistic input, e.g., particular ut-
terances, by producing states of understanding of these utterances.
The next category enumerated above is this of achievements. Achieve-
ments are typically characterized as instantaneous changes of state. Some
clear examples are noticing, recognizing, finding, and dying. As observed
by Longworth (2010), there is an intuitive sense in which linguistic under-
standing denotes an achievement. In this sense, understanding is an episode
of: “one’s coming to state-understand, or understanding, what someone has
said” (Longworth, 2010, 4); it is the temporal boundary between whatever
led to the production of state-understanding and the first moment in which
the state-understanding obtains.
Linguistic understanding has been previously characterized as a state and
as an achievement, so these two senses are fairly uncontroversial. But I have
promised to argue that there are senses of linguistic understanding corre-
sponding to all four categories enumerated above, that is also to activities
and accomplishments. In what follows, I will use the term “process” as a
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collective name for activities and accomplishments.7 Therefore, my goal now
is to argue that we can think about linguistic understanding as a process.
Activities and accomplishments are both progressive, i.e., they describe
temporal entities unfolding over time. Names of particular activities and
accomplishments can be appropriately used as answers to questions such
as “What are you doing?” or “What is going on?” (Steward, 2018, 111).
The core difference between activities and accomplishments concerns telicity.8
Accomplishments such as walking to the shops or writing a letter are oriented
towards specific goals or points “at which they must terminate” (Crowther,
2011, 6), while activities, such as walking or writing, are not. If I have walked
for ten minutes and after that kept walking for another five minutes, there
was an activity of walking that took fifteen minutes. However, if I have
walked to the shops in ten minutes, it means that I have reached the shops
after ten minutes. After that, I can walk to the shops again, but I cannot
walk to the shops some more.9
Understanding an utterance is a candidate for an accomplishment, be-
cause it has specific “completion condition” (Crowther, 2011), namely, the
achievement of the state of understanding. The claim I want to defend is
that understanding an utterance unfolds over time because hearing an ut-
terance unfolds over time and the temporal structure of understanding an
utterance overlaps with the temporal structure of hearing this utterance.10
In Section 3.2, I present psycholinguistic data about incrementality and pre-
dictivity of language understanding, which support this claim. Here, my
focus is on its philosophical motivation.
7Other authors pick different terminological conventions. For example, Crowther (2011)
uses the term “process” for what I, following e.g., Vendler (1957) and Rothstein (2004),
call “activity.”
8Cf. Rothstein (2004).
9For an exhaustive and illuminating discussion of the difference between activities and
accomplishments see (Crowther, 2011).
10That does not mean that they have the same temporal structure. More on this topic
in Section 4.
10
Let us consider the following, particularly interesting example of an ac-
complishment provided by Matthew Soteriou (2018):
It takes around 51 minutes and 14 seconds to play, from start to
finish, the 1981 recording of Glenn Gould’s performance of the
Goldberg Variations. It takes at least the same amount of time
to hear it. Once you’ve listened to the whole recording, you will
have heard the final recording of Gould’s performance of that
work. . . Although we’re unable to hear a performance of the
complete work all at once, so to speak, this doesn’t mean that we
are incapable of hearing a performance of the whole work. It just
means that this is an accomplishment that takes time. (Soteriou,
2018, 82)
The reason why it takes 51 minutes and 14 seconds to hear the 1981
recording of Goldberg Variations is that playing this piece takes the same
amount of time. At each moment of playing, there is simultaneous hearing.
But, let’s go one step further and imagine that the hearer in Soteriou’s ex-
ample is a music critic whose goal is to analyze the 1981 recording. Most
likely, the critic does not wait with their analysis till the playing is finished
and the hearing accomplished. They analyze Goldberg Variations as they
hear them being played. So, it takes (at least) 51 minutes and 14 seconds to
analyze the 1981 recording of Goldberg Variation.
I submit that, in this respect, understanding an utterance is analogous
to analyzing the 1981 recording of Goldberg Variations.11 If you utter the
sentence “It would be really nice to visit Vienna again, like in the old times,”
the uttering of this sentence takes time. Not as much time as playing the
Goldberg Variations, but still, it unfolds from the first word to the last over
11Certainly, analyzing the recording of Goldberg Variations may continue long after the
playing and hearing are finished (in fact, it may take place over the course of multiple
playings and hearings), while understanding an utterance typically finishes right after the
vocalizing and hearing.
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the course of 3 seconds or so. My hearing of this utterance, analogously to
Soteriou’s example, takes more or less the same amount of time as it takes
vocalizing it. Crucially, my understanding of this utterance starts when I
hear the first word and continues as I hear subsequent words. Just as the
critic does not wait with analyzing the Goldberg Variations till the accom-
plishments of playing and hearing the Goldberg Variations are finished, our
cognitive systems do not “wait” with understanding an utterance till the end
of accomplishments of uttering and hearing this utterance.
Obviously, the accomplishment understanding an utterance is intimately
related with both state of understanding and an achievement of understand-
ing. The state of understanding an utterance is the telos towards which the
accomplishment progresses. The achievement, as indicated by Longworth,
is the boundary between the accomplishment and the first moment of be-
ing in the state of understanding; an instantaneous episode of coming to
state-understanding. Stout observes:
In English the form of words used to refer to an achievement
is very often the same as the form of words used to refer to a
process. The phrase ‘my crossing the road’ serves both purposes.
This is an instance of the familiar process/product ambiguity.
We might say that the writing that was happening in the exam
hall resulted in the writing that could be found later on the exam
papers. The word ‘writing’ is functioning differently in its two
occurrences here, first to refer to a process and then to refer to
the product of that process. (Stout, 2018, 212)
Arguably, in contemporary English, “understanding” is almost never used
as progressive. We use expressions like “Anne is crossing the road.” or “Anne
is analyzing the data.” but “Anne is understanding the data.” does not sound
right. In this context, it is much more natural to say, e.g., “Anne is trying
to understand the data.” Is it a problem for my project of characterizing
linguistic understanding as an accomplishment?
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I do not think it is. Even if the progressive use of “understand” is not
common, it is not unprecedented.12 Moreover, the frequency and context in
which different words are used in the progressive undergo diachronic changes
and are subject to dialectical differences (Smitterberg, 2005; Levin, 2013).
We encounter at least a trace of progressiveness in constructions like: “If I’m
understanding the results correctly. . . ” This phrase can be interpreted as
conveying both that I am in a state of understanding the results in some way
(and I am not sure whether this way is the right way) and that I am still in
the process of understanding these results (which, hopefully, will culminate
with understanding them correctly). To make the process sense even more
explicit, imagine that I am reading the results as they are being printed page-
by-page. After reading just a few pages, I observe certain tendencies and
immediately report: “If I’m understanding the results correctly, the asteroid
is going to hit us in 16 hours.” I am still in the process of understanding
these results, but my current best guess is that the results indicate that the
asteroid will hit us in 16 hours. I take the process of linguistic understanding
to be analogous to the process of understanding the results as they are being
printed page-by-page. Again, following Vendler, my goal is “not to give rules
about how to use certain terms but to suggest a way of describing the use of
those terms.” (Vendler, 1957, 144).
But would it not be better to simply drop the controversial progressive
use of “understand” and use coming to understand an utterance when speak-
ing about accomplishments? The problem with using coming to understand
is that it suggests that understanding “is still entirely in the future” (Galton,
2018, 55). However, as my comparison with analyzing the Goldberg Vari-
ations was intended to demonstrate, and as I will further argue by appeal
to empirical research in the next section, when we listen to someone vo-
calizing an utterance, understanding is not entirely in the future. It is in
12See Jørgensen (1991) for a discussion of progressive uses of predominantly stative verbs
including “understand.”
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progress from the get-go and unfolds over time, simultaneously with vocaliz-
ing and hearing. Word after word there is more and more understanding an
utterance (an accomplishment) leading to understanding an utterance (an
achievement), which, in turn, demarcates the first moment of understand-
ing an utterance (a state). Vendler is on point: “verbs that call for two or
more time schemata will provide the most interesting instances of conceptual
divergence.” (1957, 144).13
Finally, can we go one step further and think about the use of linguistic
understanding as an activity? I think we can. Here is Rob Boffard describing
his experience with a speed-reading app in a Guardian article: “I started off
at a relatively mild 350wpm, but soon graduated to a cruising altitude of
600wpm. And I was understanding all of it.” (Boffard, 2014, Sptember 22).
The more reading (activity), the more understanding (activity). After read-
ing (and understanding what he was reading) for ten minutes, Boffard could
have read (and understood what he was reading) for another five minutes,
and there would be fifteen minutes of reading with understanding, just like
we expect from activities.
In this section I described various uses of linguistic understanding. Using
linguistic understanding as denoting a state or an achievement, corresponding
to the ways in which the verb “understand” is typically used in contemporary
English, was already common in the debate. However, I argued that we
can also use understanding as denoting a process (an accomplishment or an
activity). From the philosophical point of view, there are good reasons to
do so. The temporal structure of the process of understanding overlaps with
13Notice also, that (in the accomplishment sense) the sentence “Anne was understanding
what Tom was saying” is consistent with its never being the case that she understood what
Tom was saying. If Tom was saying “The results clearly indicate that the asteroid is going
to hit us in 16 hours.” but he was wrong, and the asteroid hit right after he vocalized
the word “asteroid” annihilating all life on earth, Anne was understanding what Tom was
saying but she never understood it. We can say that she understood a part of it, but we
can say the same thing about Alice who, when the asteroid hit, was building a house (a
classical example of an accomplishment). Alice never built the house (achievement), even
though she built a part of it, for example, just the walls.
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temporal structures of other processes, both activities (e.g., reading) and
accomplishments (e.g., hearing an utterance).
3.2 The process of understanding in psycholinguistics
Incrementality
Above, I have argued that, given its temporal structure, there are good rea-
sons to think about linguistic understanding as a process. In this section,
I will try to demonstrate that it perfectly fits the way in which linguistic
understanding is being characterized by empirical language sciences.
Psycholinguistics commonly characterizes linguistic understanding as un-
folding over time. A specific term has even been applied to the type of pro-
gressiveness in language comprehension. Psycholinguists say that language
comprehension is “incremental,” i.e., new unfolding input is processed by the
receiver chunk by chunk. This chimes well with the turn-taking data. Given
the very short gaps between turns, it is simply impossible for a receiver’s cog-
nitive system to “wait” until the speaker’s turn has finished and only then to
“trigger” the comprehension process and produce a response. However, there
are also other phenomena that support the claim regarding the incremental-
ity of language comprehension. One of the most robust and widely studied
is “garden pathing”, first identified by Thomas Bever (1970). There is a large
and fast-growing body of literature on garden-path processing of written text
comprehension; however, the phenomenon has also been extensively studied
in the context of speech processing (Frazier and Fodor, 1978; Kjelgaard and
Speer, 1999; Steinhauer et al., 1999; Schafer et al., 2000; Pauker et al., 2011).
Take the sentence “The old man the boat.”. When receivers hear or read the
full sentence, they realize that the most likely interpretation of the sentence’s
meaning they had built after hearing or reading only “The old man” (i.e., that
“the old man” is a noun phrase) is incorrect. As might be expected, this ef-
fect is blocked or reduced by appropriate prosodic markers (in speech) and
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punctuation (in writing). Nevertheless, the very fact that the phenomenon
occurs in some utterances is sufficient to show that language comprehension
is incremental. If no interpretation had been formed before the full utterance
was heard, receivers would not be surprised by how the utterance actually
unfolds.
Another important argument in favor of the incrementality of language
understanding comes from cross-modal eye-tracking experiments (Altmann
and Kamide, 1999; Kaiser and Trueswell, 2004; Tanenhaus et al., 1995). In
their influential study, Altmann and Kamide (1999) recorded the eye move-
ments of participants presented with pictures while simultaneously listening
to recorded sentences. The pictures were of objects with clearly differentiated
properties, e.g., a boy, a cake, a car, a ball, and a toy train. The partici-
pants heard two types of sentences, e.g., “The boy will move the cake.” and
“The boy will eat the cake.” Note that in the second sentence, only one of
the objects from the example picture could be referred to as the object the
boy was going to eat to form an utterance compatible with common sense
(only the cake is eatable). As expected, when there was only one candidate
object of a given verb, as in the second sentence above, the probability of
the participants looking at that object was significantly increased. Altmann
and Kamide conclude that: “information extracted at the verb can be used
to guide eye movements to whichever object in the visual context satisfies
the selectional requirement of the verb. This guidance is initiated before the
linguistic expression corresponding to the verb’s direct object is encountered”
(p. 258).
One could cite other similar phenomena, but I will follow the psycholin-
guistic mainstream in taking garden paths, turn-taking, and cross-modal eye
tracking to constitute a sufficient argument for the incrementality of language
comprehension. Just as suggested above, understanding does not happen af-
ter hearing or reading but happens simultaneously with them.
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Prediction
There is another feature of linguistic understanding which speaks to its pro-
cessual character. It is commonly assumed in psycholinguistics that un-
derstanding is not only incremental but also predictive. Understanding an
utterance consists of constant formation and updating of predictions about
what comes next; how the utterance will unfold and how it will end. Kuper-
berg and Jaeger (2016) go as far as to state that it is “logically impossible”
to reject the claim that language comprehension is predictive in light of some
robust linguistic phenomena. Two of those, garden-paths and turn-taking,
I have already discussed.14 Additional evidence is provided by e.g., studies
of eye movements during the processing of written texts. It has been re-
peatedly shown (see references in Kuperberg and Jaeger (2016)) that readers
fixate more on unpredictable words and less on words that fit in well with
the context (i.e., are easier to predict). For example, in a study conducted by
Rayner and Well (1996), participants read sentences containing highly, mod-
erately and weakly constrained target words while their eye movements were
recorded. The sentences were taken from an earlier study by Schwanenflugel
(1986), who asked participants to list up to three possible ways of completing
a given sentence. For instance, for the beginning of a sentence: “The woman
took the warm cake out of the. . . ”, the word “oven” was produced more than
ninety percent of the time; the word “stove”, slightly more than thirty per-
cent; and the word “pantry” less than five percent of the time. Therefore,
“oven” is highly constrained, “stove” is moderately constrained, and “pantry”
weakly constrained completion of the target sentence. Rayner and Well ob-
served that even though there were no significant differences in gaze-fixation
14Notice that the garden-path data is complementary to the turn-taking data. Fast
turn-taking alone could result from interlocutors being simply uninterested in what others
have to say and merely waiting for their chance to speak. Garden path data, however,
proves that hearers build interpretations of what speakers say based on fragments of utter-
ances which they have already perceived. This is why they are surprised when the actual
continuations of utterances do not meet their predictions.
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times while reading highly and moderately constrained target words, par-
ticipants fixated for significantly longer on weakly constrained target words.
This indicates that readers constantly predict what word or words will most
likely appear next in a given context. Prolonged eye fixation on the unpre-
dictable words reveals the increase in processing difficulty for unpredictable
completions.
Let us briefly compare this with the asteroid case discussed in Section
3.1. When I reported that the asteroid is likely to hit us in 16 hours, I was
still in the process of understanding the results (subsequent pages containing
these results were still being printed), but my best guess about the results
was that they indicate that the asteroid is going to hit us in 16 hours. This
is similar to what we do when processing linguistic input. Imagine that I
answer, “I’d like salad” 0.2 s after hearing “What would you like to have
for lunch?” To answer so fast, I must have predicted (given the context,
including communicative situation, my knowledge of the interlocutor, etc.),
that the question concerns lunch before the word “lunch” was vocalized. The
time pressure of the efficient linguistic communication (not entirely unlike the
time pressure of an upcoming Armageddon) forces us to react to an expected
result of the process of understanding before the process is completed.
However, the process of understanding the utterance does not finish when
the process of uttering the response begins. This is demonstrated by the
fact that when the process of understanding an utterance is completed, and
the final state of understanding of this utterance achieved, we may realize
that our prediction has been mistaken. In such a case there are two possible
scenarios. Either we have already started to vocalize an inappropriate re-
sponse and thus we follow it with a repair such as: “I’m sorry, I thought that
you were asking about lunch.”; or, given enough time and sufficiently keen
reflexes, we might block the process of uttering the response and reconsider
our own turn. The necessity to repair one’s own initial reply, or encountering
a highly unexpected utterance, will typically result in a considerably longer
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gap between subsequent turns (Sacks et al., 1974; Kendrick and Torreira,
2015).
Illocutionary force
There is one more important lesson regarding linguistic understanding that
we can learn from the turn-taking studies if we accept LU and extend our
characterization of linguistic understanding to account for its processual as-
pect. Of course, it is a matter of what one’s goals are in formulating a
theory of linguistic understanding; but it seems that we cannot talk of full
understanding of a given utterance unless we mean both understanding of
its content and its illocutionary force. Interestingly, this observation finds
support in empirical research on turn-taking. According to conversation
analysis (Schegloff, 2007; Levinson, 2013), it is impossible to navigate the
unfathomable environment of everyday language use and produce subsequent
turns with such speed and accuracy, unless we deploy specific strategies and
heuristics. One of the most important of these is action ascription.15 Most
discourses are logically organized around so-called “adjacency pairs”. For ex-
ample, if one speaker asks a question, it is highly probable that the turn
of the interlocutor will consist of an answer; offers trigger acceptances and
15Even though the way that conversation analysis characterizes linguistic actions is dif-
ferent from the way philosophy of language typically characterizes speech acts, I take
the two enterprises to be complementary. The primary interest of conversation analysis
is a statistical classification of countless patterns observable in human linguistic activity
(Schegloff, 1992, 2007). Speech act theories, on the other hand, are primarily concerned
with constitutive features (either conventional, intentional, functional, expressive or nor-
mative) of selected speech acts. Nevertheless, even though the list of speech acts studied
in philosophy is shorter than the list of linguistic actions studied in conversation analysis,
there can be little doubt that whatever work has already been done in relation to, e.g.,
asserting, asking, promising, etc., is but the tip of the iceberg of all the speech act types
that figure in our everyday linguistic activity. More than anything, it might be a matter of
fine-grainedness; maybe speech act theory will come up with a shorter list of more general
speech act types that could then be used as scaffolding for the classification of the myriads
of subtypes of linguistic actions. As Austin himself already admitted in his foundational
work (1962): “I am not suggesting that this is a clearly defined class by any means” (p.
99).
19
rejections; complaints trigger explanations; etc. In general:
The challenge for participants, then, is to assign at least one
major action to a turn they have only heard part of so far. But
to do this, they must have parsed what they have heard and
understood its grammar well enough to predict both the content
and its structure. . . (Levinson, 2013, 103)
The following picture emerges. In spoken linguistic exchanges under-
standing begins immediately after the hearer’s cognitive system recognizes
perceived sounds as linguistic input.16 The first important task of the hearer’s
cognitive system is to obtain sufficient information on the grammatical and
lexical features of the utterance to classify it as performing a particular speech
act. This action ascription, together with background knowledge, guides fur-
ther processing of the utterance. For example, after hearing “Would you
. . . ?”, the comprehension system of an English speaker might initially clas-
sify the input as performing the action of asking and use this “assumption”
to predict a set of possible grammatical continuations. Obviously, the initial
classification is not written in stone. An utterance of “Would you be so kind
as to close the window?” has the grammatical structure of a question, but
emerging from the mouth of an English speaker would typically perform the
action of requesting.
16As I have suggested above, the process of understanding is involuntary. It is widely
recognized that linguistic understanding is not an intentional action (Hunter, 1998) and
that it is mostly performed by our cognitive system “sub-personally” and independently
of our will (Pettit, 2010). We cannot prevent our understanding of a sentence spoken in
a language we understand in the dispositional sense, once we hear it. We cannot decide
not to trigger the understanding process. Moreover, even though there is an extensive
range of actions that we can perform to improve our understanding (in some cases we
can facilitate it by, e.g., repeating an exceptionally complicated sentence aloud or writing
it down and parsing it), the occasions on which we actually do so constitute but a tiny
portion of our omnipresent linguistic activity. Typically, the understanding process initi-
ates automatically, compulsorily and does not require any personal-level action (see, e.g.,
Marslen-Wilson and Tyler, 1981; Fodor, 1983).
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4 Doing away with the process?
In the previous section, I proposed a definition that outlines the relations
between different senses of linguistic understanding (LU) and argued that it
is appropriate to characterize linguistic understanding as a process. In this
section, I will respond to a possible objection according to which we can do
away with the process-talk in the context of understanding.
The following worry may arise. Maybe what I am characterizing as a
process of understanding is actually just a sequence of states of understand-
ing? For example, when understanding an utterance “What would you like
to have for lunch?” a hearer goes through a succession of mental states rep-
resenting subsequent fractions of the utterance as it unfolds (e.g., “What. . . ”,
“What would. . . ”, “What would you. . . ”, etc.).17 Thus, we can account for
the dynamic aspect of linguistic understanding without characterizing un-
derstanding as a process.
I think that this worry is ill-grounded. No doubt that the process I char-
acterize can be alternatively modeled as a succession of states. Plausibly,
every cognitive process can be conceptualized as a succession of states lead-
ing to its final output. Brian O’Shaughnessy (2000) speaks about it when
he contrasts non-experiential processes (such as forgetting) with experiential
processes (such as hearing). While experiential processes are “of necessity
constituted of nothing but process-parts” because “[e]verything experiential
is of necessity in flux.” (O’Shaughnessy, 2000, 49), non-experiential processes
are constituted of both: state-parts and process-parts. O’Shaughnessy ex-
plains:
. . . just as being at position p is one thing and being at p and
moving is another, so being in a certain memory-state at time t
is one thing and being in that state and forgetting some of that
17For simplicity I assume here that the utterance is represented in the subsequent states
word-by-word. Competing models, e.g., phoneme-by-phoneme, are also possible.
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content is another. . . . all that is needed for the occurrence of
the requisite process is a continuity across time of states which
stand to one another in some requisite relation. With this in mind
I say, that when the nonexperiential process of forgetting takes
processive form, that process is constituted out of memory-states.
(O’Shaughnessy, 2000, 46)
Understanding an utterance is a non-experiential process which overlaps
with the experiential process of hearing an utterance.18 Both of them are
continuous and “exist by unfolding from one time to another” (Crowther,
2009, 5). The fact that we can point at state-parts constituting the process
of understanding does not make our characterization of understanding as a
process redundant or false.
In the existent debate about linguistic understanding, most authors fo-
cused on states of understanding of the whole utterance, i.e. the final outputs
of the process of understanding an utterance. There is a good reason to pay
special attention to such states. As highlighted by Longworth: “What we
seek in an account of state-understanding is an account of how such states
can play a role in ordinary psychology, how occupying them can impact on
the rational development of one’s cognitive economy.” (Longworth, 2008b,
51-52). States of understanding interact with various other cognitive states
of the subject and thus constitute the link between our linguistic activity and
other things we do and believe. For example, I go to the kitchen because I
believe you said there is carrot cake in the kitchen; I have a desire to have
a piece of carrot cake; I know that the kitchen is close enough for me to
reach in just couple of seconds; etc. In principle, there is no reason why the-
ories of states of understanding could not be extended to give an account of
state-parts of the process of understanding. However, even equipped with a
theory of states of partial understanding leading up to full understanding, we
should not resign from describing understanding an utterance as a process.
18For more about the nature of experiential processes see Soteriou (2013, 2018).
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Like other non-experiential processes, linguistic understanding “is suscepti-
ble of two different analyses, according as different analytical agencies are
brought to bear upon it” (O’Shaughnessy, 2000, 45).
5 The “process first” approach to linguistic un-
derstanding
My main task in this chapter was to offer a theory of linguistic understand-
ing that would help us account for the dynamic aspect of everyday linguistic
interactions; especially the phenomenon of fast turn-taking. I claimed that
to do this we should focus on the nature of the process of understanding.
However, since philosophers used to focus, up to this point, mostly on the
topic of states of understanding, one might have an impression that my dis-
cussion in this essay goes orthogonal to the philosophical debate. There are
two things to be said about this worry.
Firstly, even though I appreciate and share the interest of other philoso-
phers in the problem of the nature and function of states of understanding,
I suggest expanding our attention to other aspects of linguistic understand-
ing. Human linguistic activity is a very complex and multidimensional phe-
nomenon. One of its most striking features is the speed with which we are
able to exchange information during everyday conversations. We cannot ex-
plain this feature unless we take a closer look at the nature of linguistic
processing. Even if typically studied using empirical methods, this process
may be of interest to anyone investigating the phenomenon of language use.
Secondly, the existent theories are more or less in agreement regarding a
few most important criteria a state has to meet to qualify as a state of under-
standing. Firstly, it has to be a representational state; representing at least
the content (and, possibly, also the illocutionary force) of a given utterance.
Secondly, it has to be a personal-level state, i.e., a state consciously accessi-
ble to the hearer. Finally, it has to be a state that can interact with other
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personal-level representational states of the subject. These are all necessary
conditions for something being a state of understanding. But how can we
tell which among the competitive theories is the right one?
LU outlines how the different elements of linguistic understanding: the
process, the state, and the disposition to understand a given language, are
related to each other. States of understanding are generated by the process
of understanding; they are the end products towards which the accomplish-
ments understanding an utterance unfold over time. If this is the case, inves-
tigating the nature of the process might teach us a lesson about the nature
of states.
To illustrate it with an example. It is a central point of Longworth’s
(2018) theory (in contrast with, e.g., Fricker’s (2003) theory) that states
of understanding represent the content of the utterance directly (they are
attitudes towards the content of the form “p”), and not as uttered by a given
speaker (i.e., attitudes towards the content of the form “that S said that
p” where S represents a speaker). However, since both these alternatives
are compatible with the criteria enumerated above, we might be in a better
position to say which one is right if we take a closer look at the mechanisms
involved in language processing. For example, the data enumerated by Polka
and Nazzi (2018) suggest that:
. . . although the “who” and “what” sides of the signal are dis-
tinct, their processing is functionally integrated, as suggested by
research on adults. For example, adults are better at learning
to recognize talkers in their native language than in an L2, and
dyslexics show impairments in both native language talker recog-
nition and phonological processing. . . (Polka and Nazzi, 2018,
759)
If the processing of two types of information is in fact integrated, it is
not unlikely that it gives rise to a richer type of representation: “that S said
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that p”. Longworth suggests that we should not expect, e.g., small children
who seem perfectly able to understand simple utterances, to have conceptual
resources necessary to represent content involving concepts such as BEING
SAID. But here again the discussion is very much open given that the research
on speech processing suggests that:
Infants successfully extract information about who is talking early
in development (the “who” side of the message), well before they
begin to sort out the “what” side of the message, that is, the
referential content of words. (Polka and Nazzi, 2018, 758)
I am not claiming that this data alone shows that Longworth is mistaken19
or constitutes conclusive evidence for any particular stance in the debate.
What I want to illustrate is that if we want to choose between different types
of representation performing a given task equally well, it might be beneficial
to take a look at the way they are actually produced.
6 Concluding remarks
The goal of this chapter was to offer an account of the process of linguistic
understanding. Only by focusing on the process sense of understanding,
we are able to capture its dynamic and temporal profile. Just like other
processes, linguistic understanding unfolds over time.
Crucially, this does not imply that focusing on the state of understanding
or the achievement of understanding is inappropriate or misguided. Linguis-
tic understanding is a multidimensional phenomenon and “linguistic under-
standing”—a capacious notion. As outlined in LU, different aspects of this
19Longworth’s account of linguistic understanding is very elaborate (Longworth, 2008a,
2008b, 2010, 2018), and I could not hope to address all its subtleties here. In this sec-
tion, my only goal is to suggest that by paying special attention to the process by which
the states of understanding are generated, we might collect additional data worth taking
into consideration while investigating the nature of these states. More on these issues in
Chapter 2.
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phenomenon are closely intertwined. My goal was to illuminate the one as-
pect relatively absent from the philosophical debate to this date. I hope that
this will contribute to our gaining an even better grasp on this complex yet
fascinating topic in the future.
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Chapter 2
The representational structure of
linguistic understanding
Abstract. Building on the strengths of available philosophical ac-
counts, and drawing from empirical research on various aspects
of language comprehension, this chapter offers a new account
of the representational structure of linguistic understanding. In
contrast to existing theories, it postulates that the representa-
tional structure of linguistic understanding consists of multiple
interdependent representations generated by a dual-stream pro-
cess. Moreover, the proposed model establishes a middle ground
between two competing accounts of the relation between com-
prehension and acceptance: Cartesian, according to which we
are free to either accept or reject comprehended contents and;
Spinozan, according to which we automatically believe whatever
we comprehend.
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1 Introduction
Linguistic understanding is a central element of our social lives. The fact
that the hearer understands what the speaker says is one of the main fac-
tors contributing to their successful communication and action coordination.
Moreover, linguistic understanding enables the transmission of knowledge
through testimony. No doubt linguistic understanding is important, but
what is it exactly?
To answer this question, we have to go back to the disambiguation pre-
sented in Chapter 1. While talking about linguistic understanding we might
have in mind either a disposition to understand utterances of sentences in a
given language (i.e., knowledge of a given language), a representational state
that results from exercising this disposition upon encountering a linguistic
input (i.e., state of understanding) or, finally, a process that generates this
state. This chapter focuses on states of understanding.
There is no consensus in the philosophical literature regarding the best
way to characterize the state of understanding. Is it a type of knowledge
(Evans, 1982; Heck, 1995); belief (Millikan, 2004, 2005; Balcerak Jackson,
2019); or does it belong to yet another attitude-type (Hunter, 1998; Fricker,
2003; Longworth, 2018)? What exactly is the content of this attitude? In
this chapter, I will argue that we should abstain from identifying linguistic
understanding with a single mental attitude towards a particular representa-
tion. It is much more appropriate to talk about the representational structure
of linguistic understanding, which consists of multiple interdependent repre-
sentations. I will demonstrate that some controversies between the available
philosophical accounts originate from the exclusive and narrow focus on se-
lected aspects of linguistic understanding. Other controversies, however, turn
out to be more substantial. Luckily, we can solve them relying on knowledge
from empirical language sciences.
The model I will propose is a result of an inference to the best expla-
nation based on the analysis of available philosophical theories of states of
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understanding and data coming from the empirical research on language
processing, text comprehension, belief-fixation, and source monitoring. Cru-
cially, this model spells out some major constraints that we ought to take
into account while appealing to the nature and function of linguistic under-
standing in philosophical inquiries into the nature of communication and the
epistemology of testimony.
In Section 2, I provide a quick overview of the current philosophical de-
bate about states of linguistic understanding. In Section 3, I discuss a broad
spectrum of empirical research that sheds light on the nature of the rep-
resentational structure of linguistic understanding. In Section 4, I offer a
new model of this structure. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the
philosophical relevance of my model.
2 Philosophical accounts of states of understand-
ing
Let us start with a simple story. Rebeka and Hamid are walking along a
seashore. Rebeka reminds herself of an interesting fact that the average
lifespan of a starfish is 35 years. She wants to share this curiosity with
Hamid. In order to do this, she utters the sentence “The average lifespan of
a starfish is 35 years.” Hamid is a competent English speaker. Upon hearing
Rebeka’s utterance, he recognizes the sounds produced as an utterance of
the sentence “The average lifespan of a starfish is 35 years.” He grasps the
meaning of her utterance. As a result, he acquires knowledge that Rebeka
has said that the average lifespan of a starfish is 35 years. Plausibly, if he
did not know it before, he also acquires knowledge that the average lifespan
of a starfish is 35 years.
Hopefully, we will be able to identify an element (either explicit or im-
plicit) of this story as the target of our investigation, i.e., the state of linguis-
tic understanding. In order to presuppose as little as possible, I introduced
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the scenario using vague (e.g., recognizing sounds as linguistic utterances;
acquiring various forms of knowledge) or even metaphorical (e.g., grasping
meaning) terms. Since all of these terms call for elucidation, and since it
cannot be offered in a theory-neutral way, I will use this story to review
the most influential among the philosophical theories of the state of under-
standing. Borrowing a helpful distinction from Guy Longworth (2018), we
can divide them into two groups: indirect and direct.1 The distinction is
based on the way in which a state of understanding postulated by a given
theory represents the content of the linguistic input. According to indirect
views, the content (p) of an utterance is represented as being said/asserted
by a given speaker.2 When Rebeka says that p, Hamid’s understanding has a
content: r = that Rebeka said/asserted that p. According to direct views, on
the other hand, the content of a state of understanding is just the content of
the utterance, i.e., p.
There are three most prominent indirect views: the knowledge view, the
linguistic seeming view, and the indirect belief view. According to the knowl-
edge view, Hamid’s understanding of Rebeka’s utterance is identical with
his propositional knowledge that Rebeka said that the average lifespan of a
starfish is 35 years (Evans, 1982; Heck, 1995). The knowledge state rep-
resents the content of Rebeka’s utterance indirectly, i.e., as said by Rebeka.
Obviously, we could not demand from a comprehender to have a direct knowl-
edge of whatever was the content of an understood utterance; one can un-
derstand a false utterance, but one cannot know what is not true.
The second indirect view is the linguistic seeming view formulated by
Elisabeth Fricker (2003). Fricker characterizes linguistic understanding as a
type of seeming (she uses the term quasi-perception) of the content and force
of an utterance.
1Longworth uses different terminology; he speaks about first- and second-order states
of understanding.
2Given that indirect representations have direct representation embedded in it, I will
also refer to indirect representations as meta-representations (cf. Sperber, 2000).
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In fact she [the hearer] may not, as it were, bother to form a
belief about what was said at all. The most immediate personal-
level psychological effect of her auditing of the utterance is that
she enjoys a representation of a distinctive kind special to lan-
guage understanding: a conscious representation of the content
and force of the utterance. (Fricker, 2003, 325)
When Hamid hears Rebeka’s utterance during their walk, it seems to
him as if Rebeka asserted that the average lifespan of a starfish is 35 years.3
Again, as in the case of the knowledge view, the content of the seeming is
not the same as the content of the utterance. It does not seem to Hamid
that the average lifespan of the starfish is so and so, only, that Rebeka said
that it is so and so.4
The third of the indirect views is the indirect belief view (cf. Balcerak
Jackson, 2019). According to this view, Hamid’s understanding of Rebeka’s
utterance is identical with his belief that Rebeka said that the average lifespan
of a starfish is 35 years. Again, just like in other indirect views, the state of
understanding meta-represents the content of the target utterance as coming
from a given source.
On the other side of the barricade, we find two prominent views accord-
ing to which states of understanding are direct (i.e., represent exclusively the
content of the target utterance): the content-entertaining view and the direct
belief view. According to Guy Longworth’s (2018) content-entertaining view,5
3On Fricker’s account, seemings are prima facie justificatory for beliefs about the force
and content of the speaker’s utterance. For a discussion see Balcerak Jackson (2019) and
Chapter 3 of this thesis.
4A related view has been offered by David Hunter (1998). Hunter identifies linguistic
understanding with an experiential state “of immediate awareness. . . of the text’s or
speaker’s meaning” (p. 577).
5What I describe here is Longworth’s theory of linguistic understanding as presented in
his (2018). His full theory of language comprehension is fairly nuanced (and in many re-
spects similar to my positive proposal). Crucially, he distinguishes comprehension from un-
derstanding and treats comprehension as a super-faculty constituted by two sub-faculties:
understanding, and speech perception (Longworth, 2008a, 363). More on this below.
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to understand an utterance is to entertain the very proposition expressed by
this utterance (p), and not some other proposition about p, e.g., r = that
Rebeka said that p. On this account, Hamid’s understanding of Rebeka’s
utterance equals his engaging with or, entertaining that the average lifespan
of a starfish is 35 years (as a result of perceiving Rebeka’s utterance). Im-
portantly, according to Longworth, entertaining does not entail acceptance.
One can entertain given content without believing it.
This last assumption is rejected by the second direct view, i.e., the direct
belief view (Millikan, 2004, 2005; cf. Mandelbaum, 2014; Mandelbaum and
Quilty-Dunn, 2015; Recanati, 2002). According to this view:
We do not first understand what is said and then evaluate whether
to believe it. Rather, we first believe what is said and then, if
we are not under too much cognitive stress, we may think it over
critically and reject it. (Millikan, 2004, 121)
Normally, hearing that p is believing that p—possibly not in the
purely statistical sense of “normally” (although I would argue that
that is so too), but believing that p is the default. It is what
happens when nothing intrudes. (Millikan, 2004, 129)
According to this account, for Hamid to understand Rebeka’s utterance
is to form a belief that the average lifespan of a starfish is 35 years.
To sum up, we can distinguish five views about the nature of states of
understanding. Three indirect: the knowledge view, the seeming view, and
the indirect belief view; and two direct: the content-entertaining view, and
the direct belief view. Despite obvious differences, all these views have a lot
in common. In the remainder of this section I would like to indicate the five
most important features of the state of understanding accepted by all these
accounts.
Firstly, the theories enumerated above agree that understanding is a rep-
resentational state.
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Representation: the state of understanding represents the con-
tent (and, plausibly, the illocutionary force) of an utterance.
A state of understanding represents the content or what is said in an
utterance either directly or indirectly. Whether it also represents the illocu-
tionary force of this utterance is more debatable. The force is represented in
states of understanding according to indirect views. In general, a hearer who
understands an utterance has knowledge/belief/seeming that the Speaker
asserted/asked/ordered/etc. that p. As it stands, this view is controversial
because it presupposes that comprehenders have conceptual resources neces-
sary to represent the force of speakers’ utterances. A more compelling story
might be available; however, it merits a separate discussion. In this chapter,
I will focus on the (complicated enough) topic of understanding the content
of assertoric speech.
Secondly, competing theories converge on the claim that states of under-
standing are consciously accessible to the receiver.
Accessibility: the state of understanding is, in principle, acces-
sible to comprehender’s consciousness (i.e., it is a personal-level
state).6
I will follow Rowlands (2010) in distinguishing two main types of cog-
nitive processes. Personal-level cognitive processes are ones which make
information (unavailable prior to this processing) available to the subject.
Sub-personal cognitive processes are ones that make information (unavail-
able prior to this processing) available to subsequent processing operations
but not to the subject. The process of language comprehension is a paradigm
examples of personal-level process, i.e., a process that makes previously un-
available information about the content of a linguistic input available to the
comprehender.
6This and the next feature of the state of understanding are pointed out by Longworth
(2008b, 51).
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Thirdly, understanding can (and often does) interact with other personal-
level states:
Interaction: the state of understanding can interact with other
personal-level states, such as beliefs, knowledge, and desires.
The most important role of states of understanding is to link our linguistic
activity with other things we think and do. If you tell me “There is carrot
cake in the kitchen” and I jump up off my chair and run out of the room,
I plausibly do it because I understood that you have told me that there is
carrot cake in the kitchen. My understanding of your utterance interacts
with (i) my desire to have some carrot cake; (ii) my belief that the kitchen
is a place I can reach in just a few seconds, etc.
Additionally, all available accounts agree that an important role of lin-
guistic understanding is that it enables us to acquire two types of knowledge:
Knowledge-enabling: the state of understanding enables com-
prehenders to acquire (i) knowledge about what other people say
and, (ii) testimonial knowledge about the world.7
Importantly, at least in the direct views, it is assumed that (i) is not
a prerequisite for (ii). However, available theories rarely elaborate on the
exact relationship between these two types of knowledge. It is one of the
advantages of the model I propose in Section 4, that it allows us to tackle
this difficult problem.
The last feature of states of understanding is sparsely discussed in the de-
bate but relatively uncontroversial. It connects three senses of understanding
mentioned in the Introduction.
7According to the knowledge view linguistic understanding not only enables but is
identical with (i).
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Origin: the state of understanding originates from the process of
understanding based on the disposition to understand utterances
of sentences of a given language (i.e., linguistic competence).8
A state of, e.g., entertaining the content expressed through a given ut-
terance does not qualify as a state of understanding this utterance, unless it
was generated by an appropriate type of processing of this utterance. I can
entertain the content of an utterance u without even being aware that u was
ever uttered and thus without a linguistic understanding of u. This is the
case, for example, if I have understood another utterance w (possibly in a
different language), which expresses the same content as u.9
These five general features of states of linguistic understanding demarcate
the subject area of our investigations. By keeping them in mind we will
avoid the risk of changing the topic of our discussion while engaging with the
empirical literature on language comprehension in the rest of the chapter.
To sum up. The intuitions driving the accounts enumerated in this section
seem to pull us in different directions. Do we automatically believe everything
we comprehend? Do we typically follow just what is said or, also, who said
that? My goal in the rest of this chapter is to offer an account that allows
us to answer these questions and reconcile the intuitions voiced by different
contributors to the debate. In the next section, I take a closer look at the
empirical research on language comprehension to find out what it teaches us
about the types of representations employed during linguistic understanding.
8Cf. my discussion in Chapter 1.
9More on this topic in Chapter 5.
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3 Psychology of language comprehension
3.1 From propositional representations to situation mod-
els
Looking for psychological counterparts of mental attitudes postulated by
philosophical theories of understanding, one undoubtedly comes across the
classical Construction-Integration model of language comprehension (Kintsch
and van Dijk, 1978; van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; Kintsch, 1988).10 The model
distinguishes three levels of representations, two of which are particularly rel-
evant to our discussion: propositional textbase representation, and situation
model.11 The construction of a propositional representation is postulated as
an initial step of text processing.
The textbase level is represented in terms of propositions. One
important assumption of the model is that the fundamental unit
of processing is the proposition, which consists of a predicate and
argument(s). The proposition generally represents one complete
idea. (McNamara and Magliano, 2009, 309)
At the first stage of processing, comprehension generates propositional
representations of bits of discourse.12 These representations are encoded in
10In this section, I will be focusing on models of text comprehension. It is commonly be-
lieved that assumptions about processing of written text extend to comprehending speech.
Although, due to relative difficulty of empirical testing of speech comprehension in com-
parison with text comprehension, the body of empirical research on spoken discourse
comprehension is still small (but see, e.g., Piest et al., 2018).
11The third level of representation is the surface structure representation, i.e., the result
of “decoding of phonetic and graphic strings, the identification of phonemes/letters, and
the construction of morphemes” (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983, 13).
12It is worth noticing that the characterization of propositions used by van Dijk and
Kintsch is closely related to a fairly standard philosophical characterization: “a proposition
is an abstract, theoretical construct, which is used to identify the meaning, or what is
expressed by a sentence under specific contextual restrictions (speaker, time, place), and
which is related to truth values” (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983, 111).
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the episodic memory and become, at least to some extent, available to the
hearer or reader (cf. Accessibility). The formation of propositional repre-
sentations of linguistic input is an important element of discourse processing,
however, the authors of the model make the following reservation:
One must, however, guard against the view that they [propo-
sitional representations] are allpurpose representations, and, in
particular, provide “the” representation of meaning. (van Dijk
and Kintsch, 1983, 38)
They highlight that:
A major feature of our model is the assumption that discourse
understanding involves not only the [propositional] representation
of a textbase in episodic memory, but, at the same time, the
activation, updating, and other uses of a so-called situation model
in episodic memory: this is the cognitive representation of the
events, actions, persons, and in general the situation, a text is
about. (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983, 11; emphasis mine)
Even though most of the contemporary theories agree that propositional
representations play some role in text comprehension, it is the notion of
situation model that made a career in the literature on language processing
in the last thirty five years (Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983;
cf. McNamara and Magliano, 2009). So, what are situation models?
Situation model is a complex representation of a state of affairs described
by a given piece of discourse and constantly updated upon reading subse-
quent clauses and sentences (cf. Zwaan et al., 1995; Zwaan and Radvansky,
1998; Wyer and Radvansky, 1999; Zwaan, 2016; Richter et al., 2009; Richter
and Singer, 2018). Construction of a situation model requires integration
and elaboration of information presented across sentences and, thus, engages
readers’ background knowledge. Importantly, the formation of a situation
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model is often taken to be a measure of the depth of comprehension (Long
and Freed, 2018). Researchers focus on five dimensions integrating the infor-
mation represented in situation models: space, time, causality (i.e., causal
relations between events), intentionality (i.e., intentions guiding agents’ ac-
tions), and entities (either agents or objects) (cf. Zwaan and Radvansky,
1998; Wyer and Radvansky, 1999).
As complex representations, situation models are itself constituted of sim-
pler representations. It is a common assumption in the empirical literature
that comprehension delivers representations of multiple formats, all of which
contribute to a situation model.
. . . comprehension involve multiple modalities and modes of repre-
sentation, including verbal, symbolic, and iconic modalities. The
creation of images while understanding discourse is assumed to be
fundamental process of comprehension. . . Certainly, all compre-
hension models assume that the reader is creating iconic images
while reading. . . The alternative notion is simply ridiculous. (Mc-
Namara and Magliano, 2009, 348)
Although the topic of the plurality of representational formats involved in
language comprehension is intriguing,13 I have to leave it for another occasion.
Here, when talking about situation models, I will be referring exclusively to
its doxastic component, i.e., beliefs constituting situation models.
Given that language comprehension produces both the propositional rep-
resentations of pieces of linguistic input and situation models integrating
information expressed in these pieces, we have to ask: “How are the two
related?” According to the psychology of text comprehension, propositional
representations of currently read sentences or clauses are updated or incor-
porated into the situation model. The process is cyclical and occurs when-
13See, for example, Glenberg and Kaschak (2003) and Shepherd (2018) for the discus-
sion of a possibility that language comprehension produces, among others, motor format
representations appropriate to guide physical actions.
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ever a representation of a short sentence or phrase is generated (Kintsch,
1988). During processing of a compound sentence (even outside the context
of a longer text or discourse), a reader’s cognitive system generates multiple
propositional representations (one for each clause or phrase), and instantly
integrates each one of them into the situation model of the state of affairs
described in the sentence. It is, thus, difficult to point out the single state
of understanding of utterances of even such apparently uncomplicated sen-
tences as “I really need to go to work, but I am too sick to drive.” According
to empirical models of comprehension, while comprehending an utterance of
this sentence, a reader’s cognitive system generates two propositional rep-
resentations (one for each clause) which are subsequently integrated into a
situation model representing the described state of affairs. Moreover, if the
next sentence says: “I have to call a taxi or ask Mark to give me a lift,”
propositional representations generated as a result of processing this input
get integrated with the same situation model.14 Crucially, when asked about
the content of a comprehended bit of discourse, readers retrieve informa-
tion primarily from the situation model. It is assumed that memory traces
of propositional textbase representations are consulted only when answering
questions regarding which information was explicitly stated in the text, and
are quite limited (Sparks and Rapp, 2011; Long and Freed, 2018). Finally,
it is a crucial assumption of the leading psychological models of comprehen-
sion, that the information from propositional representations is updated to
the situation model automatically. Does it mean that we automatically be-
lieve whatever we comprehend? In the next section, I take a closer look at
this exact question.
14Obviously, it is possible to be building two (or more) distinct situation models at
once. This happens, for example, if one reads a book about the World War II while
simultaneously listening (or half-listening) to her friend describing his day at work.
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3.2 Comprehension, acceptance, and validation
Motivating her theory of understanding as a direct belief, Millikan (2004,
121, 2005, 117) appeals to research of a psychologist Daniel Gilbert.15 In
the early ‘90s Gilbert and his colleagues published several studies designed
to test two competitive models of acquisition of beliefs through linguistic
comprehension (Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1993).
According to the so-called Cartesian model, people do not believe everything
they comprehend. Understanding is separated from acceptance; when we
comprehend an utterance, we first entertain a proposition it expresses and
then, in a subsequent step, either accept or reject it. This view is in line
with Longworth’s (2018) content-entertaining view. Discussing an example
of understanding “Smoking is dangerous,” Longworth says:
Although understanding such an assertion involves engaging the
content that smoking is dangerous at first order [directly], it does
not—or need not—involve accepting that content. (Longworth,
2018, 824)
According to the second model discussed by Gilbert, the so-called Spinozan
model, understanding is believing. Acceptance is a default position towards
comprehended content, while rejection is an effortful activity, which requires
time and cognitive resources, and happens only after a belief has been already
acquired (cf. Mandelbaum, 2014; Recanati, 2002). Loosely speaking, we can-
not prevent the content we comprehend from getting into our belief-box. All
we can do is try and get rid of it once it is already there.16
15Cf. Kissine and Klein (2013), Mandelbaum (2014), Mandelbaum and Quilty-Dunn
(2015).
16Gilbert (1991) mentions also a hybrid Cartozan model according to which we are
biased towards acceptance (acceptance and rejection are not on par), but mere compre-
hension and acceptance are separate states. However, Gilbert (1991) argues that there is
no clear empirical evidence for the existence of mere comprehension as separate from ac-
ceptance. Probably this is why Cartozan model is virtually absent in subsequent literature
on this topic.
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Gilbert argued that the Spinozan model is correct. One of the first studies
designed to establish it was “The Hopi Language” experiment (Gilbert et al.,
1990, Study 1). Participants of this experiment read a series of statements
of the form An X is a Y, with an English noun in place of Y and what
they were supposed to believe is a Hopi word (in fact a nonsense string of
letters) in place of X (e.g., A tarka is a wolf.). Some of the statements
were followed by a display of the word true (indicating that the previous
sentence was true), others with false, yet others with no display of either
true or false. Most importantly, during the presentation of some statements,
participants heard a tone. Earlier, they had been instructed to press a button
as quickly as possible each time they heard it. This “interruption task” was
intended to increase the cognitive load and make the subjects’ processing of
the information on the screen more challenging.
The initial learning phase was followed by a testing phase where par-
ticipants were asked about the meanings of words, which they had learnt
through the statements presented in the learning phase (Is X a Y? ). Ac-
cording to Gilbert and his colleagues, if it would turn out to be the case that
the additional cognitive load makes it difficult to tag statements as false but
does not influence tagging statements as true, the Spinozan model would be
vindicated; accepting comprehended propositions is automatic but rejecting
them is costly and requires effort. The results revealed the expected pattern
and supported the Spinozan model.
It is, however, unclear whether this particular experiment actually tested
comprehension-based belief-fixation or just memory of the learned informa-
tion (cf. Kissine and Klein, 2013). To make sure that the Spinozan model
is correct, Gilbert and his colleagues conducted another set of experiments
(Gilbert et al., 1993). In one of them, participants read crime reports con-
sisting of multiple statements, some of which were false (as indicated by
use of the red font) while others were true (displayed in black font). As
in the Hopi Language experiment, researchers used an additional interrup-
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tion task, to selectively increase cognitive load. Crucially, after the learning
phase, participants were asked not only memory retrieval questions (about
whether a given statement appeared as true, as false, or did not appear at
all). They were also asked, for example, to recommend a prison term for
the perpetrators based on the reports just read. The results showed that:
“Interrupted subjects recommended that perpetrators serve nearly twice as
much time when the false statements contained in the police reports exacer-
bated (rather than extenuated) the severity of the crimes.” (Gilbert et al.,
1993, 225). Again, it seems that—as predicted by the Spinozan model—
participants initially accepted all information as true. Those of them, who
were simultaneously distracted by an interruption task, did not manage to
remove the propositions explicitly indicated as false from their belief box. As
a result, they kept assuming this information to be true while recommending
a prison term.
As far as the results of Gilbert’s experiments go, Millikan’s direct be-
lief view of understanding looks convincing. However, the last 25 years of
research on the relation between comprehension and acceptance push us to-
wards a more nuanced picture. Hasson et al. (2005) conducted two exper-
iments designed to test the Spinozan model. In the first experiment, they
demonstrated that highly informative false sentences were not represented
as true even if participants operated under cognitive load. Gilbert and his
colleagues’ (1990) results were replicated only in relation to uninformative
false sentences. In the second experiment, Hasson et al. demonstrated that
in a lexical decision task participants were considerably faster to associate an
adjective (e.g., optimist) with someone who has been previously character-
ized with a matching statement (e.g., this person thinks that things turn out
for the best) if the statement was said to be true of a person in comparison
to it being said to be false or neither true nor false. This suggests that, in
contrast with Gilbert’s assumption, sentences marked as false and sentences
whose veracity is unknown might not be automatically encoded as true: some
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degree of belief suspension is possible (see also Street and Richardson, 2015).
Finally, Pantazi et al. (2018) suggested that the tendency to believe compre-
hended information (both true and false) might be independent of cognitive
load. This result also undermines the Spinozan model whose central assump-
tion was that subjects are unable to filter out false information only if their
cognitive resources are limited, i.e., under cognitive load.
All these results suggest that a third way between Spinozan and Carte-
sian view of language comprehension is needed. To find it, we should focus
on the research on the mechanism of so-called validation (cf. Wyer and Rad-
vansky, 1999; Singer, 2006, 2013, 2019; Schroeder et al., 2008; Richter et
al., 2009; Isberner and Richter, 2014; Richter, 2015; Kendeou, 2014; O’Brien
and Cook, 2016). Validation is a process of monitoring incoming information
both for internal consistency and consistency with comprehender’s knowledge
(Richter et al., 2009).17 If a comprehender has relevant background infor-
mation, either active in working memory or easily accessible in long-term
memory, this information will be used to validate the content of a linguistic
input independently of cognitive load.18 Minimally, validation is assumed
to detect “violations of factual world knowledge (e.g., Soft soap is edible),
implausibility (e.g., Frank has a broken leg. He calls the plumber), incon-
sistencies with antecedent text (e.g., Mary is a vegetarian. . . She orders a
cheeseburger), and semantic anomalies (e.g., Dutch trains are sour).” (Is-
berner and Richter, 2014, 246).19
17This mechanism is similar to what Sperber et al. (2010) call vigilance towards the
content.
18This is compatible with results of Gilbert’s Hopi Language experiment where partici-
pants lacked background information against which the linguistic input could be validated.
19I focus on comprehending discourses that are not established or recognized as fictional.
In the case of comprehending fiction, validation is recalibrated : “. . . specific discourse con-
texts, most notably stories that create a fictional story world, seem to modulate validation
to some degree.” (Richter and Singer, 2018, 184). Situation models constructed while
comprehending fiction contain beliefs about the world of the fiction. Therefore, if it is suf-
ficiently obvious that we speak about a fictional world, e.g., the Incredible Hulk has thrown
a lorry, can successfully pass validation and get integrated with the situation model.
43
Validation is routine and non-strategic, i.e., independent of subject-specific
processing goals.20 For example, Richter et al. (2009) demonstrated that
participants asked to monitor the orthographical correctness of a statement,
produced affirmative orthographical judgment (that the target word in the
statement was spelled correctly) slower and with lower accuracy when the
target statement was false.21
Crucially, validation serves as a precondition on updating a situation
model with the information captured in propositional textbase representa-
tions (Wyer and Radvansky, 1999). According to Schroeder et al. (2008),
the construction of a situation model is guided by two main directives: accu-
racy (to represent the state of affairs described in the discourse as accurately
as possible) and stability (to represent the state of affairs described in the
discourse in a stable and consistent way).
How do comprehenders manage to achieve both accurate and sta-
ble representations? We suggest that they carry out epistemic val-
idation processes that monitor whether incoming information is
consistent with other ideas provided in the text, with the current
state of the situation model, and with general world knowledge.
We assume that these validation processes are routinely carried
out when situation models are updated and that they are a major
determinant of whether a particular piece of information is inte-
grated into the situation model, with the potential consequence
of altering a comprehender’s world view. (Schroeder et al., 2008,
238)
The fact that the formation of situation models is guided not only by accu-
racy but also stability has some troublesome consequences from the epistemic
20Comprehenders can engage in validation strategically (cf. Singer, 2019) but not all
kinds of validation are strategic and intentional. Here, I focus on the routine validation
(sometimes called epistemic monitoring (cf. Schroeder et al., 2008)).
21See Isberner and Richter (2013, Experiment 2) for similar effect obtained using non-
linguistic, color judgment task.
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point of view. According to Schroeder et al. (2008), once information passes
the gatekeeper of validation and gets integrated with the situation model,
it becomes a background for further validation of new information. By the
same token, it becomes very difficult to remove, even if it turns out to be
false. Validation is by no means a perfect counter-deceptive tool. It has
considerable limitations: it employs only available and activated background
information (which may in itself be false); it often fails to filter out suffi-
ciently plausible false information; it is based only on quick and incomplete
analysis; etc. (Isberner and Richter, 2014; Richter, 2015; Marsh et al., 2016).
The following picture emerges. Linguistic comprehension generates (at
least) two types of representation: propositional representations and situ-
ation models. When we understand an utterance of a compound sentence
(not to mention a bigger piece of discourse), propositional representations
of particular phrases and clauses get cyclically integrated with the situation
model. The update is conditional on their passing by the gatekeeper of valida-
tion.22 Validation is routine and non-strategic, i.e., it does not depend on the
subject’s conscious decisions, their goals, or evaluative mindset. Therefore,
neither the content-entertaining view, which follows the Cartesian model nor
the direct belief view, inspired by the Spinozan model, got it quite right. We
do not automatically believe everything we are told, but we automatically
believe everything that is not filtered out by validation.23
22It is still to some extent an open question what happens to information that does not
pass the gatekeeper of validation. One hypothesis is that if the falsehood is informative
and the subject knows that it is false, they represent it in terms of what its falsity implies.
If I learn that Lin does not have a sister is false, I might update my situation model
with the information Lin has a sister. However, if I learn that Lin is a pilot is false, I
probably update my situation model with the information Lin is a pilot with a falsity
tag. Apparently, this second way of updating makes me much more prone to the error of
misremembering the information as true (which helps explain the results of Gilbert’s Hopi
language experiment) (Hasson et al., 2005).
23For a similar assessment of the relation between Spinozan and Cartesian models see
(Kissine and Klein, 2013).
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3.3 Vigilance towards the source
Thus far I did not say anything about representing the content of a linguistic
input as said by a particular speaker or as coming from a particular source.
Does it mean that indirect views of linguistic understanding are totally off
the mark? I do not think so. Representing a given content as coming from a
particular source is one of the crucial skills of comprehenders.
The literature on the phenomenon of so-called source monitoring or vig-
ilance towards the source is vast, and I will not attempt to review it in
this chapter.24 Different aspects of this phenomenon were to this day in-
vestigated in hundreds of empirical studies and incorporated in dozens of
theoretical models (for reviews see, e.g., Johnson et al., 1993; Sperber et
al., 2010; Mercier, 2017). The core assumption of this research program
is that language speakers routinely track the identity of their informational
sources, which, in consequence, allows them to monitor the competence and
benevolence of these sources. Some of the hottest questions in the debate
concern: the exact mechanisms employed by vigilance towards the source,
the effectiveness of our monitoring mechanisms, and the development of vig-
ilance during human ontogenesis (i.e., at what age children become vigilant
language users).
Research on source monitoring offers a straightforward lesson about lan-
guage comprehension: we routinely track which information comes from
whom. It is a separate (and somehow scholastic) question whether source
monitoring accompanies linguistic understanding or belongs to it as a part
and component. This question turns out to be a bone of contention between
the direct and indirect views on the nature of states of understanding. If, as
is the case according to indirect views, the state of understanding represents
that a given speaker said that p, then monitoring turns out to be a compo-
nent of understanding. If, however, as is the case according to direct views,
the state of understanding represents simply the content of an utterance (p),
24More on this topic in Chapter 4.
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source monitoring accompanies linguistic understanding.25
Independently which way we will ultimately go, given what we know
about source monitoring in language comprehension, we can assume that
an indirect or meta-representation of an utterance as coming from a given
source is yet another element of the representational structure generated and
employed during linguistic understanding.26 We can think about this repre-
sentation as having two slots: SOURCE(CONTENT). The slot for SOURCE
is filled with a more or less fine-grained representation of the source available
to the comprehender, e.g., someone in the crowd ; my mum; the author of
this article; the girl with a weird accent, etc. The slot for CONTENT is filled
with a representation of the utterance content similar to the propositional
representation.27
25The latter option is endorsed by Longworth (2018). He argues that one does not accept
the content one entertains if “. . . one has, or if one takes oneself to have, sufficiently weighty
reasons for doubting the competence or sincerity of the assertor.” (Longworth, 2018, 824).
However, on his account, source monitoring accompanies, instead of being a part of, under-
standing. This is a consequence of Longworth’s (2008a) distinction into understanding and
comprehension. According to this distinction, comprehension is a super-faculty consisting
of an intellectual faculty of linguistic understanding, and perception. The information
about the source is not represented in the state of understanding but it is delivered by
perception: “The outputs of the super-faculty are cognitions to the effect that that partic-
ular utterance gave expression to a particular entertained content. . . ” (Longworth, 2008a,
363).
I think that Longworth’s theory of comprehension is on the right track, but he underesti-
mates to what degree his understanding (i.e., the intellectual component of comprehension)
is integrated with perception (see discussion in Drożdżowicz, 2019). As indicated by Fa-
landays et al. (2018): “. . . speech perception is readily influenced by lexical and semantic
context. . . [t]he current state of the literature now definitively points to a highly parallel,
interactive architecture of speech perception.” (p. 2). For example, it was demonstrated
that ambiguous acoustic stimuli are perceived differently depending on the meaning of
their antecedents, e.g., after comprehenders hear “the man put on his. . . ” the ambiguous
acoustic token is much more often perceived as “coat” than “goat” (Borsky et al., 1998).
Therefore, I do not subscribe to Longworth’s distinction into comprehension and under-
standing and I will keep using these two terms interchangeably. If someone wants to pre-
serve the distinction, they should think about my theory of understanding/comprehension
as corresponding with Longworth’s theory of comprehension.
26See Sperber (1997, 2000) for a discussion of the role of meta-representations in lan-
guage comprehension.
27As mentioned in Section 2, many indirect views suggest that these representations
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4 The representational structure of linguistic
understanding
It is time to take stock. In Section 2, I enumerated five theories of states of
understanding. According to three of them, states of understanding repre-
sent the content of the utterance indirectly (i.e., meta-represent the content)
as coming from a given source. According to the remaining two, while un-
derstanding an utterance, we engage with its content directly. The empirical
data reviewed in Section 3 does not favor either of these approaches. Ap-
parently, to explain what happens when we understand language, we have
to postulate at least three types of representations: (i) direct propositional
representations; (ii) indirect meta-representations of the content as coming
from a given source; and (iii) situation models, i.e., complex representations
consisting of beliefs about (and other, non-discursive representations of) the
states of affairs described in a given piece of discourse. But how are all these
representations related to each other? Is it possible to fit them all into a
single, coherent picture? I believe it is.
I would like to offer the following new model of the representational struc-
ture of linguistic understanding (fig 1.).28 According to this model, the pro-
cess of understanding runs in two streams. The first, direct stream is faster.
It involves the production of the propositional textbase representation which,
if it passes the filter of validation, gets automatically integrated into the sit-
uation model and shapes our beliefs about the world.29 This stream is re-
sponsible for the aspect of linguistic understanding highlighted by the direct
have a further slot for the illocutionary force: SOURCE(FORCE(CONTENT)). I find
this view worth exploring but cannot do it in the present discussion.
28As mentioned in the introduction, this model is a result of an inference to the best
explanation based on empirical research discussed in Section 3, and intuitions voiced by
various philosophical accounts (Section 2).
29As I mentioned above, it shapes our beliefs about the world when the comprehended
linguistic input is not recognized as fictional. In the case of comprehending fiction, it
shapes our beliefs about the world of the fiction.
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views: upon understanding a linguistic input, we immediately and directly
engage with its content. When you tell me that a given car is brand new, it
makes me initially think about the car (that it is brand new) and not about
you (that you have said that the car is brand new).
The second, indirect stream is slower. It generates a meta-representation
of the content of an utterance as uttered by a given speaker or as coming
from a given source. This representation is filtered by vigilance towards the
source, which serves as an additional gatekeeper of the situation model.30 If
30While in the case of validation it is clear that at least some validation is routine and
non-strategic, and, thus, can be conceived as a subprocess of the process of comprehen-
sion, it is more questionable when it comes to vigilance towards the source. Plausibly, we
could localize different vigilance mechanisms on a scale from more routine and automatic
(e.g., vigilance based on a foreign accent; vigilance base on an inappropriate use of words)
to more strategic (e.g., vigilance towards the source who has proved to be unreliable in
the past; vigilance towards the source about whose potential deceitfulness we have been
warned) (cf. the distinction into type 1 and type 2 vigilance in Michaelian (2013)). Some
people might be inclined to characterize the automatic vigilance as a part of comprehension
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the filter detects that the information comes from an unreliable source, the
subject can attempt an update of the situation model and belief revision.31
If, for example, I know that you are very desperate to sell me the car, I may
end up revising my belief that it is brand new.32
Importantly, the hypothesis about asynchrony of the two streams is, at
least initially, vindicated by empirical research. Relying on the results of
Sparks and Rapp (2011) and Nadarevic and Erdfelder (2013), Weil et al.
(2019) suggest that “. . . readers consider the credibility of a source only af-
ter they have comprehended information and evaluated its consistency with
the active memory contents. Accordingly, source credibility might not influ-
ence the initial encoding of the information, but rather, encoding might be
modified after validation is completed” (p. 231).
It is worth highlighting that the current model is a dual-stream model
and not a default-interventionist dual-process model (cf. Gawronski et al.,
2014). Comprehension routinely runs through both the direct and indirect
stream. The only exception might be very early childhood; it is possible that
in human ontogeny the direct stream develops first,33 and that there is a
period in which children are already able to understand language but not yet
able to monitor the source of comprehension-based information. Still, the
claim is by no means obvious as we have evidence of source monitoring and
source identification already in infants (Polka and Nazzi, 2018), and we know
that children as young as 3-years-old display some selective trust based on
process and the strategic vigilance as a mechanism accompanying comprehension. Oth-
ers might be inclined to treat all vigilance mechanisms as accompanying comprehension.
Nothing important for my discussion hinges on resolving this matter in one or the other
way.
31Often, after the indirect SOURCE(CONTENT) representation passes through the
filter of vigilance towards the source, the source of information gets forgotten (Begg et al.,
1992; cf. Michaelian, 2010).
32More on this topic in Chapter 4.
33Although I do not want to engage in evolutionary speculations, I think that it is also
quite likely that the direct stream appeared first in human phylogeny as evolving from
older, perceptual mechanisms (cf. Kissine and Klein, 2013).
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source identity (cf. Hermes et al., 2018). The question remains opened until
more empirical evidence is collected.
5 Conclusion: consequences for the philosoph-
ical debate
The model I offered, while compatible with the results of empirical research,
reveals that both direct and indirect views point out important aspects of
the phenomenon of linguistic understanding. Direct views are right that
upon hearing or reading an utterance we directly engage with its content. I
argued that we do it through situation models built primarily on the basis of
propositional representations. Simultaneously, indirect views are right that
we monitor the source of a given linguistic input. If the representation of
content as coming from a given source does not pass the filter of vigilance
towards the source, we make an attempt to update the situation model by
removing the information coming from an unreliable source. One thing does
not exclude the other—comprehension flows in two streams.
Secondly, the model I offer helps to spell out the complicated relation be-
tween comprehension and acceptance. Neither the content-entertaining nor
the direct belief view captures this relation well. As demonstrated in the re-
search on validation, even though we do not automatically accept everything
we hear or read (e.g., validation filters out inputs that are in contradiction
with relevant background information active in our working memory or eas-
ily accessible in long term memory), we cannot freely choose what to believe
and what to reject.
Thirdly, this model has important consequences for the debate about the
epistemic role of linguistic understanding. As I said in the beginning (Section
2), one thing that makes linguistic understanding philosophically interesting
is that it enables the acquisition of two types of knowledge: knowledge about
what other people say; and knowledge about the world based on what other
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people say (testimonial knowledge). In most theories it remains unclear how
exactly these two types of knowledge relate with each other. The model I
offer allows us to spell out this relationship.
The knowledge about what other people say originates from the indi-
rect stream of comprehension, which involves the representation of content
as coming from a given source. How it happens can be explained in dif-
ferent ways, and I discuss it in detail in Chapter 3. In a nutshell, we
can either assume that our attitude towards the indirect representation of
SOURCE(CONTENT) is a belief (cf. Balcerak Jackson, 2019) or some other
attitude, e.g., a seeming (Fricker, 2003). If it is a belief, we have to explain
how it is justified and whether it amounts to knowledge about what other
people say. If it is a seeming, we could argue—as Fricker (2003) does—that
it provides prima facie justification for beliefs, which (plausibly under further
conditions) amount to knowledge about what other people say.
When it comes to the knowledge about the world based on other people’s
say-so (testimonial knowledge), the whole dual-stream process of compre-
hension (with all the representations involved) contributes to its acquisition.
The more we know about how comprehension works, the more adequate our
assumptions about its role in the generation of testimonial knowledge. Let
me illustrate it with just one (however, quite prominent) example. According
to a local reductionist view of testimony (Fricker 1994, 1995), for a receiver’s
testimonial beliefs to be justified, the receiver has to establish whether the
source of the information is trustworthy regarding this particular information
on this particular occasion. Crucially, Fricker admits that, for her view of
testimony to be accurate, it has to be the case that “it is not intrinsic to
the state of understanding an utterance that it compels the hearer towards
belief in what she grasps as being asserted” (1994, 157). Kourken Michaelian
(2010) suggests, that Gilbert’s studies put some pressure on this assump-
tion, and thus on the whole of Fricker’s account. As I argued extensively
in Section 3.2, although Gilbert’s view is a little too strong, we actually are
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compelled to believe what we understand if only the information passes the
gatekeeper of validation. Moreover, the piece of information which passes
validation becomes a part of the informational background and increases the
probability that further inputs coherent with it will pass validation as well.
Therefore, the model offered in this chapter turns out to be highly relevant
to the epistemology of testimony. I come back to this topic in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
The justification of
comprehension-based beliefs
Abstract. What justifies our beliefs about what other people say
(hanceforth, comprehension-based beliefs)? According to epis-
temic inferentialism, the justification of comprehension-based be-
liefs depends on the justification of other beliefs, e.g., beliefs
about what words the speaker uttered or even what sounds they
produced. According to epistemic non-inferentialism, the justi-
fication of comprehension-based beliefs does not depend on the
justification of other beliefs. This chapter offers a new defense of
epistemic non-inferentialism. First, I discuss three counterexam-
ples to epistemic non-inferentialism provided recently by Brendan
Balcerak Jackson (2019) (“Against the perceptual model of utter-
ance comprehension”, Philosophical Studies 176:387–405). I argue
that only one of Balcerak Jackson’s counterexamples is effective,
and that it is effective against only one version of epistemic non-
inferentialism, viz. language comprehension dogmatism. Second,
I propose an alternative version of epistemic non-inferentialism,
viz. comprehension-process reliabilism, which is immune to these
54
counterexamples. I conclude that we should follow Balcerak Jack-
son in his rejection of language comprehension dogmatism but
not all the way to the endorsement of epistemic inferentialism.
Comprehension-process reliabilism is superior to both these al-
ternatives.
1 Introduction
My friend Ruth and I have a chat over coffee. Thanks to my ability to
understand what Ruth says, during our conversation I acquire two types of
beliefs. First, I acquire beliefs that Ruth said so and so, e.g., that Ruth said
that it’s full moon tonight. Let us call them comprehension-based beliefs.
Second, I acquire beliefs about the world based on the things that Ruth
asserted, e.g., that it’s full moon tonight. Let us call the second type of
beliefs testimony-based beliefs. This chapter is devoted to comprehension-
based beliefs; more specifically, to the issue of their justification.
A view about comprehension-based beliefs which has attracted consider-
able attention in the recent philosophical literature is the so-called perceptual
model (cf. Fricker, 2003; Pettit, 2010; Brogaard, 2018, 2019). It is relatively
easy to identify the intuition behind the perceptual model: comprehension is
in important respects similar to perception, and thus comprehension-based
beliefs are somehow similar to perceptual beliefs. Unfortunately, it is much
more difficult to spell out the details of the perceptual model. Different
authors have different opinions regarding what exactly accounts for the sim-
ilarity between comprehension and perception. Additionally, it is not always
clear whether the perceptual model is a view about cognition (i.e., the view
that the process of formation of comprehension-based beliefs is similar to the
process of formation of perceptual beliefs), epistemology (i.e., the view that
the structure of justification of comprehension-based beliefs is similar to this
of perceptual beliefs), or both.
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For these reasons, in my current discussion, I will abandon the label per-
ceptual model in favor of more precise categories. When it comes to the
epistemology of comprehension-based beliefs, the perceptual model is often
contrasted with an inferential model. Therefore, I will use the name epistemic
inferentialism for the view that justification of the comprehension-based be-
liefs is non-immediate, i.e., that it depends on the justification of other beliefs,
e.g., beliefs about what words the speaker uttered or even what sounds they
produced. Respectively, I will call epistemic non-inferentialism the view ac-
cording to which justification of comprehension-based beliefs is immediate
and does not depend on the justification of other beliefs.1
In his recent paper, Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2019) offers a critique of
what he calls perceptual model. In fact, he criticizes a version of epistemic
non-inferentialism: language comprehension dogmatism (or simply dogma-
tism). He puts forward three counterexamples designed to show that dogma-
tism fails to explain our intuitions about the justification of comprehension-
based beliefs. The same task, according to Balcerak Jackson, is easily fulfilled
by epistemic inferentialism. Crucially, Balcerak Jackson claims that his coun-
terexamples constitute an abductive argument for epistemic inferentialism:
Taken collectively, the cases present a very strong abductive ar-
gument for concluding that the hearer’s justification for her belief
about what is said typically depends on her justification for be-
lieving that the speaker has uttered a particular sentence. If so
then her justification is not immediate, contrary to what the per-
ceptual model claims. (2019, 402)
This argument has an important flaw (which, I believe, results at least in
part from the fact that Balcerak Jackson falls prey to the ambiguity of the
term perceptual model). In a nutshell, Balcerak Jackson mistakenly takes his
arguments against a particular version of epistemic non-inferentialism (i.e.,
1Cf. Pryor (2005), Goldman (2008).
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language comprehension dogmatism) to provide an abductive support for the
view that justification of comprehension-based beliefs is inferential.
In this chapter, I argue, first, that Balcerak Jackson’s critique is far less
damaging to dogmatism than he thinks. Only one of his three counterexam-
ples poses a serious threat to the theory. Second, I present another version of
epistemic non-inferentialism, comprehension-process reliabilism, which resists
all the counterexamples. Therefore, despite what Balcerak Jackson suggests,
his critique does not provide motivation for inferentialism. At most, it helps
us choose between alternative versions of epistemic non-inferentialism.
I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I introduce language comprehension
dogmatism. In Section 3, I present Balcerak Jackson’s counterexamples
and discuss to what extent are they effective against this view. In Sec-
tion 4, I outline comprehension-process reliabilism: a version of epistemic
non-inferentialism immune to Balcerak Jackson’s counterexamples.
2 Language comprehension dogmatism
Balcerak Jackson presents Fricker’s (2003) view as a prototypical non-inferentialist
position. According to Fricker, language comprehension gives rise to con-
scious representational states of quasi-perception, which confer prima facie
justification on beliefs about what other people say.2 Balcerak Jackson quotes
Fricker:
When a hearer quasi-perceives that someone is saying that p to
her, this is how things seem to her objectively to be, no less. . .
Taking her aural experience at face value, that is what she would
judge to be the case. . . Thus a quasi-perception of the content
2Fricker’s quasi-perceptions are similar to phenomenal seemings produced by visual
perception. I will use quasi-perceptions and seemings interchangeably to refer to all kinds
of conscious experiential states taken to be immediately justificatory for comprehension-
based beliefs.
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and force of a heard utterance is, by its intrinsic nature, a prima
facie though defeasible ground for belief. (Fricker, 2003, 341)3
A more recent version of this view is developed by Berit Brogaard (2018).
In her own words:
. . . our experiences of what is said immediately justify our be-
liefs about what is said without any reliance on further belief or
theorizing, at least in the absence of defeaters. So, in the ab-
sence of defeaters, our beliefs about the meanings of utterances
are justified. (Brogaard, 2018, 2969)
I will use language comprehension dogmatism as an umbrella term for
both these theories.4 What is central to language comprehension dogmatism
is the claim that quasi-perceptions provide an immediate prima facie justi-
fication for comprehension-based beliefs. It is immediate in that it is not
based on the justification of any other beliefs.5 It is prima facie in the stan-
dard Pollockian sense (Pollock 1986) of being good unless defeated. There
are two kinds of defeaters: undercutting defeaters target subject’s grounds
for believing in a given proposition, e.g., the evidential connection between
a seeming and the relevant belief; rebutting defeaters, on the other hand, are
reasons to believe in the negation of the proposition or some other proposition
incompatible with it. For example, I would have an undercutting defeater
for a perceptual belief that I see a sheep if I knew that I have just taken a
drug that is likely to cause visual hallucinations. I would have a rebutting
defeater for the same belief, if I were told by the owner of the animal that it
3Notably, according to Fricker, quasi-perceptions represent both the content and the
illocutionary force of the comprehended utterance. This creates further complications that
are way too heavyweight to be addressed in this essay. I will point out just one of them
in Section 3.1, because it contaminates an element of Balcerak Jackson’s argumentation.
4Although in the next section I will discuss some of their idiosyncrasies.
5Including the belief that one’s language comprehension faculty is reliable (cf. Pryor,
2005; Steup, 2018).
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is actually a dog, which, when its fur gets long, looks very much like a sheep.
According to dogmatism, unless a hearer6 is in possession of a defeater of
one or the other type, their belief that it was said that p is justified if it
seems to them that what was said was that p. A reader familiar with the
debate about perceptual justification will immediately recognize similarities
to Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism:
Phenomenal conservatism: If it seems to S as if p, then, in the
absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justi-
fication for believing that p. (Huemer, 2007, 30)
Just like phenomenal conservatism, language comprehension dogmatism
is a non-doxastic theory of justification, i.e., it rejects the claim that jus-
tification of comprehension-based beliefs has to depend on justification of
other beliefs. It is, however, an evidentialist theory; seeming states provide
evidential support for beliefs about what a speaker said. Thus, in both phe-
nomenal conservatism and language comprehension dogmatism beliefs are,
at least prima facie, evidentially justified by non-doxastic states.
Before moving forward, let us briefly examine whether seemings of what
was said are in fact non-doxastic states. A fairly standard way of deciding
whether a state is non-doxastic is by testing it against the background of a
known illusion. Even if we know that the lines in the Müller-Lyer optical
illusion are equally long (e.g., we examined them using a precise ruler) they
still seem to differ in length. The seeming does not go away when confronted
with a strongly justified belief that the lines are equally long. Assuming that
it is rational to modify a false belief in the light of such glaring counter-
evidence, we conclude that the representational state presenting the lines as
unequal is not a belief. Rather, it is a non-doxastic seeming.
6A broader story about language comprehension will include also comprehension of
written text and, plausibly, other types of linguistic inputs (e.g., sign language). For
simplicity, in this essay, I will follow Balcerak Jackson in focusing on comprehension of
spoken utterances and thus use hearer instead of the more medium-neutral receiver.
59
Can we think about a parallel situation in language comprehension? Bro-
gaard (2018, 2975-2976) gives a great example. On the internet one can find
tons of videos of cats making noises that sound as if they were saying “I love
you!” None of us, except maybe a few over-the-top cat enthusiasts, believe
that cats can say “I love you!”7 Yet the seeming that they do so remains
immune to our belief. Therefore, seemings of what was said pass the test
for being non-doxastic. Given that epistemic inferentialism claims that all
comprehension-based beliefs are justified by inferential relations between be-
liefs, dogmatism is an obvious example of epistemic non-inferentialism.
3 Balcerak Jackson’s abductive argument for
epistemic inferentialism
As I mentioned in the introduction, Balcerak Jackson offers three counterex-
amples to dogmatism, which he takes to constitute an abductive argument for
epistemic inferentialism. Let us first see whether Balcerak Jackson’s coun-
terexamples undermine dogmatism. Each of them is designed to reveal a
different flaw in this theory. The first one is supposed to show that dogma-
tism can only assume, but cannot really explain why and how the prima facie
justification provided by quasi-perceptions can be defeated. The second is
supposed to show that, in certain situations, our background beliefs might
actually justify a belief that someone must have uttered some other sentence
than the one whose meaning we have quasi-perceived. The point of the third
counterexample is to show that in the clairvoyant-style cases language com-
prehension dogmatism wrongly predicts that a hearer is justified in believing
that what was said was that p, as long as it seems to them that what was
said was that p.
7Even though they can be trained to produce these sounds it still would not count as
saying.
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3.1 Rabbits, habits, and minimal pairs
It will be useful for the discussion to quote Balcerak Jackson’s counterexam-
ples at length.
Rabbit Habit
Ordinary competent English hearer Hans hears speaker Sven pro-
duce what sounds to him like an utterance of the following sen-
tence:
(2) I have too many bad rabbits.
As it happens, Hans is being treated for a certain illness, and his
doctor has warned him that the medication he is taking frequently
has the curious side effect that patients regularly confuse [h] and
[r] sounds in others’ speech. This means, for example, that for
someone taking the medication there is a high likelihood that an
utterance of ‘habit’ will sound like an utterance of ‘rabbit’ and
vice versa. (Balcerak Jackson, 2019, 391)
Intuitively Hans is not justified in believing that Sven has said that he
has too many bad rabbits. But why? An answer available to an epistemic
inferentialist is that: (i) Hans has a justified belief that he is likely to mis-
perceive [h] and [r], which in turn (ii) justifies his belief that Sven did not
utter the word “rabbit” at the end of his utterance of (2), which finally (iii)
defeats the justification for Hans’s belief that Sven said that he has too many
bad rabbits. Obviously, a supporter of epistemic non-inferentialism cannot
appeal to such inferential links between different doxastic states.
It is stipulated in Rabbit Habit that Hans has a quasi-perception of what
was said in (2). According to dogmatism, this quasi-perception is prima facie
justificatory for his belief about what Sven said. Since it is justified only
prima facie, it might be defeated. However, Balcerak Jackson argues: “What
the perceptual model [dogmatism] needs to explain is how the information
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that Hans has from his doctor manages to defeat the prima facie justification
provided by his quasi-perception.” (2019, 392). According to him, dogmatism
does not offer such an explanation.
It would seem that there is a simple and natural answer available to
a dogmatist. His doctor’s warning is a reason for Hans to doubt the re-
liability of his language comprehension faculty, and thus it undercuts the
evidential support between the seeming that Sven said so and so and Hans’s
comprehension-based belief—it serves as an undercutting defeater. However,
Balcerak Jackson is not satisfied with such an answer. Let us see why.
Balcerak Jackson invites us to compare Rabbit Habit with a case in which
the doctor says that the medication Hans is taking is likely to affect his per-
ception of voice pitch or accent. If the warning in Rabbit Habit undermined
Hans’s trust in the reliability of his language comprehension faculty, this one
should as well. Yet, according to Balcerak Jackson, if the doctor’s warning
concerned voice pitch or accent, we would still be inclined to take Hans to be
justified in his beliefs about what is said: “Neither of these warnings would
have had any effect at all on Hans’s justification for his belief about what
was said.” (Balcerak Jackson, 2019, 392, emphasis mine).
This, I take it, is the core of Balcerak Jackson’s challenge. According
to him, it is not enough to explain why a warning about possible misper-
ception of the speaker’s utterance defeats the prima facie justification of
comprehension-based beliefs. A dogmatist has to explain why some such
warnings (about the confusion of phonemes) do, while others (about misper-
ception of voice pitch or accent) do not.
I think that Balcerak Jackson is simply mistaken in assuming that a
warning about misperception of voice pitch or accent would not defeat the
justification of comprehension-based beliefs. In fact, it would have the exact
same effect on Hans’s justification as the warning about possible confusion
of phonemes; it would be an undercutting defeater. To see this let us first
analyze what is so special about Rabbit Habit.
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What is special about Rabbit Habit is that it is built around a minimal
pair. English words “rabbit” and “habit”, just like “pin” and “bin”, “pen” and
“pan,” constitute a minimal pair, i.e., a pair of words which differ in only one
phonological element. In consequence, a misperception of phoneme [h] as [r]
results not only in that it does not seem to Hans that Sven said “I have too
many bad habits” but that it seems to him that Sven said “I have too many
bad rabbits.” Moreover, “rabbit” and “habit” are of the same grammatical
category. “I have too many bad rabbits,” even if potentially unexpected in
the context of the conversation, is a grammatically correct English sentence.
Imagine now that what Sven says is “I am happy” or “It starts to rot.”
I guess that Balcerak Jackson would not be inclined to argue that it is a
challenge for a dogmatist to explain why Hans is not justified in believing
that Sven said “I am reppy” or “It starts to hot,” respectively. Therefore, it
is not the misperception of phonemes per se that makes Rabbit Habit tricky,
but the fact that “rabbit” and “habit” constitute a minimal pair and that (2)
is a grammatically correct English sentence.8
Balcerak Jackson argues that the warning about misperception of voice
pitch or accent would not have any effect on the justification of comprehension-
based beliefs. But we can build similar “minimal pair” examples around mis-
perception of voice pitch and accent. First, intonation (i.e., the variation of
pitch) often works in spoken English as a force marker. The rising intonation
marks asking or interrogating: “You just walked in without ↗ knocking?”,
while the falling intonation marks assertion: “You just walked in without ↘
knocking.” Since Balcerak Jackson follows Fricker (2003) in characterizing
quasi-perceptions and comprehension-based beliefs as representing both the
content and the force of heard utterances, we can think about a scenario in
which Hans, informed by his doctor that he might be misperceiving voice
8An additional weakness of Balcerak Jackson’s case is that there is another occurrence
of a “suspect” phoneme ([h]) in “I have too many bad habits.” How can Hans be sure that
Sven did not want to say “I rav too many bad rabbits” thinking (mistakenly!) that the
word “rav” (rhymes with “have”) means to kill in rage?
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pitch, has a seeming as of Sven asserting “You just walked in without knock-
ing.” In this case, contrary to what Balcerak Jackson assumes, Hans would
not be justified in believing that Sven asserted that Hans has just walked in
without knocking.
Similarly, with the misperception of accent. For example, a hearer who
misperceives “special” as “spatial” due to a drug-induced failure “to compen-
sate for the tensing of lax vowels characteristic of speech in southeast Ohio”
(Bond, 2005, 298) would not be justified in believing that the speaker said
“I have a spatial task for you.”
To sum up. We can build “minimal pair” cases similar to Rabbit Habit
involving the misperception of voice pitch and accent. Claiming that the
misperception of phonemes is somehow special, Balcerak Jackson guided us
to a long detour. But we are back to where we started. All that is important
from the perspective of the dogmatist theory of defeat is that the hearer
is warned about the unreliability of their language comprehension faculty,
and thus they have an undercutting defeater for their comprehension-based
beliefs. If one has such a defeater, it does not matter that they have a
seeming as if the speaker said something meaningful, e.g., “I have too many
bad rabbits.” The defeater undercuts the evidential support between the
seeming and the comprehension-based belief. Thus, dogmatism can explain
why Hans is not justified in believing that Sven said “I have too many bad
rabbits.”
3.2 He must have said “coat”
Let us now take a look at the second counterexample offered by Balcerak
Jackson.
New Goat
Helena and Sven are in conversation, when it seems to Helena
that Sven utters the following:
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(4) I just bought a new goat.
Helena is initially puzzled by Sven’s utterance. It seems to her
that Sven has said that he just bought a new goat. But this
would be a bizarre thing for him to say. (He hates goats, and
he lives in a small city apartment that doesn’t allow pets.) But
Helena has every indication that Sven is speaking sincerely and
honestly, and not ironically or metaphorically. All in all, Helena
has very strong reason to believe that Sven did not, in fact, say
that he had just bought a new goat, and so she concludes that
she must have misheard him; perhaps she mistook an utterance
of ‘coat’ for an utterance of ‘goat’. (Balcerak Jackson, 2019, 400)
Crucially, Balcerak Jackson stipulates, that in this case, Helena has a
strong defeater for the belief that Sven said that he bought a new goat: “if it
is not already plausible from the above description, the case can be modified
as necessary. (Perhaps the conversation takes place in front of dozens of
attentive and reliable witnesses, all of whom sincerely assure Helena that
Sven did not say that he had bought a new goat.)” (Balcerak Jackson, 2019,
400). Therefore, the task is not to explain why her belief that Sven said that
he just bought a new goat is defeated. The actual task is to explain why
“in this case there is another belief for which Helena does have justification,
namely the belief that Sven must have uttered some other sentence than (4).”
(Balcerak Jackson, 2019, 400; emphasis in the original).
Contrary to Balcerak Jackson, I do not take New Goat to be problematic
for dogmatism (or any other version of epistemic non-inferentialism, for that
matter). Obviously, epistemic non-inferentialism does not claim that every
justified belief about what other people say is justified non-inferentially.9 The
claim is that comprehension-based beliefs of a competent language speaker,
9For example, imagine that my friend is on the phone with his girlfriend and I hear
him say “How can you say I’m needy?” I form a justified belief that my friend’s girlfriend
said that he is needy. Justification of this belief is obviously inferential.
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formed through the exercise of their language comprehension faculty, are
typically justified immediately. In New Goat, Helena’s belief that Sven said
that he just bought a new goat was prima facie immediately justified by her
seeming. However, as stipulated, the justification was rebutted. Believing
that Sven did not say that he just bought a new goat (but curious about
what he said), Helena further inferred that he must have said something that
sounds similar but makes more sense in the present context. She concluded
that he must have said “I just bought a new coat.” A supporter of epistemic
non-inferentialism can readily agree that justification for the belief about
what Sven must have said is non-immediate, i.e., inferential.
What is interesting about this case is the “initial puzzlement” that He-
lena experiences upon hearing Sven’s utterance. Of course, this is just an
element of Balcerak Jackson’s description of the New Goat scenario; never-
theless, I think that this description is quite realistic and highlights a note-
worthy phenomenon. To explain it, we should appeal to the fact that lan-
guage comprehension is a predictive process (see, e.g., Kuperberg and Jaeger,
2016).10 Given the context of the conversation and other things she knew
about Sven, Helena’s confrontation with the stimulus that her comprehension
system identified as “goat” at the end of Sven’s utterance, triggered strong
surprisal, which she might have experienced as puzzlement. Plausibly, this
puzzlement prompted attention relocation in effect of which Helena started
consciously analyzing what Sven has actually said. Eventually, she inferred
that he must have uttered some other word than “goat”, probably: “coat”.
Notice that in this last inference Helena must have appealed to her expertise
with English minimal pairs (see section 3.1). Otherwise, why wasn’t her first
guess that Sven must have said “fridge”?
3.3 Seemings out of the blue
Let us now move to the last counterexample offered by Balcerak Jackson.
10See also my discussion in Section 3.2 of Chapter 1 of this thesis.
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Interpretive Clairvoyance
Hans is meeting Sophia for the first time at an informal gathering
of United Nations workers. He asks Sophia about her area in an
attempt to make small talk, but when she answers, it sounds to
Hans exactly as if Sophia is speaking some foreign language that
is entirely unknown to him; the sounds she is making strike Hans
as nothing more than an unbroken stream of unfamiliar vocal
noises. And yet at the same time, Hans has a quasi-perception
as of Sophia saying that she is an economist. (Balcerak Jackson,
2019, 396)
As far as the intuitions go, Hans is not justified in believing that Sophia
said that she is an economist. His quasi-perception of the content of Sophia’s
utterance came out of the blue. And yet, according to dogmatism, the sole
fact that Hans has this quasi-perception provides justification for his belief
“and none of the information at his disposal seems to do anything to call that
into question.” (Balcerak Jackson, 2019, 397).
I agree that Interpretative Clairvoyance is an effective counterargument to
a version of dogmatism according to which prima facie justification depends
solely on the possession of the relevant seemings or quasi-perceptions. But
does it work against more restrictive versions of dogmatism? In the remainder
of this section, I will take a look at a few such proposals.
First, let us examine Brogaard’s sensible dogmatism (2013, 2018). Ac-
cording to Brogaard, not all seemings that p confer prima facie justification
on beliefs that p. Only seemings that are “grounded in the content of [sub-
ject’s] perceptual, introspective, or memory-related experience” (Brogaard
2013, 278) do so. In what sense are seemings grounded in the content of
experience?
Content Grounding: A seeming of the form [It seems to A as if q]
is grounded in a content p of a particular perceptual, introspec-
tive, or memory-related experience e had by A iff [Reliably(if p is
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a content of e, then it seems to A as if q) and Reliably(if it seems
to A as if q, then q)]. (Brogaard, 2013, 277)
The intended reading of reliably here is “in the majority of close hypo-
thetical situations.” Thus, a seeming as if q is grounded in a content p of
an experience e if and only if in the majority of close hypothetical situations
experiences with the content p trigger seemings as if q, and in the majority
of close hypothetical situations the world is as it seems.
I think that sensible dogmatism does not suffice to avoid Interpretive
Clairvoyance. It is already stipulated that what Sophia says sounds to Hans
like some foreign language. But according to sensible dogmatism, whenever
Hans has some perceptual experience e that fulfills the condition for Content
Grounding, his seemings as if Sophia said so and so should confer justification
on his comprehension-based beliefs.11 Imagine, for example, that every time
Hans hears Sophia speak he has a sensation of a piano melody (different for
different utterances) accompanied with a quasi-perception of the utterance
meaning. In the majority of close hypothetical situations, experiences of a
particular piano melody trigger the same seemings. If Hans has a sensation
of melody a, he has a seeming as of Sophia saying that she is an economist, if
he has a sensation of melody b, he has a seeming as of Sophia saying that it
is her first time at the gathering of United Nations workers, etc. Moreover,
in the majority of close hypothetical situations, if it seems to Hans that
Sophia said that p, Sophia, in fact, said that p. Still, we are not inclined
to say that Hans’ beliefs about what Sophia says are justified, even if there
is a systematic relation between the piano melodies he experiences and his
accompanying seemings.
Fricker’s (2003) theory is also a restrictive version of language compre-
hension dogmatism. According to Fricker’s definition of occurrent utterance
understanding:
11For a similar argument against sensible dogmatism see (Lyons 2015a).
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To understand a particular heard utterance of [a sentence] S,
U(S), occurrently is to enjoy a correct quasi-perceptual represen-
tation of the content and force of U(S), and to do so in part as the
result of one’s dispositional understanding of S—that is, through
the exercise of a stably possessed, internally constituted reliable
capacity to enjoy such representations with respect to utterances
of S. (Fricker, 2003, 346, emphasis mine)
However, this is still not enough to deal with Interpretative Clairvoy-
ance. Arguably, not any stably possessed, internally constituted reliable
capacity to enjoy such representations would do. We would not say that my
comprehension-based beliefs are prima facie justified by quasi-perceptions of
utterance meaning, if these quasi-perceptions were triggered by sensations of
piano music, smells, or colorful afterimages.
Here is one more potential line of defense for language comprehension
dogmatism. A dogmatist could say that perceptual beliefs are prima facie
justified by seemings that are not only grounded in experience (as it is char-
acterized by Brogaard) but grounded in an appropriate experience. In the
case of language comprehension, the appropriate experience might be, for
example, the experience of words in a given language. Not just any experi-
ence of words in a given language would do, however. A dogmatist would
have to stipulate that seemings of utterance meaning are grounded in the
experience of the appropriate words. But how can we establish which words
are appropriate to trigger a given seeming? Obviously, we cannot simply
say that these are the words which have the same meaning which the hearer
quasi-perceives, because the utterance meaning and word meaning are two
very different things.12 The case remains open.
To sum up. I argued that dogmatism has all the tools necessary to answer
Rabbit Habit and New Goat. Nevertheless, I agree with Balcerak Jackson
that neither of the existing versions of dogmatism successfully deals with
12Cf. Drożdżowicz (2019).
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Interpretative Clairvoyance. I am not claiming that it is impossible to develop
a version of dogmatism immune to this counterexample, but I will leave
this task to devoted supporters of dogmatism. In the next section, I will
argue that even if there is no hope for language comprehension dogmatism,
it is too early to declare the victory of epistemic inferentialism. Balcerak
Jackson’s abductive argument does not go through, because there is another
non-inferential theory of justification of comprehension-based beliefs which
deals with all counterexamples discussed in this section.
4 Comprehension-process reliabilism
Even though Balcerak Jackson’s discussion focuses on language comprehen-
sion dogmatism, he is ultimately interested in establishing that “the hearer’s
justification for her belief about what is said is not immediate” (Balcerak
Jackson, 2019, 402). Discarding dogmatism would be sufficient to achieve
this goal if dogmatism was the only available theory of immediate justifica-
tion of comprehension-based beliefs. But it is not. In this section, I outline
another such theory, i.e., comprehension-process reliabilism.13
According to process reliabilism, a belief that p of a subject S is prima
facie justified if it is generated by a reliable belief-forming process (cf. Gold-
man, 1979, Goldman and Beddor, 2016). Comprehension-process reliabilism
is simply an application of process reliabilism to a particular type of belief-
13Discussing Interpretive Clairvoyance, Balcerak Jackson considers the possibility of res-
cuing the perceptual view by mixing it with reliabilism but does not find it promising. He
claims that it is “the essence of the perceptual model that taking one’s quasi-perception
at face value is a process that can confer justification” (Balcerak Jackson, 2019, 398), and
therefore a supporter of perceptual model cannot say that Hans’s comprehension process
in Interpretative Clairvoyance does not confer justification on his comprehension-based
beliefs. Here again, Balcerak Jackson falls prey to the ambiguity of the term percep-
tual model : does it refer to dogmatism or epistemic non-inferentialism? Taking quasi-
perceptions at face value is “the essence” of dogmatism, i.e., the evidentialist version of
epistemic non-inferentialism. Below I will provide a non-evidentialist process reliabilism for
comprehension-based beliefs. If we take perceptual to mean epistemically non-inferential,
my account counts as a version of perceptual model.
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forming process, namely, language comprehension:
Comprehension-process reliabilism: (i) a belief that p is prima
facie justified if it is the result of a reliable belief-forming process;
(ii) language comprehension is a non-inferential, reliable belief-
forming process.14
This is a general recipe. To turn it into an actual account, one has to say
more about the process of language comprehension and why it is reliable.
Dean Pettit (2010) comes close to formulating a version of comprehension-
process reliabilism. First, he criticizes epistemic inferentialism as well as dog-
matism, which suggests that he wants to defend a different kind of epistemic
non-inferentialism.15 Second, according to Pettit, linguistic competence is
warrant conferring but not warrant apt.16 It is not warrant apt because it
does not stand in need of any further evidence. It is warrant conferring in
that beliefs based on the exercise of linguistic competence are justified.17
Pettit provides reasons why linguistic competence is not warrant apt. He
claims that it is deployed sub-personally and (at least to some extent) in a
modular way. The question of warrant aptness simply does not arise with
respect to such faculties. Just as our visual system, language comprehen-
sion does not require further evidence to confer justification to the beliefs it
14Given my goal here, I stipulate in the definition that language comprehension is non-
inferential and, therefore, commit myself to epistemic non-inferentialism. One could drop
this condition and formulate an inferentialist version of comprehension-process reliabilism.
(Thanks to Derek Ball for helpful discussion here.)
15Balcerak Jackson mentions Pettit among representatives of the perceptual model
(2019, 389, footnote 4), which is yet another indication that he does not restrict the
perceptual model to language comprehension dogmatism.
16For the purposes of the current discussion, I will use warrant interchangeably with
justification.
17It is worth highlighting that Pettit (2010) focuses on linguistic competence (compe-
tence with syntax and semantics of a given language) and not the process of language
comprehension (exercise of this competence). However, linguistic competence is warrant
conferring only insofar as language comprehension produces (at least prima facie) justified
beliefs.
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produces. In the absence of counter-evidence suggesting that it is not work-
ing properly, we are justified in taking its outputs at face value. But, as
he focuses mostly on the critique of epistemic inferentialism, Pettit does not
develop his alternative account in any detail; in particular, he does not re-
ally explain why the exercise of linguistic competence is warrant conferring,
and thus, why we should take comprehension-based beliefs to be prima facie
justified.
I will now outline an account which does explain why the process of
language comprehension is warrant conferring. It draws on Peter Graham’s
(2010) teleological process reliabilism for testimony-based beliefs.18 Just as
a reminder: while comprehension-based beliefs are beliefs of the form that S
said that p, e.g., that Ruth said that it’s full moon tonight; testimony-based
beliefs are beliefs about the world, e.g., that it’s full moon tonight, obtained
through testimony.
Since Graham’s target are testimony-based beliefs he does not focus on
the process of language comprehension simpliciter but on what he calls
comprehension-with-filtering. Filtering may be characterized as a suite of
cognitive counter-deception mechanisms that prevent receivers of testimony
from being easily manipulated by testifiers.19 Graham enumerates a list of
empirical research supporting the claim that, starting at a very young age
18There are, obviously, other paths one could follow to develop their favorite version
of comprehension-process reliabilism. One of them is suggested by Jack Lyons (2009).
According to Lyons, beliefs are prima facie justified if they are produced by processes
rooted in so called primal systems. Primal systems are, in turn, characterized as systems:
(i) whose inner workings are not accessible to introspection; (ii) which result from an
innate state of an organism developed by learning. They are, thus, quite similar to Fodor’s
modules (Fodor, 1983; for a detailed comparison with Fodor’s view, see Lyons, 2015b).
The most widely discussed primal system is perception, but Lyons suggests: “Some beliefs
about the speech of others are clearly perceptual. My auditory belief that so-and-so just
said ‘The cat is on the mat’ is a straightforwardly perceptual belief. My belief that so-
and-so just said that the cat is on the mat will be a perceptual belief only if the language
comprehension system counts as a perceptual system; it very well might on the present
understanding of perceptual systems, and I have no problem with this result.” (2009, 135).
19This notion of filtering is very close to Sperber et al.’s (2010) epistemic vigilance; see
my discussion in Chapter 4.
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(some experiments involve 16-month-olds), we develop special attentiveness
towards speakers who make obvious mistakes, do not sound confident, have
been unreliable in the past, etc. Notably, according to Graham, filtering does
not condemn us to epistemic inferentialism.
Filtering need not involve explicit awareness—belief or judgement
—that counter-considerations are absent. Filtering need not in-
volve reasons and reasoning. . . filtering involves sensitivity to
counter-considerations: where there are counter-considerations of
a certain sort, acceptance would be less likely. (Graham, 2010,
152)
As I have mentioned, Graham’s account is teleological. It is spelled out
in terms of etiological function, normal functioning, and normal conditions
(Millikan 1984). In a nutshell, an etiological function of any mechanism or
feature is the effect of its ancestors, which explains why the mechanism or
feature persisted. The etiological function of our hearts is to pump blood,
because pumping blood was the effect that hearts were selected for, i.e., it is
the effect of ancestors of our hearts which explains why we still have hearts.
Normal functioning is working in the way that contributed to stabilizing
the etiological function (e.g., pumping blood, in the case of the heart), and
normal conditions are conditions sufficiently similar to those in which “that
function has historically been performed” (Millikan, 1984, 34).
Here is how Graham applies the teleological apparatus to the problem of
epistemic entitlement.20 According to him, “entitlement attaches to beliefs
in virtue of the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the
20Graham appeals to Burge’s (1993, 1996) distinction into two types of warrant : jus-
tification, which involves reasons and evidence a subject can often cite; and entitlement,
which does not involve them. Given that, according to Graham, the positive epistemic
standing of testimony-based beliefs does not depend on reasons or evidence, he says that
testimony-based beliefs enjoy prima facie entitlement. In the present discussion, I will use
justification and entitlement interchangeably. However, the reader should bear in mind
that justification in the sense in which I am using it does not require reasons or evidence.
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process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function” (Gra-
ham, 2010, 156). Perception-based beliefs enjoy prima facie entitlement
because the perceptual process has forming true beliefs reliably as a func-
tion. Similarly, Graham argues, comprehension-with-filtering has inducing
true testimony-based beliefs reliably as its function. The reason why we are
equipped with the cognitive mechanism of comprehension-with-filtering is
that an ancestor of this mechanism was beneficial to our ancestors. More
specifically, it allowed them to reliably acquire true beliefs about the world
based on testimonies of their interlocutors.21
Since my goal in the present chapter is to provide an account of justifica-
tion of comprehension-based beliefs, i.e., beliefs of the form that the speaker
said that p, I do not need to engage here in the debate about the nature and
epistemic status of filtering.22 Therefore, I would like to suggest a restriction
of Graham’s theory to comprehension simpliciter.
Teleological comprehension-process reliabilism (TCR): (i) a belief
is prima facie justified if it is based on a normally functioning
belief-forming process that has forming true beliefs reliably as a
function; (ii) language comprehension is a non-inferential, belief-
forming process that has forming true comprehension-based be-
liefs reliably as a function.
I find it extremely plausible that forming true comprehension-based be-
liefs is the etiological function of the process of language comprehension.
Hearts persisted because of their beneficial effect of pumping blood. Lan-
guage comprehension persisted because of its beneficial effect of generating
21Graham makes a further, Millikan-style argument that it is an etiological function of
assertion to induce true beliefs in hearers. Otherwise, assertion would not persist. “So
unless hearers get something out of accepting reports, they will not accept them. And if
they will not accept them, speakers will not benefit from making them. Then they will
not get made.” (Graham, 2010, 160). In result, the function of assertion and the func-
tion of comprehension-with-filtering taken together support the prima facie justification
of testimony-based beliefs.
22I discuss it extensively in the next chapter.
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true beliefs of the form that S said that p. That obtaining such true beliefs is
beneficial to members of our species is rather uncontroversial; it contributes
to successful communication and allows us to learn from and cooperate with
others.
Finally, the restriction of Graham’s teleological account to comprehension
simpliciter, and thus to the generation of comprehension-based beliefs, seems
to be necessary anyways. Forming true testimony-based beliefs is the function
of comprehension-with-filtering of assertoric utterances. But what about
other speech acts? Understanding that Ruth asked whether it’s full moon
tonight does not (at least not directly) generate the belief that it’s full moon
tonight; understanding that Ruth ordered to stop the car does not (at least
not directly) generate the belief that I will stop the car, etc. A complete
theory of language comprehension, applicable to all speech acts, seems to
require the two-level structure with (i) comprehension-based beliefs on one
level, and (ii) testimony-based beliefs for assertions, and their counterparts
for other illocutionary forces, on the other.23
Let us now see whether TCR can deal with Balcerak Jackson’s counterex-
amples. Discussing Rabbit Habit in Section 3.1, I argued that it does not
pose an actual problem to dogmatism. According to dogmatism, seemings
provide prima facie justification to comprehension-based beliefs. As prima
facie, this justification can be defeated, e.g., if the hearer has a reason to
doubt that their language comprehension faculty is reliable. Thus, the warn-
ing about the possible misperception of phonemes, which Hans receives from
his doctor, plays the role of a defeater undercutting the evidential support
between his seeming and the respective belief. An equivalent answer is avail-
able to TCR. TCR is also a theory of prima facie justification and thus it
leaves room for defeat. If, as it is in Rabbit Habit, a hearer knows that his
language comprehension faculty is not functioning normally, the prima facie
23The two-level structure is a theoretical assumption. I am not claiming that it has
psychological reality, e.g., that when we comprehend an assertion, we have to go through
both these levels.
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justification of beliefs formed by this faculty is defeated, and the hearer is
not justified in believing that the speaker said so and so.24
What about New Goat? Discussing this counterexample in section 3.2, I
have argued that it does not pose a problem for epistemic non-inferentialism.
It is stipulated by Balcerak Jackson that Helena’s justification for the belief
that Sven said “I just bought a new goat” is defeated. It might be the case
that Helena will end up forming another belief, i.e., the belief that Sven
must have said “I just bought a new coat,” but a supporter of any version
of epistemic non-inferentialism (be it dogmatism or TCR) can readily agree
that Hans’s justification for this belief is inferential. Clearly, not all beliefs
about what other people say (or must have said) are justified immediately.
The belief that Sven must have said that he bought a new coat is not.
Finally, what about Interpretative Clairvoyance? Just as a reminder, the
challenge posed by Interpretive Clairvoyance was to explain why Hans is not
justified in believing that Sophia said that she is an economist, despite the
fact that it seems to him that she said this exact thing. What is crucial for
TCR is that it does not take justification to be grounded in experiential states
(or in any other state, for that matter). It is not only a non-doxastic but a
fully anti-evidentialist position. It might very well be the case that typically
the language comprehension process is associated with certain phenomenal
states, but the justification of comprehension-based beliefs is not grounded
in these states. Comprehension-based beliefs are justified only as far as they
originate from a normally functioning language comprehension process. Of
course, Hans’s belief in Interpretive Clairvoyance is not formed by a normally
24There is a long-standing debate in epistemology, one in which I will not engage here,
whether process reliabilism can offer a satisfactory account of epistemic defeat. The most
popular strategy of explaining defeat in process reliabilism, Alvin Goldman’s Alternate
Reliable Process (ARP) theory (Goldman 1979; cf. Lyons, 2009, 2016), has been passion-
ately discussed over the years (see Beddor, 2015, forthcoming for good overviews). For
recent defenses of improved versions of ARP see Grundmann (2009) and Graham and
Lyons (forthcoming). Here, I will simply assume that there is a theory of defeat available
to process reliabilism.
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functioning comprehension-process or any other process that has forming
true-beliefs reliably as a function. Hans’s ancestors did not have the faculty of
interpretive clairvoyance, so this faculty does not have an etiological function
at all. This is enough to explain why interpretive clairvoyance does not
produce prima facie justified beliefs.
The above is not an all-out defense of comprehension-process reliabilism
or TCR. Nevertheless, by outlining and making an initial case for this theory,
I have shown that we are not doomed to epistemic inferentialism, even if
Interpretive Clairvoyance defeats language comprehension dogmatism.
5 Concluding remarks
The goal of this chapter was to offer a new defense of epistemic non-inferen-
tialism about comprehension-based beliefs, i.e., the view that justification of
comprehension-based beliefs is immediate. I started by examining Balcerak
Jackson’s critique of a version of epistemic non-inferentialism, viz. language
comprehension dogmatism. Only one out of three counterarguments pro-
vided by Balcerak Jackson turned out to be successful, but it was enough
to reject dogmatism (at least until an improved version of this view is pro-
vided). Nevertheless, the rejection of dogmatism does not suffice to establish
epistemic inferentialism. In the last section, I offered another version of epis-
temic non-inferentialism, viz. teleological comprehension-process reliabilism.
I argued that this view successfully deals with all counterexamples provided
by Balcerak Jackson.
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Chapter 4
Effective filtering
Abstract. It is a popular view in social epistemology that we
are equipped with a set of cognitive tools that help us to filter
out unreliable testimony. But do we have reasons to assume that
these tools are effective? In this chapter, I answer this question in
two steps. In the first step, I argue that filtering is not real-time
effective, i.e., the process of filtering, which takes place simulta-
neously with or right after the process of comprehension, does
not allow a particular hearer on a particular occasion to prevent
the formation of beliefs based on untrustworthy testimony. In the
second step, I argue that filtering is long-term effective. The very
fact that some hearers sometimes detect untrustworthy testimony
puts pressure on speakers and increases the incentive for honesty.
Finally, I argue that these considerations support a version of
strong social anti-reductionism about testimonial entitlement.
1 Introduction
It is hard to imagine how limited one’s knowledge about the world would
be, had it not been for testimony. It is through testimony that I know that
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Huascaran is in the Andes and that mitochondria contain DNA. It is also
through testimony that I know where my parents spent their last holidays,
and what dose of medicine works best for my dad’s blood pressure. From
trivia to vital information, our epistemic situation depends greatly on things
we are being told.
A widespread opinion in the philosophical debate about testimony is that
we are not gullible, i.e., we engage in some form of assessment of the trust-
worthiness of testimony we receive or, at least, we are sensitive to signs of its
untrustworthiness.1 This assumption plays a particularly important role in
reductionist theories of testimonial warrant.2 As stated in Elizabeth Fricker’s
classical paper:
. . . the hearer should be discriminating in her attitude to the
speaker, in that she should be continually evaluating him for
trustworthiness throughout their exchange, in the light of the
evidence, or cues, available to her. This will be partly a matter
of her being disposed to deploy background knowledge which is
relevant, partly a matter of her monitoring the speaker for any
tell-tale signs revealing likely untrustworthiness. (Fricker, 1994,
149-50)
This monitoring (or filtering)3 is a way of collecting reasons for speakers’
1Cf. Shieber (2012, 2015).
2When I speak about reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, I refer to a set of
views which tend to agree that the warrant of testimony-based beliefs depends on hearer’s
having some reductive (i.e., based not on testimony itself but, for example, perception,
memory, or inductive inference) reasons for trusting their testifier. Proponents of reduc-
tionism include Hume (1975), Adler (1994), Audi (1997, 2004, 2006), Fricker (1987, 1994,
1995, 2006), Lipton (1998), Lyons (1997). Anti-reductionists, on the other hand, argue
that testimony-based beliefs can be warranted without hearers’ possessing such reductive
reasons. Various forms of anti-reductionism have been defended by Reid (1970), Burge
(1993, 1997), Coady (1973, 1992), Goldberg (2006, 2007, 2010, 2014), Goldman (1999),
Graham (2006, 2010, 2015), Greco (2015), Simion (2020).
3Throughout the text I will use monitoring and filtering interchangeably. I will also
use the noun filter to refer to a set of mechanisms, processes, or any cognitive tools that
allow us to perform monitoring/filtering.
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trustworthiness, and thus lies in the core of reductionism. However, even
though reductionists tend to accuse anti-reductionists of painting hearers as
helplessly gullible,4 there are ways of incorporating the monitoring require-
ment into anti-reductionist accounts.5 In his polemics with Fricker, Sanford
Goldberg (2007) offers the following formulation of anti-reductionism:
A hearer H is epistemically justified in accepting (has the epis-
temic right to accept; is epistemically entitled to accept) another’s
testimony on occasion O so long as (i) there are no undefeated
good (doxastic, factual, or normative) reasons not to accept the
testimony, and (ii) on O H’s acceptance was the outcome of a
process that exhibited a ‘counterfactual sensitivity’ to the pres-
ence of defeaters (which, given (i), turns up no such defeaters on
O). (2007, 168)
The monitoring requirement is captured in clause (ii) and takes the form
of “counterfactual sensitivity.” Goldberg (2007, 166) highlights that it is
sufficient for hearers to be on a lookout for defeaters (as opposed to looking
for defeaters) to avoid the charge of gullibility, and that this condition is
compatible with anti-reductionism.6
Authors trying to carve up a middle ground between reductionism and
anti-reductionism also suggest that, as recipients of testimony, we routinely
monitor the trustworthiness of testifiers. To give just one example, Jennifer
Lackey (2006) suggests that we do it by relying on “inductive evidence for
believing. . . that reports made with sustained eye contact are typically sincere
ones, or that reports made ably and confidently are typically competent
ones.” (p. 173).
This chapter takes up the question: “Is filtering effective?” My answer
consists of two steps. In the first step (Section 2), I argue that filtering is
4Cf. Fricker (1994, 154; 1995, 404).
5Cf. Coady (1992, 47).
6Cf. Goldberg and Henderson (2006).
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not real-time effective, i.e., filtering, which takes place simultaneously with
or right after comprehension, does not allow a particular hearer on a par-
ticular occasion to prevent the formation of beliefs based on untrustworthy
testimony. To establish this conclusion, I argue, first, that Michaelian (2010)
and Shieber’s (2012, 2015) arguments against real-time effectiveness of filter-
ing are immune to recent critique by Fricker (2016). Second, I outline and
shortly defend an account of language comprehension, which suggests that
filtering cannot be real-time effective.
Even if filtering is not real-time effective, it does not mean that it is not
effective at all. As I argue in Section 3, filtering brings expected benefits
only in the long run, i.e., that it is long-term effective. The very fact that
some hearers sometimes detect untrustworthy testimony puts pressure on
speakers and increases the incentive for honesty. Finally (Section 4), I argue
that these considerations support a version of strong anti-reductionism about
testimonial entitlement.
2 Filtering is not real-time effective
2.1 Michaelian, Shieber, and Fricker on the real-time
effectiveness of filtering
Kourken Michaelian (2010) and Joseph Shieber (2012, 2015) are two authors
who recently devoted a lot of attention to the problem of the real-time effec-
tiveness of filtering.7 Both of them proceed from a compelling assumption:
as long as we are interested in how filtering works and how impermeable it is,
we cannot limit ourselves to theoretical considerations. Instead, we should
consult relevant empirical research, mainly from the field of social psychology.
7Real-time effectiveness of filtering can be understood in terms of reliability : a filter
is real-time effective if it takes place simultaneously with or right after the process of
comprehension, and reliably prevents a particular hearer on a particular occasion from
forming beliefs based on untrustworthy testimony.
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Michaelian’s (2010) paper is a polemics with Fricker’s reductionist theory
of testimonial justification and knowledge (Fricker 1987 and onward). For
the purpose of his discussion, Michaelian breaks Fricker’s theory down into
two main components: (i) the claim that the reductive account to testimonial
justification (reduction of testimonial justification to receiver’s possession of
non-testimonial reasons) is necessary, and (ii) the claim that it is available.
The question of the effectiveness of filtering plays a crucial role in assessing
the second claim. In Michaelian’s reconstruction, the process of formation of
testimonial beliefs postulated by Fricker:
. . . takes as input the subject’s beliefs about what the speaker
said, about the competence of the speaker, and about the honesty
of the speaker and produces as output either a testimonial belief
or no belief at all: if the subject believes that the speaker asserted
that P, that the speaker was then competent with respect to
P, and that the speaker was then honest with respect to P, the
process outputs a belief that P; otherwise (e.g., if the subject
believes that the speaker was incompetent with respect to P),
the process outputs no belief. (Michaelian, 2010, 406).
Two features of this characterization of the belief-forming process will
become central to my discussion in Section 2.2, but I would like to flag them
here. Firstly, Fricker assumes that one of the inputs to the process (the one
achieved by way of linguistic comprehension) is the receiver’s belief about
what a speaker said (Fricker, 1994, 150). Secondly, according to Fricker, the
output of the process is either belief or no belief. As I hope to demonstrate
in the next section, despite their popularity in the contemporary debate on
testimony, both these assumptions are problematic.
For the time being, however, let us focus on what is crucial for Michaelian’s
critique of Fricker’s theory. The reason why receivers are not gullible, accord-
ing to Fricker, is that the process of formation of testimonial beliefs makes
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use of their beliefs about honesty and competence of the testifiers. These be-
liefs, in turn, are acquired by means of—plausibly unconscious (Fricker, 1994,
150)—monitoring for signs of dishonesty and incompetence. What does this
monitoring require? Fricker reassures us that it does not require “. . . an ex-
tensive piece of M15-type ‘vetting’ of any speaker before . . . [the hearer] may
accept anything . . . [the speaker] says as true” (1994, 154). Moreover, Fricker
optimistically assumes that “[e]xpert dissimulators among us being few, the
insincerity of an utterance is very frequently betrayed in the speaker’s man-
ner, and so is susceptible of detection” (Fricker, 1994, 150). But do we have
good reasons for such optimism?
Michaelian argues that even though Fricker might be right that we fre-
quently and casually monitor for competence and insincerity, there are no
good reasons to assume that this monitoring is effective in the sense Fricker’s
theory requires. Michaelian focuses on detection of a speaker’s dishonesty.
He presents a line-up of empirical studies which suggest that our accuracy
rates in deception detection are “only slightly better than fifty-fifty” (Levine
et al., 1999, 126; cf. Bond and DePaulo, 2006; Levine, 2019b).8 There may
be many reasons for such underwhelming results, but Michaelian suggests
that it is neither that receivers do not monitor for cues to deception nor that
there are no cues to deception to monitor for in the first place. Rather, the
task of monitoring for cues to deception is very difficult: receivers plausibly
do not monitor for all the cues to deception and the ones that they monitor
for are subtle and vary significantly across agents and contexts (Vrij, 2000,
2004; Feeley and Young, 2000).
Shieber (2012, 2015) raises similar worries. He suggests that we can
think about two types of monitoring strategies: the first, based on gathering
positive evidence of the trustworthiness of a given testifier; and the second,
8The slightly better than chance accuracy (around 54%) might result from a few trans-
parent liars effect (Levine, 2010). According to Levine’s metaphor, deception detection is
similar to taking a test where you know answers to approx. 10% of the easiest questions,
and guess all the rest.
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based on sensitivity to indications of deception. Unfortunately, according to
Shieber, social psychology does not give us reasons to assume that either of
these strategies is reliable.9
When it comes to the first strategy, its success depends on a receiver’s
ability to detect cues to trustworthiness. However, according to Shieber,
psychological literature suggests neither that there is a unified set of such
cues nor that we are particularly good at spotting them. Instead, receivers
tend to trick themselves into taking physically attractive (Chaiken, 1979)
and generally likeable (Chaiken and Eagly, 1983) testifiers as trustworthy.
Furthermore, sustained eye contact or “keeping straight face,” commonly
taken to be cues to trustworthiness, may be in fact negatively correlated
with sincerity (Sitton and Griffin, 1981; Bond et al., 1985).
What about the second strategy? Shieber’s overview of the psycholog-
ical literature leads him to the same conclusion as the one formulated by
Michaelian: it does not seem that our success rate in detection deception is
much better than chance (0.5). Moreover, Shieber quotes research according
to which accuracy rates of professionals whose work may require sensitivity
to deception, such as police officers, are not significantly better than these of
laypeople (Kraut and Poe, 1980; DePaulo and Pfeifer, 1986; Köhnken, 1987).
To sum up, we are bad at deception detection by default, and there is little
room for improving this skill through training.10,11
9Separately, Shieber discusses possible strategies for monitoring for the competence of
a testifier, and reaches similarly pessimistic conclusions (cf. 2012, 9-12). For my current
discussion, it is sufficient to focus on monitoring for a testifier’s trustworthiness.
10The most optimistic conclusion drawn from existing empirical research on the im-
provement of deception detection accuracy (when it comes to real-time detection based
on behavioral cues) is that “certain professions or certain subgroups within professions
may develop particular sensitivity to certain kinds of lies” (O’Sullivan et al., 2009, 536,
emphasis mine).
11Some readers might be worried that Michaelian’s and Shiebier’s arguments rely on an
already outdated psychological literature. But this is not the case. The same conclusions
about the real-time effectiveness of filtering are presented in recent meta-analyses and
literature reviews (Hartwing and Bond, 2014; Hauch et al., 2016; Levine, 2019b; Solbu
and Frank, 2019; Sternglanz et al., 2019). See also discussion below.
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Fricker (2016) strongly resists the pessimism. What we have to take
into account while assessing the effectiveness of filtering—Fricker suggests—
is that that our communication takes place in different testimonial environ-
ments (T-environments). T-environments are individuated based on “what
frequency and what manner of false testimony . . . [the receiver] might easily
encounter” (Fricker, 2016, 96). For a filter to be effective is for it to be effec-
tive in a given T-environment; the same “narrowly” construed belief forming
method might turn out to be reliable in one environment (e.g., one’s every-
day T-environment full of family members, friends, and acquaintances), but
not another (e.g., a T-environment full of habitual and expert liars).
Moreover, since it is well established that cues to deception differ across
testifiers and contexts, if the empirical studies were supposed to help us
assess the effectiveness of filtering, environments created in the experimental
settings would have to be sufficiently similar to the everyday T-environments
of participants. But this is not the case in the current empirical literature.
Additionally, the effectiveness of the filter is not supposed to result solely
from our ability to recognize perceptual cues to deception typically targeted
by experimental studies. The other, and probably even more important
component of the filtering toolkit, is the use of background knowledge about
specific testifiers (including past records of their honesty; current motives,
etc.) and general social context. Finally, even if there were empirical reasons
to assume that we do not filter effectively, there are no reasons to assume
that we cannot learn to filter effectively. According to Fricker, the jury
is out on effectiveness of filtering until we demonstrate that: “Humans are
constitutionally incapable of learning to respond discriminately to testimony.”
(2016, 103, emphasis mine).
Fricker concludes that empirical data cited by Michaelian and Shieber is
insufficient to vindicate the claim that filtering is not effective. This comes
with no surprise, I think, given the requirements she imposes makes it virtu-
ally impossible to vindicate this claim using empirical methods. Fricker does
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not explain in detail how finely we should individuate T-environments, how-
ever, given that T-environments are individuated by appeal to frequency and
manner of false testimony one encounters, we can easily imagine that every-
one would have their own everyday T-environment unlike the T-environment
of any other person or even unlike their own T-environment at different times.
If this sounds radical, let’s take a look at the example Fricker provides.
ELLA: Ella, a teenager, has a circle of friends in which there
is a strong norm of trust and honesty. They very rarely deceive
each other—even to the point of preferring honesty to tactfulness.
In the situation of Ella and her circle lying is infrequent, and
anyone who lies is unpracticed, guilty and embarrassed. The
liar shows tell-tale signs and Ella, no fool and perceptually well-
attuned, is able to detect them. Then Ella’s father gets a new
job, and the family moves to a city in another part of the country.
Ella goes to a new school with very different social conditions
and mores. In her new school, lots of the pupils lie regularly in
pursuit of their own selfish purposes and are practiced and profi-
cient dissemblers. Ella retains the perceptual attunedness she
previously possessed—her “narrow” T-method is the same. But in
her new environment the old skill is not sufficient for the different
and more taxing task of detecting when these cynical streetwise
city kids, her new classmates, are lying. (Fricker, 2016, 97-8)
Now let’s imagine that Ella takes part in an experimental study on decep-
tion detection. If it takes place before she moves to the new city, according to
Fricker’s standards, to actually measure Ella’s detection deception skills, the
setting of the study should replicate the environment of her old school. But
what if the study took place a couple of months after she moved to the new
school? With the environment of the new school becoming her new everyday
T-environment, her filtering skills gradually attune to the reality of the life of
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the “cynical streetwise city kids.” To measure her detection deception skills
after spending a couple of months in the new environment, the study should
replicate the T-environment of the new school. For now, we take into ac-
count still relatively broadly characterized T-environments of the old school
and the new school but there is no principled reason why we should stop
here. Every single student of each of these schools encounters a different set
of testifiers (assuming that no one is their own testifier), which might affect
the frequency and manner of the false testimony they are exposed to, thus,
plausibly, every student has their own T-environment.
Reconstructing such specific individual differences is obviously impossible
in an experimental setting. After all, it is the bread and butter of empirical
research that an experimental design balances between keeping the environ-
ment as natural as possible while simultaneously controlling for variables
that might affect the result. What comes close to fulfilling Fricker’s expec-
tations are studies devoted to deception detection in intimate relationships:
romantic relationships, friendships, or parent-child relationships (Mccornack
and Parks, 1986; Evans et al., 2016; Levine and Knapp, 2018). Interest-
ingly, many of these studies demonstrate that deception detection accuracy
is actually lower in close relationships than between strangers (even though
participants are more confident in their judgment). Others demonstrate that
it is slightly higher in close relationships, but still no higher than 65% (Levine
and Knapp, 2018).
Fricker openly discards the assumption that: “the data which show that
recipients of testimony are bad at detecting lying concern studies in a very
specific experimental setting; but the nature of the findings may nonetheless
be such that it is likely that they will carry over to other situations in which
testimony is given and received.” (Fricker, 2016, 102). Similar assumptions
are fairly standard in social psychology. I do not want to imply that there
are no problems with ecological validity of deception detection research, only
that there is no reason to flat out dismiss them based on this observation.
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What is lacking in Fricker’s critique, is an argument that real-time deception
detection is uniquely environment-dependent and thus virtually impossible
to investigate empirically.
I understand and sympathize with Fricker’s worry that, while appealing
to empirical research in philosophical discussion, we might be tempted to
cherry-pick studies which support our points. That is why it is important
to, whenever it is available, take into account not only particular studies but
also meta-analyses which allow us to recognize general tendencies and derive
unified conclusions from bodies of research consisting of multiple studies.
Meta-analyses available in deception-detection literature point consistently
into the direction of only slightly better than chance accuracy of deception
detection in general population and fairly limited possibility of its improve-
ment by training (Bond and DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig and Bond, 2014; Hauch
et al., 2016; Sternglanz et al., 2019).
In sum, I think that we should reject Fricker’s critique as based on unreal-
istic demands. Empirical research cited by Michaelian and Shieber (together
with further research on deception detection published in the last ten years)
make a very strong case against the real-time effectiveness of filtering. But
I also think that we can do even more to demonstrate that filtering is not
real-time effective. In the next section, I will take up Fricker’s challenge of
demonstrating that: “Humans are constitutionally incapable of learning to
respond discriminately to testimony.” (2016, 103).
2.2 Three models of language comprehension
At the beginning of the previous section, I presented a reconstruction of
Fricker’s account of the testimonial belief-forming process and flagged out
two of its features. First, besides the beliefs about the speaker’s honesty and
competence, the belief-forming process takes as an input the receiver’s belief
about what the speaker said (e.g., that the speaker said that p). Following the
terminology introduced in Chapter 3, I will call such beliefs comprehension-
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based beliefs. Second, based on the input it receives, the belief-forming pro-
cess outputs either a testimonial belief that p or no belief at all.
Here is the model of language comprehension underlying Fricker’s ac-
count: upon hearing or reading an utterance, receivers (i) form comprehension-
based beliefs representing the speaker as asserting12 certain content (p), and
then (ii) either accept or reject p based on the assessment of the speaker’s
honesty and competence, which leads to the formation of a corresponding
testimony based belief that p or no formation of belief. I will call this model
Optional Belief Formation (OBF). If one thinks, as most authors in the de-
bate do, about filtering in terms of OBF, it is natural to assume that the filter
is “located at the entrance” to our belief box and that its role is to keep con-
tents of testimony from unreliable (dishonest or incompetent) sources from
falling into the belief box. OBF is so popular across the current philosophical
debate, that one could assume it is the only game in town. But it is not.13
In an alternative model (Automatic Belief Formation (ABF)), upon com-
prehending an utterance that p, a receiver automatically accepts the content
of this utterance and forms a belief that p.14 Later on, they can reject the
belief and remove that p from their belief box. However, rejection is an ad-
ditional step, which requires extra time and cognitive resources. As I have
already described in Chapter 2, viability of ABF was brought to the attention
of philosophers by research conducted by psychologist Daniel Gilbert and his
colleagues in the early nineties (Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et
al., 1993). In a series of experiments, Gilbert aimed to demonstrate that un-
der cognitive and time pressure, people fail to reject comprehended contents
that are explicitly identified as false. His studies suggest, contra OBF, that
content-acceptance and belief-formation are not optional, but automatic and
12This is the case for assertoric speech. Plausibly, in cases of other speech acts, receivers
represent speakers as asking, ordering, etc.
13It is worth mentioning that Michaelian (2010) is aware of this fact (p. 403, footnote
9). However, for the purpose of his discussion with Fricker, he assumes OBF to be true.
14Since (Gilbert et al., 1990), OBF and ABF are often called Cartesian and Spinozan
model, respectively. Cf. Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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mandatory. Gilbert’s research had a big impact on Ruth Millikan’s theory
of language comprehension (Millikan, 2004, 2005) and Eric Mandelbaum’s
(Mandelbaum, 2014; Mandelbaum and Quilty-Dunn, 2015) and Andy Egan’s
(2008) theory of belief formation in general.15
If one thinks about filtering in terms of ABF, one has to assume that
there is only filtering ex post. Nothing could prevent the initial formation of
a belief that p based on comprehension of an assertion that p. This sounds
(and indeed is) very radical. What about the comprehension of blatantly false
and improbable assertions? Do I automatically form beliefs that Paris is in
Germany or that the Earth is flat upon hearing these pieces of information
being asserted?
As I argued extensively in Chapter 2, thirty years of empirical research
on language comprehension since Gilbert’s seminal studies suggest that nei-
ther OBF nor ABF gives a fully accurate picture of language comprehension
(Hasson et al., 2005; Street and Richardson, 2015; Kissine and Klein, 2013).
Apparently, contra OBF, a lot of what we comprehend is in fact automat-
ically accepted before the credibility of the speaker is taken into account
(Spark and Rapp, 2011; Nadarevic and Erdfelder, 2013; Weil et al., 2019).
However, contra ABF, we do not accept contents that are glaringly incon-
sistent with our active or easily accessible background knowledge. Besides
the source-oriented filter commonly discussed in the philosophy of testimony,
there is a content-oriented filter which the literature on language compre-
hension calls validation, and which prevents us from believing obviously false
information (Singer, 2013, 2019; Schroeder et al., 2008; Richter et al., 2009;
Isberner and Richter, 2014; Richter, 2015).16
Based on these considerations, in Chapter 2 I proposed a dual-stream
model of language comprehension. The first stream is faster and entirely
15Mandelbaum (2014) offers an excellent discussion of Gilbert’s research and its philo-
sophical consequences.
16The suggestion that filtering has to be both content-oriented and source-oriented ap-
pears also, e.g., in Sperber et al. (2010), Sperber (2013), Levine (2019a).
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content-oriented. It updates contents of comprehended assertions into our
belief box unless they are filtered out by validation. For example, if Liz
comprehends Tom’s utterance that p, this stream processes only the content
of the utterance (p), and forms a belief that p, unless p is obviously false.
The second stream is slower and source-oriented. Just like OBF, it operates
on representations of contents as produced by a given speaker (e.g., that Tom
asserted that p). In this stream some contents are filtered out because they
come from unreliable sources. For example, if Liz knew that Tom is a prolific
liar, the content p could be filtered out as being asserted by Tom. Crucially,
however, it is not the case that based on the result of the second form of
filtering (as OBF and philosophical common view assume) subjects either
form a belief that p or no belief at all. The first, content-oriented stream
is faster. Therefore, if the content of the assertion passes the gatekeeper of
validation, that p is already in the subject’s belief box. Monitoring for the
trustworthiness and competence of the source can thus, at most, trigger an
attempt of belief revision but does not prevent its formation.
Furthermore, in this model, each stream has its respective real-time filter:
validation and source monitoring. Unfortunately, neither of these filters turns
out to be effective. Validation filters out only blatantly false and inconsistent
information, but it remains virtually helpless against plausible falsehoods
(Isberner and Richter, 2014; Marsh et al., 2016). Source oriented filtering,
on the other hand, not only has all the problems enumerated by Michaelian
and Shieber, but it can at most trigger an attempt to remove already accepted
contents from our belief box.
If this model is correct, we go a long way towards demonstrating that:
“Humans are constitutionally incapable of learning to respond discriminately
to testimony.” (Fricker, 2016, 103) While posing this challenge, Fricker fo-
cused on the possibility of the improvement of filtering as it is conceptualized
in OBF. But the truth about the mechanisms underlying the comprehension
of testimony seems to be more complicated than OBF suggests. There are
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good reasons to assume that comprehension consists of two streams and that
the faster stream does not involve any source-oriented filtering. Some authors
suggest that the form of language processing taking place in the faster stream
might be phylogenetically prior, and more directly related to the visual per-
ception (Kissine and Klein, 2013). If this is right, the evolved cognitive setup
of our comprehension is not optimized for perfect discrimination between re-
liable and unreliable testimony, and there is no reason to think that we can
alter this predicament if we just try harder.
In this section, I argued that filtering is not effective in the real-time,
i.e., the process of filtering, which takes place simultaneously with or right
after the process of comprehension, does not allow a particular hearer on a
particular occasion to prevent the formation of beliefs based on untrustworthy
testimony. Now I proceed to the second part of my discussion on filtering.
It is concerned with its long-term effectiveness.
3 Long-term effectiveness of filtering
The discussion about filtering within the epistemology of testimony is pre-
dominantly occupied with the matter of its real-time effectiveness. But (i)
filtering which we perform is not necessarily limited to the real-time filtering
(i.e., filtering taking place upon or right after comprehending given testi-
mony), and (ii) filtering might bring benefits only in the long run, i.e., might
be long-term effective without being real-time effective.
Both (i) and (ii) are suggested by Dan Sperber (2013) in his response to
Michaelian’s (2013) critique of Sperber et al.’s (2010) paper about epistemic
vigilance.17 In his (2013), Michaelian deploys a set of arguments similar to
these which he offered in (Michaelian, 2010) and which I have summarized
17Sperber and his colleagues define epistemic vigilance as “a suite of cognitive mecha-
nisms. . . targeted at the risk of being misinformed by others” (2010, 359). This is exactly
what I mean by the filter (see footnote 3), thus, I will use epistemic vigilance and the filter
interchangeably.
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above, but this time he directs them towards a different opponent. While in
(Michaelian, 2010) his target was Fricker’s assumption that filtering is real-
time effective and thus provides grounds for a theory of reductive testimonial
justification, (Michaelian, 2013) swings at Sperber et al.’s (2010) claim that
epistemic vigilance is central for “ensuring reliability and hence the evolu-
tionary stability of communication” (Michaelian, 2013, 37). The evidence
from deception detection literature—Michaelian argues—indicates that even
if recipients usually avoid being deceived, it is not due to the effectiveness of
epistemic vigilance or filtering.
In his response, Sperber (2013) points out that Michaelian’s account of
vigilance is too narrow:
Michaelian seems to attribute to us the view that ‘epistemic vig-
ilance is a matter of processes devoted to screening out incom-
ing false information on the basis of available behavioural cues’.
Showing that vigilance in this narrow sense is not efficient would,
he holds, be quite damaging to our conjecture. This is a misun-
derstanding. (Sperber, 2013, 65)
This is a misunderstanding, because there is much more to effective fil-
tering than real-time deception detection based on behavioral cues. Not less
important are such skills as “drawing inferences from remembered past com-
municative performance, understanding the sender’s immediate purpose in
communicating, or taking into account the sender’s reputation.” (Sperber,
2013, 65).18 What is, however, central to Sperber’s account, is that epis-
temic vigilance understood in this broader fashion, is crucial for shaping our
social reality. As summarized in the title of his paper: “Speakers are honest
because hearers are vigilant.” This hypothesis arises from two independent,
18Instead of reputation, which is a purely social phenomenon, it might be better to
talk about psycho-social demeanor, i.e., “a constellation of inter-correlated behaviors that
function as a gestalt, relating to how people present themselves, the image they convey to
others, and how they are perceived by others.” (Levine, 2014, 3).
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well-established, and fairly minimal observations. Firstly, some of us are
occasionally successful in detecting dishonesty,19 either in the real-time or
(substantially more often) with a delay.20 Secondly, being caught on dis-
honesty triggers social retribution (Dunbar, 1996; Dessalles, 2007; Sperber
and Baumard, 2012). The combination of these two factors puts pressure on
speakers, and results in a high incentive to honesty:
Quasi-universal vigilance makes dishonesty less likely to be ben-
eficial in the short run and more likely to be costly in the long
run: falsehoods may be disbelieved, and dishonesty may have
reputational costs. (Sperber, 2013, 69)
But maybe speakers are naturally inclined to honesty independently of
hearer’s vigilance? This seems to be implied by Timothy Levine in his Truth-
Default-Theory (TDT) (Levine, 2014, 2019a). According to Levine, it is an
empirical fact that dishonesty is not very prevalent. As indicated by survey
studies conducted in the US, UK, Netherlands, Japan, and Korea (Serota et
al., 2010; Halevy et al., 2014; Serota and Levine, 2015; see also discussion in
Levine, 2019a, Chapter 9), “[m]ost communication by most people is honest
most of the time” (Levine, 2014, 9) while the majority of lies are produced by
a few prolific liars.21 Interestingly, Levine explicitly rejects the speculation
about an evolutionary arm-race between speaker’s benefiting from deception
and hearer’s benefiting from deception detection. Thus, at least seemingly,
he contradicts Sperber:
This is where TDT departs from almost all evolutionary thinking
about deception. I have heard and read the argument many times
19Solbu and Frank’s (2019) argue that we might be collectively effective in catching lies
thanks to the fact that “some individuals are more apt at being good lie detectors” (p.
40).
20Cf. Park et al. (2002).
21Obviously, we have to approach this kind of studies with great caution; they are
typically based on self-report surveys conducted within specific, contemporary populations
(Sperber, 2013, 67). But there is no reason to cast them aside entirely.
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that since humans evolved to deceive, we must have evolved the
ability to detect deception. Evolution, it is argued, necessitates
a coevolutionary arms race between the ability to deceive and
the ability to detect. . . I do not think that accepting evolution
requires accepting a coevolutionary struggle between the ability
to deceive and the ability to detect deception in real time. (Levine,
2019a, 187, emphasis mine)
As we see, Levine rejects the hypothesis that the arms race promotes
evolution of the ability to detect deception in the real-time. But this is
not what Sperber argues for. What he argues for is that the evolutionary
arm race forced the receivers to develop a suite of filtering skills, which are
effective in the long-term: by shaping our social reality into one in which
deception is risky and difficult. This much seems to be at least compatible
with Levine’s own observations:
We have created cultures, religions, and socialization that seek
to prevent deception. . . Prevention is not 100% effective. . . Pre-
vention reduces the prevalence and risk of deception to make the
truth-default payoff stronger. It’s more efficient to prevent de-
ception than to evolve brains well suited to real-time deception
detection. (Levine, 2019a, 189, emphasis mine)
In this quote Levine speaks as if prevention was restricted to social con-
ventions and constraints. But if we look under the hood of his theory, we
will see that what he postulates is almost indistinguishable from Sperber’s
vigilance. Based on the evidence about the prevalence of honesty and the
ineffectiveness of the real-time deception detection, Levine formulates the
core of his Truth-Default-Theory: it is adaptive for participants in communi-
catory exchanges “to operate on a default presumption that what the other
person says is basically honest” (Levine, 2014, 1). A receiver operating under
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this presumption remains in what Levine calls a truth-default state. However,
the truth-default state can be abandoned:
The truth-default state requires a trigger event to abandon it.
Trigger events include, but are not limited to (a) a projected
motive for deception, (b) behavioral displays associated with dis-
honest demeanor, (c) a lack of coherence in message content, (d) a
lack of correspondence between communication content and some
knowledge of reality, or (e) information from a third party warn-
ing of potential deception. (Levine, 2014, 9)
Of course, trigger events themselves have to be detected somehow to push
a receiver out from the default-state.22 Therefore, some kind of “low-key
monitoring” (Sperber, 2013, 64) or sensitivity to possible deception has to
be active all the time, even in the truth-default state.23 Despite superficial
differences, Levine and Sperber’s theories are compatible. Moreover, they are
both simultaneously supported by the evolutionary hypothesis clearly stated
by Sperber, as well as the empirical research about the prevalence of honesty
collected by Levine.
To sum up. Even though filtering is not real-time effective, it is effective
in the long-term. It is not real-time effective because it does not reliably block
false contents of comprehended testimonies from falling into our belief box.
There are two reasons why this is not the case. First, as argued by Michaelian
and Shieber, we are really bad in identifying unreliable testimonies on the
22A similar picture is suggested by Lipton (2007) in his default-trigger model of tes-
timony. According to Lipton, upon encountering a trigger event, a receiver leaves the
default mode and enters the evaluative mode “where he pauses to consider whether he
should believe what he has been told” (Lipton, 2007, 241).
23Obviously, once receivers abandon the truth-default state upon detecting a trigger
event, they do not become able to effectively detect deception in the real-time. Instead,
they become suspicious and motivated to look for further evidence of speaker’s dishonesty.
This might lead—typically with a delay—to identifying given content as false: “most lies
are detected after-the-fact based on either confessions or the discovery of some evidence
showing that what was said was false.” (Levine, 2014, 6).
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fly. It is, thus, quite uncommon that upon comprehending a testimony we
are in possession of reliable information about a speaker’s dishonesty, which
we could use as a reason not to accept the testimony. Second, as I have
argued in Section 2.2 and more extensively in Chapter 2, the very idea that,
each time we comprehend a given assertoric utterance, we are free to either
accept or reject it, is plausibly based on an idealized and inaccurate picture
of linguistic comprehension. If my dual-stream model of comprehension is on
the right track, we accept what is said in comprehended assertoric utterances
upon only minimal, content-oriented filtering (validation).
Nevertheless, it does not mean that filtering is pointless. Quite the oppo-
site, as I argued in this section, in the long-term filtering makes dishonesty
both costly and risky, and thus far less prevalent than it would have been
was filtering absent. In the next section, I spell out the consequences this
picture has for the debate about the epistemology of testimony.
4 Strong anti-reductionism
Are we by default entitled to believe what we are being told? To answer
“no” is to support some sort of reductionism about testimonial entitlement;
to answer “yes” is to support some sort of anti-reductionism. In this final sec-
tion, I will argue for a particular version of anti-reductionism, which results
from the above considerations. As I mentioned in the introduction, the very
idea that we perform some sort of filtering is not contradictory with anti-
reductionism (cf. Goldberg, 2007). Many anti-reductionists suggest that we
should distinguish filtering understood as actively looking for reasons to trust
a testifier (required by reductionism), from filtering understood as sensitivity
to potential signals of dishonesty or incompetence.
A version of anti-reductionism, which ascribes a central role to filtering,
is offered by Peter Graham (2010). I have already introduced elements of his
theory in Chapter 3, but it is worth reminding some of its crucial aspects here.
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Graham formulates his account based on the theory of etiological functions
(Millikan, 1984). An etiological function of an item is “the effect of the
ancestors of the item that explains why the item was replicated” (Graham,
2010, 154). The etiological function of the heart is to pump blood. We have
hearts because the effect of pumping blood was beneficial for the systems
equipped with organs that were evolutionary ancestors of modern human
hearts. Hearts have also other effects, e.g., they make a thumping sound.
However, since making the sound is not the effect that has let the ancestors
of our hearts pass the natural selection, it is not the etiological function
of the heart of a modern human. Additionally, it is one thing to have an
etiological function and another to function normally. A heart failure may
prevent a particular heart from pumping blood, but the heart does not lose
its function of pumping blood. It simply does not function normally, i.e., in
accordance with its etiological function.
Graham applies the theory of etiological functions to the problem of epis-
temic entitlement in general (Graham, 2012) and the problem of entitlement
of testimony-based beliefs in particular (Graham, 2010). According to his
theory: (i) beliefs formed by normally functioning belief-forming processes
that have forming true beliefs reliably as a function enjoy prima facie pro
tanto entitlement; (ii) comprehension-with-filtering is a belief-forming pro-
cess that has forming true beliefs reliably as a function. Therefore, testimo-
nial beliefs, which are formed by comprehension-with-filtering of assertoric
utterances, enjoy prima facie pro tanto entitlement. But why think that
(ii) is true? According to Graham, it is an etiological function both of asser-
tion and comprehension of assertoric utterances to induce true hearer beliefs.
However, comprehension alone might not induce true hearer’s beliefs reliably.
This is exactly where filtering helps:
I am happy to grant the possibility that comprehension taken
alone, comprehension without filtering, may fail to have inducing
true beliefs reliably as a function. . .My thesis is that comprehen-
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sion-with-filtering has forming true beliefs reliably as a function,
not comprehension neat, comprehension taken alone. It’s the fil-
tering, or so I argue, that is for producing a sufficiently high truth
ratio. (Graham, 2010, 170, emphasis mine)
Recently, Mona Simion and Christoph Kelp (2018; cf. Simion, 2020)
classified Graham’s view as a version of moderate, as opposed to strong, anti-
reductionism. According to strong anti-reductionism, we are prima facie
entitled to believe whatever we are being told. An a priori form of strong
reductionism is defended by Tyler Burge (1993; see discussion in Graham,
2018), and an a posteriori form of strong anti-reductionism based on the
social contract (Testimonial contractarianism) is defended by Mona Simion
(2020). According to moderate anti-reductionism, on the other hand, some
additional condition has to be met for our testimony-based beliefs to enjoy
prima facie entitlement. In Graham’s (2010) theory, this additional condition
is that the beliefs have to be produced by the process of comprehension-with-
filtering.
What is particularly interesting for my discussion, while criticizing Gra-
ham’s account, Simion and Kelp appeal to Michaelian’s arguments against
the real-time effectiveness of filtering (Simion and Kelp, 2018, 2854-5). Gra-
ham in fact combines comprehension-with-filtering into a single belief-forming
process, and claims that only such a complex process produces true beliefs
reliably, but the role played by filtering in Graham’s account is in fact much
more complex. He never says that filtering is real-time effective in the sense
discussed in Section 2 above. He says that “filtering involves sensitivity to
counter-considerations: where there are counter considerations of a certain
sort, acceptance would be less likely” (Graham, 2010, 153, emphasis mine).
Moreover, Graham is well aware that filtering is long-term effective in the
way similar to the one I described in Section 3: “Filtering . . . plays a very
important role; it ensures the reliability of beliefs formed on the basis of
comprehension, for misleading or untrustworthy assertions often get filtered
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out.” (Graham, 2010, 173). If untrustworthy assertions were never filtered
out, speakers would lack the incentive to speak truly and, in effect, produc-
ing true hearer’s beliefs would not stabilize as the etiological function of the
speech act of assertion.
I think that what might be misleading in Graham’s account is the op-
position between the process of comprehension taken alone and the process
of comprehension-with-filtering. For everyone, (except maybe very small
children—I will discuss this matter shortly) there is no comprehension with-
out filtering. Even though they are mostly ineffective in the real-time, some
basic filtering mechanisms (such as validation discussed in Section 2.2) al-
ways accompany linguistic comprehension. At the same time, we are prima
facie entitled to believe whatever we are being told, not because we are likely
to recognize if an utterance we are about to hear is false, but because we op-
erate in a social environment in which, due to the long-term effectiveness
of filtering, dishonesty is risky, costly and thus, not very prevalent. Given
that there is no comprehension without filtering, we are prima facie enti-
tled to believe whatever we are being told. This is strong, not moderate,
anti-reductionism.24
But maybe this clear and harmonious picture is marred if we take into
consideration testimonial beliefs acquired by small children? Do comprehen-
sion and filtering fall apart in this case? I do not think so. First, if we
realize that filtering consists of a multitude of mechanisms: some very so-
phisticated (like paying attention to someone’s social demeanor), some much
more primitive (like detecting incongruences between what one says and our
background, e.g., perceptual information), it is quite likely that some basic
forms of filtering appear in children’s development simultaneously with the
ability to comprehend language. Given that this type of filtering does not
have to be real-time effective (to filter does not mean to filter effectively
24It is not obvious to me whether what I present here is an available “strong reading” of
Graham’s theory or a distinct theory generated by strengthening Graham’s account.
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in the real-time), I do not find this possibility hard to accept. But even if
it would turn out that, on some early stages of development, children are
already able to comprehend language but lack any sort of filtering mecha-
nisms, their comprehension is a comprehension-without-filtering only in the
internalist sense. They themselves cannot perform the cognitive process of
comprehension-with-filtering.25 However, as I have argued throughout this
chapter, human communication is never fully bereft of filtering. The social
context in which all of us (including small children) operate, is shaped by
the long-term effectiveness of filtering. It is sufficient that all adult receivers
are, to different degrees, vigilant all the time, for all our beliefs based on the
comprehension of testimony to enjoy prima facie entitlement.
This view bears important similarities to the way of treating the problem
of childhood testimony by Sanford Goldberg (2007).26 Goldberg suggests
that, while assessing whether a child acquired knowledge by comprehending
a given testimony, we should take into consideration the context in which it
happened, especially the role played by the child’s adult guardians. Accord-
ing to Goldberg, adult caretakers actively monitor their child’s environment
and thus “enhance the reliability of a good many of the beliefs that are elicited
by the child’s encounters with testimony” (2007, 221). While Goldberg’s
anti-individualism relies on active-monitoring, the view outlined here can be
characterized as a form of anti-individualism based on passive-monitoring.
Taken separately, and from the perspective of a particular instance of recep-
tion of testimony, we are all nearly child-like vulnerable to acquiring false
beliefs. Our ability to detect deception in the real-time is only slightly better
than chance. However, being vigilant by default, every adult language user
constantly takes care of the whole linguistic community. Thanks to the long-
term effectiveness of filtering, human linguistic communication takes place
25Which might be enough to make the view presented here incompatible with Graham’s
original account.
26But notice that Goldberg focuses on the acquisition of knowledge, while I focus only
on prima facie entitlement.
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in a sufficiently well-monitored context to make us prima facie entitled to
believe whatever we are being told.
Finally, I think that the view presented here complements Simion’s (2020)
Testimonial contractarianism. According to Testimonial contractarianism,
we are prima facie entitled to believe whatever we are being told because,
in virtue of the social contract in play, speakers are by default compliant
with the norms governing speech acts (in particular, the knowledge norm of
assertion: one should only assert that p if one knows that p.). Speakers are
by default compliant with these norms, because this is the rational thing to
do if one is not oriented towards one’s straightforward and immediate self-
interest, but towards long-term, constrained self-interest (Simion, 2020, 23).
If we were oriented towards maximizing only straightforward self-interests,
it would be rational to lie whenever a given lie might bring about immediate
benefits. But since we are oriented towards constrained self-interest, the
fact that our lies might be detected (immediately or with a delay; by the
receiver themselves or by someone else in the community) changes what is
the rational thing to do. Social reputation, which we risk if we are caught
on unreliable testimony, is often more valuable than whatever we gain by
lying in a particular situation. Thus, what makes it beneficial for speakers to
comply with the norms governing speech acts and thus, with a social contract
like the one proposed by Simion, is that filtering is long-term effective. The
normativity of language use described by Simion seems to be grounded in the
psychology and epistemology of the language use described in this chapter.
There is one more, maybe the most radical, conclusion resulting from my
discussion in this chapter. Even though currently available empirical data
does not allow us to establish it with full certainty, it might be the case that
strong anti-reductionism is the only epistemology of testimony that fits our
psychological setup. This would be the case if the model of comprehension
in which we are always free to choose whether we are going to believe what
we are being told (OBF) would turn out to be a false idealization. As I
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suggested, it is probable that comprehension of assertoric utterances leads to
automatic acceptance of almost everything that is being said; with rejection
being available only ex-post and requiring extra effort. If this is right, it is
good that we are prima facie entitled to believe whatever we are being told,
because that is exactly what we do.
5 Concluding remarks
So, is filtering effective? In this chapter, I have argued that we should look
at this question from a broader perspective. Filtering is not real-time effec-
tive because it does not allow us to respond discriminatingly to particular
instances of testimony. We are really bad in online deception detection. But
filtering is long-term effective because all (at least all adult) language users
are routinely vigilant and being caught on a lie is socially disadvantageous.
In result, filtering prevents us from forming a large number of false testimo-
nial beliefs not by turning each of us into a high-functioning polygraph, but
by turning the social environment of our communication into one in which
such polygraphs are not required.
This way of looking at the effectiveness of filtering allows us to reconsider
the role that language comprehension plays in the acquisition of testimony-
based beliefs. In particular, it allows us to come to terms with a growing body
of empirical research, suggesting that we are not free to either accept or reject
whatever we comprehend. It is quite likely that acceptance is the default
reaction to comprehended content, and thus real-time effective filtering is
simply impossible. Finally, on the ground of the debate about testimonial
entitlement, by ascribing the central role to the long-term effectiveness of
filtering, these considerations support a form of strong anti-reductionism, i.e.,
a view according to which we are prima facie entitled to believe whatever we
are being told.
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Chapter 5
Understanding a communicated
thought
1
Abstract. The goal of this chapter is twofold. First, we argue
that the understanding one has of a proposition or a propositional
content of a representational vehicle is a species of what contem-
porary epistemologists characterise as objectual understanding.
Second, we demonstrate that even though this type of under-
standing differs from linguistic understanding, in many instances
of successful communication, these two types of understanding
jointly contribute to understanding a communicated thought.
1 Introduction
Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture. As a competent English
speaker, you understand what you have just read. You have read that Grigory
Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture. We call this kind of understanding,
1Co-authored with J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon. Material from: Carter, J.A.,
Gordon, E.C., Grodniewicz, J.P., “Understanding a communicated thought.” Synthese
(2020), doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02854-2 Springer Nature.
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however one would like to characterise it in detail,2 linguistic understanding.
Linguistic understanding of a given utterance differs from understanding
of a proposition expressed by this utterance.3 To understand the proposition
Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture, it is not sufficient to recog-
nize, that this is what utterances of the English sentence “Grigory Perelman
proved the Poincaré conjecture” express in certain contexts. Prima facie, it
seems plausible that Fields Medal recipient Terence Tao has a rich under-
standing of the proposition Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture,
while a fourteen-year-old not particularly interested in mathematics—very
minimal. Nevertheless, as competent English speakers, they would both
agree that this is precisely what is said in the first sentence of the previous
paragraph.
There is clearly an epistemic difference between understanding a propo-
sition and mere linguistic understanding. What is it? Epistemologists of
understanding have by and large been inclined to set this question aside.
For example, according to Stephen Grimm (2011), epistemologists seek to
uncover the nature of
. . . understanding of the natural world (broadly understood), and
little will be said about how—if at all—the approaches on offer
here might relate, for example, to the kind of linguistic under-
standing we have of concepts or meanings. . . [because] the way
in which we achieve understanding in these areas seems different
enough that it deserves to be dealt with separately (2011, 84, our
italics).4
2We come back to this question in Section 4.
3We take propositions to be whatever plays the role of contents or objects of attitudes
(e.g., belief) and speech acts (e.g., assertion), and semantic values of utterances of sentences
in context. We say more on this topic in Section 3.
4Grimm uses the term “linguistic understanding” in a very broad sense in which it
includes grasping concepts and understanding propositions as meanings of linguistic ex-
pressions. We devote Section 4 to argue that the types of understanding we have of
propositions and of linguistic entities are distinct.
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We disagree. At least, we disagree with the thought that understanding
what people tell us (broadly speaking) is interestingly unlike the kind of
understanding we have of the natural world, epistemically speaking.
Here is the plan for the chapter. In Section 2, we briefly outline some
of the key epistemic features of what epistemologists call objectual under-
standing, e.g., the kind of understanding one might have of a subject matter,
such as football or geometry, and how this is typically thought to differ from
(mere) propositional knowledge possession.5 Next, we show that understand-
ing a proposition is just a special case of objectual understanding, viz. the
understanding one attains only when one grasps (in an appropriate way) the
relations between the constituents of a body of information. In Section 4,
we demonstrate how it is that understanding a proposition and linguistic
understanding are distinct from one another. Nevertheless, the two types
of understanding are closely related; as we argue in Section 5, they jointly,
and indispensably, contribute to what we call understanding a communi-
cated thought, an important species of understanding that is distinct from,
but consists of, both.
2 The epistemology of objectual understanding
A widely held view in epistemology is that objectual understanding is a richer
cognitive good than mere propositional knowledge.6 Objectual understand-
ing attributions take the form “S understands ϕ” where ϕ is (or, can be
treated as) as subject matter. “Giles understands algebraic geometry” and
“Darla understands football” are paradigmatic sorts of objectual understand-
ing attributions; note that the relations between Giles and algebraic geometry
and Darla and football (respectively) are relations between agents and, not
5Though see Kelp (2016) for resistance to this orthodoxy.
6For instance, Grimm (2011); Elgin (2009); Zagzebski (2001); Greco (2014); Riggs
(2003, 2009); Bengson and Moffett (2011) and Kvanvig (2020).
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explanations (as in the case of understanding-why7) but objects—viz, bodies
of information. The view that objectual understanding can be in some way
reduced to knowing an aggregate of propositions is – unlike the correspond-
ing view that understanding-why can be reduced to propositional knowledge
– widely rejected,8 and there are three key reasons for this: the argument
from luck, the argument from degrees, and the argument from regress.9
The argument from luck goes as follows: Gettier-style cases feature a
kind of epistemic luck that is widely taken to be incompatible with propo-
sitional knowledge (Pritchard 2005, 2015). If (objectual) understanding is a
species of propositional knowledge, we should be able to generate Gettier-
style cases for objectual understanding. But we cannot. Therefore, objectual
understanding is not a species of propositional knowledge.10
To use Kvanvig’s (2003) often-cited example here, suppose the subject
matter under consideration is the “Comanche dominance of the southern
plains of North America from the late seventeenth until the late nineteenth
century” (2003, 197). A student checks out and reads a book from the library
on this topic, retains the information and can answer relevant questions af-
terwards, to the extent that it is natural to attribute to her an understanding
of the relevant subject matter. Here’s the twist: while each statement in the
book read by the student was true, the fact that this is so was the result of a
random and fortuitous glitch at the printers, which by dumb luck corrected
for all the mistakes. As a result, all the true beliefs formed by reading the
book are only accidentally true (e.g., Gettiered). As Kvanvig sees it, this
7For a substantial discussion of understanding-why, see Hills (2016).
8If explanatory understanding is reducible to propositional knowledge, then Khalifa’s
(2013) proposal stands to motivate an avenue for reducing objectual understanding to
propositional knowledge by way of reducing objectual understanding to explanatory un-
derstanding.
9Cf. Kvanvig (2012) for an argument to the effect that understanding, rather than
knowledge, has the property of satisfying curiosity.
10Zagzebski (2001) and Kvanvig (2003) were among the first to suggest that objectual
understanding is (unlike propositional knowledge) compatible with Gettier-style epistemic
luck.
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discovery should not lead us to withdraw the initial claim that the student
understands the subject matter in question even though it should be enough
to lead us to deny that the student possesses the relevant items of proposi-
tional knowledge. Accordingly, Kvanvig reasons, objectual understanding is
(unlike knowledge) compatible with Gettier-style luck11, and thus, the former
is not a species of the latter.
Variations on the argument from degrees have been widely defended (e.g.,
Kvanvig, 2003; Pritchard, 2009; Zagzebski, 2001; Riggs, 2003; Grimm, 2012).
The core reasoning goes as follows. Objectual understanding is gradient.
Whenever one understands something, we can ask to what degree they un-
derstand it. Propositional knowledge is not gradient in this way. You either
know something or you do not: two people can’t know that something is
true to different degrees. This is so even if the two knowers differ with re-
spect to how well justified they are in believing the target proposition.12 But
if objectual understanding is just a function of knowledge possession—viz.,
knowledge of a conjunction of propositions—understanding will not be gra-
dient any more than propositional knowledge of a conjunction is gradient.
11As Pritchard (2009) has pointed out, Kvanvig’s case becomes even more compelling
if we add a twist to the details: suppose Kvanvig’s case is modified so that it becomes a
barn-façade-style case, where the relevant epistemic luck at play is environmental rather
than intervening. To do this, just imagine the book is itself a book each proposition of
which the author knew (and so, none of which is Gettierized). But, for the twist, now
suppose that this book is surrounded on its shelf by books in the library with inaccurate
accounts of the Comanche dominance of the American plains—placed there by a jokester
(who overlooked only the genuine book picked by the student). While, à la barn façade
cases, propositional knowledge is incompatible with environmental luck—viz., where the
belief could easily have been false despite nothing actually going awry (compare: Russell’s
stopped clock case)—it would seem especially strange to deny that our student understands
the Comanche dominance of the American plains simply because he could have easily read
a misleading book. Cf. Grimm (2006) for a challenge to the view that understanding
differs from knowledge in its resilience to epistemic luck.
12See, however, Pavese (2017) for some resistance to this idea in the context of the
relationship between knowing how and knowing that. For a more general rejection of this
idea, see Hetherington’s defence of epistemic graduatlism (e.g., Hetherington, 2001, 2011,
2013). For criticism of Hetherington’s gradualist position, see e.g., Ginet (2010); Leite
(2006); and Faulkner (2003).
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Therefore, objectual understanding is not a species of propositional knowl-
edge.13
Thirdly, the argument from regress proceeds as follows. If possessing ob-
jectual understanding is a matter of knowing propositions, then we should
expect that, for any (understandable) subject matter (or body of informa-
tion) ϕ, there are some n propositions p such that (i) p1, p2, . . . , pn are parts
of ϕ and (ii) S’s knowing these n propositions suffices for S’s understanding
ϕ. However—and for reasons that parallel the kind of reasoning that features
in Lewis Carroll’s (1895) “anti-intellectualist” regress14 (cf., Ryle, 1945)—it
remains an open question, for any given number of ϕ-relevant propositions
one knows (and for any further item of propositional knowledge one might
add to what one already knows), whether one understands ϕ. Just as, per
Carroll and Ryle, drawing an inference plausibly requires some kind of abil-
ity, so does understanding.15 As Kvanvig (2003, 192) remarks, one can know
various items of information but “understanding is achieved only when [these]
informational items are pieced together by the subject in question,”16 and the
mere possession of such information does not, as this line of argument goes,
entail that one is either able or disposed to do this. (Just imagine, for exam-
ple, a pupil who fails to understand geometry despite coming to know, via
reliable testimony with no defeaters, a range of propositions about geometry
that a trusted teacher tells him).
What does this ability involve? According to Riggs (2003, 20–21) it in-
volves seeing how the various parts of the understood subject matter “hang
together”, something one does only if one “grasps” the relevant relations be-
tween the propositions making up the subject matter. Thus, as Grimm
13The degree constraint applies primarily to objectual understanding and is less obvious
vis-à-vis explanatory understanding (i.e. understanding-why).
14For some resistance to this line of argument, as well as to Ryle’s variation on it in the
case of know-how, see Pavese (2015).
15Elgin (2009) makes a similar point in suggesting that possessing objectual understand-
ing is not simply a matter of believing a long conjunction of relevant propositions.
16Our italics.
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(2014) puts it: to understand one must “be able to see or grasp how changes
in some of these items will lead (or fail to lead) to changes in the others.”17
The idea is that S understands ϕ only if S grasps certain relationships be-
tween the relevant parts that constitute ϕ; Kvanvig and Grimm have referred
to what specifically is grasped as coherence-making relations, though how to
best characterise the grasping requirement remains an issue of some contro-
versy.18
3 Understanding of a proposition
The matter of how to understand the “grasping” metaphor has been a cen-
tral issue in work on understanding across disciplines.19 For one thing, the
grasping metaphor features prominently in an issue at the intersection of
epistemology, the philosophy of mind and cognitive science—specifically, with
regard to what counts as grasping a concept. However, the question driving
this debate can easily be rephrased as a question about concept possession20
as opposed to a question about grasping, (and understanding), per se. But
what about the debate concerning propositions and propositional contents?
Propositions play a number of central roles in our mental and social lives.
They function as:
• Objects or contents of attitudes like belief, speech acts like assertion,
and perhaps others in each category;
• (Partial) meanings of utterances of declarative sentences, and perhaps
others;
17See here also Hills (2009) for a similar proposal.
18For an alternative view, see Kelp (2015), according to whom the understanding-
relevant relations between propositions are best characterised as basing relations.
19For discussion, see Grimm (2011).
20See here, for example, Bealer (1998); Boghossian (2003); Peacocke (1989); Millar
(1994).
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• Referents of ‘that’-clauses;
• (Primary?) bearers of truth and falsity, and the modalities of truth
and falsity: necessity, possibility, probability (subjective or epistemic,
objective or metaphysical);
• What gets assessed in determining the validity of arguments.
(García-Carpintero and Jespersen, 2019, 1210)
As we noted at the outset, it is typical of those working on the episte-
mology of objectual understanding to set the matter of what is involved in
understanding a propositions (viz., what play the above roles) aside as though
what would be involved—epistemically—in such understanding is fundamen-
tally different from what would be involved epistemically in understanding
the “natural world” (Grimm, 2011). But why think this, exactly?
Let us come back to the example we presented briefly in the introduc-
tion. Terence Tao and a fourteen-year-old read an utterance of an English
sentence “Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture.” As a result,
they both entertain21 the proposition Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré
conjecture. Nevertheless, it is at least prima facie plausible that Terence
Tao’s epistemic relation to this proposition is somehow different than the
fourteen-year-old’s (just as Terence Tao’s relation to geometric topology is
different than the fourteen-year-old’s). The difference lies in the fact that
Tao has a rich degree of understanding of the discussed proposition (and the
whole field of geometric topology). The fourteen-year-old, on the other hand,
has a minimal or no understanding of either of these subject matters.
In this section, we would like to defend two theses:
21We use entertain here as an umbrella term for whatever type of cognitive attitude one
has towards the proposition after comprehending an utterance of a sentence expressing
this proposition. Importantly, we do not claim that entertaining is a sui generis kind of
mental attitude.
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Weaker thesis: the kind of understanding we aim to have of
propositions is similar to the kind of understanding-as-grasping
that contemporary epistemologists call objectual understanding.
Stronger thesis: the kind of understanding we aim to have
of propositions is type-identical to the kind of understanding-as-
grasping that contemporary epistemologists call objectual under-
standing.
We would like to keep our discussion as neutral as possible with regard
to the vast and venerable debate about the nature of propositions. The only
assumption we make is that propositions are structured, i.e., that they “are
complex entities, entities having parts or constituents, where the constituents
are bound together in a certain way” (King 2019).22,23
A convincing argument suggesting that propositions (or at least propo-
sitional contents of mental attitudes) are complex and structured entities
appeals to their productivity and systematicity.24 Propositional contents are
productive because anyone with basic conceptual repertoire can, at least in
principle, entertain infinitely many of them. If you can entertain a proposi-
tion that the chair stands next to the table, and you have a concept of SOFA,
you can entertain a proposition that the sofa stands next to the table, etc.
22In fact, our account of understanding of a proposition does not require any substantive
metaphysical commitment to the “hidden natures” of propositions. It is compatible with
deflationary views about propositions according to which either propositions themselves
are not structured but they exist only as represented by structured representational ve-
hicles (García-Carpintero, ms, 3) or “propositions are abstractions from (possible) mental
state tokens that represent exactly the same” (Grzankowski and Buchanan 2019, 3160)
and thus “inherit” the structure from these tokens. If representational vehicles but not
propositions are structured, our account would be more precisely characterized as an ac-
count of understanding a propositional content of a vehicle. Everything we will say can
be stated by assuming this more deflationary stance.
23More concessively still, we commit ourselves neither to a view that propositions are
mind-independent entities (such as facts) nor to its negation (see, e.g., Collins, 2018).
24Again, it might be the case that only representational vehicles but not propositions
are structured and, therefore, that systematicity and productivity should be explained by
appeal to the features of vehicles, not propositions (García-Carpintero, ms).
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Propositional contents are systematic because “. . . our ability to entertain
. . . one propositional content is intrinsically connected to our ability to enter-
tain other . . . propositional contents, so that our ability to entertain the one
automatically implies that we can entertain the others” (Duncan, 2018, 353).
If you can entertain the proposition that a chair stands next to the table you
can, by the same token, entertain the proposition that the table stands next
to the chair.
This said, let’s return to the main question of this section: how should
we characterise the epistemic relationship we have to a proposition we take
ourselves to understand? We suggest that, given the assumption that propo-
sitions are structured, a (singular) propositional attitude relation is off the
table; after all, if we assume (for reductio) that we understand a proposition
p just when we stand in some propositional attitude relation to p, we find
ourselves left unavoidably with a remainder: namely, what epistemic rela-
tion do we have vis-à-vis the constituents of p? Recall that productivity and
systematicity rationalise that we grasp p by grasping the constituents of p
and relations obtaining between them.
In light of this worry, we might be tempted toward an obvious sort of
improvement—specifically, we might suppose that we can preserve a proposi-
tional-attitude approach and (unlike the previous view considered) cover for
the remainder that was the cognitive relationship we must bear to the con-
stituents of p. The idea would be something like the following: S understands
p just when S (i) bears some propositional attitude relation to p; and (ii)
bears some propositional attitude relations r1 . . . rn to the constituents of p.
An initial reaction here is to consider whether (ii) on this amended view
would make (i) redundant. But ultimately, this doesn’t much matter. The
problem with the amended view is that there is no suitable way to fill in the
details that will not lead the amended view to collapse into the aggregate
view we considered in Section 2.
Recall that a fundamental problem for the aggregate view (vis-à-vis ob-
113
jectual understanding in epistemology) highlighted the sense in which ob-
jectual understanding appears to have a grasping condition as a necessary
condition, and further, that such a condition (as per the regress problem)
will not plausibly be satisfied simply by requiring that the agent know an
appropriate number of propositions. The subject should also grasp the way
in which the constituents of the subject matter “hang together.” In the case
of propositions it is relatively easy to fill in the details of the relevant grasp-
ing condition: grasping the way in which constituents of propositions “hang
together” is just grasping the ways in which these proposition are structured,
i.e., what are the relations relating their constituents.25
From here it’s not hard to see that understanding a proposition is look-
ing quite a bit like the kind of understanding epistemologists call objectual
understanding. Even more, as we will see, understanding of a proposition
seems to be compatible with Gettier-style cases that serve to undermine
propositional knowledge.
Let’s consider a case structurally similar to Kvanvig’s (2003) library book
case (Section 2). Suppose Alex is studying for a biology exam. A disgruntled
employee at a company that makes the biology textbooks that Alex’s class is
using has tampered with the chapter on the structure and function of the cell,
switching around some of the information. Alex, fortunately, grabs a book
25Our story fits particularly well with a solution to the so called problem of the Unity
of propositions offered by Eklund (2019) (for an exhaustive discussion of the problem see
Gaskin (2008)). Here is the problem: “How can there be this complex, the proposition,
made up of its constituents, as opposed to merely (the collection of) the constituents
themselves?” (Eklund, 2019, 1236). A somehow classical worry is that the problem cannot
be solved without falling into a vicious constitution regress. Let’s take the proposition that
a is F. We might assume that it has two constituents: a and F. But what is the difference
between this proposition and a mere collection of a and F? We have to say that in the
proposition a instantiates F and thus that the proposition has a further constituent: the
instantiation relation R. But in this case, what is the difference between this proposition
and a mere collection of: a, F, and R? etc. Eklund’s solution to this problem is to take
the relation relating the constituents as primitive and not as a further constituent of the
proposition: “what accounts for the constituents being combined into the unity they are
is how they are related. What would the remaining worry be?” (Eklund, 2019, 1244).
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in which the disgruntled employee attempted to mix the definitions around
but accidentally mixed them back in the original order, leaving the book
that Alex grabs with correct descriptions of the elements of a cell. Alex’s
acquisition of the series of concepts (including NUCLEUS, CYTOPLASM,
and MITOCHONDRION) is thus unsafe. Suppose that Alex studies the
textbook carefully and is able to use these previously unfamiliar concepts
to entertain propositions about cell structure. Moreover, if she hears an
utterance of the sentence “Mitochondria contain no DNA” she can tell that
the proposition expressed by this sentence is false, just as she can tell that
the propositions expressed by the following sentences are true:
(1) Cytoplasm is enclosed by the cell membrane.
(2) Eukaryotic cells contain membrane-bound nuclei.
(3) Mitochondria produce most of the cell energy supply.
In short, and in a familiar sort of way, Alex has come (thanks to her
biology textbook) to understand propositions expressed by utterances of sen-
tences (1-3), even though the unsafe acquisition of the relevant information
undermines her would-be propositional knowledge of the definitions of con-
stituents of the propositions expressed by (1-3).
Taking stock then, understanding of a proposition is, like the kind of
objectual understanding that features in mainstream epistemology, (i) not
reducible simply to the possession of a propositional attitude or proposi-
tional attitudes; (ii) has a grasping condition as a necessary condition; (iii) is
compatible with knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. This concludes our
argument for the Weaker thesis.
Can we go further and establish the Stronger thesis as well? If the
stronger thesis is right, then understanding a proposition involves a kind of
apprehension of the way the propositional constituents stand in relation to
each other that is akin to the way understanding a body of information or a
subject matter (e.g., algebraic geometry) involves a kind of apprehension of
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how the facts constituting this subject matter stand in relation to each other.
Here the degree-based ex-ante constraint on objectual understanding noted
in Section 2 is relevant. If it turns out that, for example, scientific theories,
but not propositions, can be understood to greater or lesser degrees, this
would surely count against the Stronger thesis.
As Riggs (2009, 7) notes “the amount of information present in someone’s
[objectual] understanding can vary.”26 This will be the case, for instance,
when we compare the understanding of a housefire possessed by a novice
fireman as opposed to the understanding of a housefire possessed by an ex-
pert in exothermal reactions. In this respect, objectual understanding can
vary along what we might call the information dimension. But the degrees
of understanding possessed by two individuals might also diverge along what
we will call the action dimension. As Elgin (2009) notes: “the student who
understands geometry can do more with it than the student who just knows
all the axioms, the main theorems and their derivations.” Stronger thesis
(that understanding a proposition is a special case of objectual understand-
ing) predicts, then, that for two individuals, A and B, A’s understanding of
some proposition p should be able, in principle, to diverge from B’s under-
standing of p along both the informational and action dimensions.
Each of these points can be made rather straightforwardly. Firstly, the
point about informational variance: consider that Terence Tao, as well as
most of his first-year UCLA students, understand the proposition Grigory
Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture. Suppose a first-year student at
UCLA, Johnny, knows the following things: that the Poincaré conjecture
was a problem in geometric topology that is usually illustrated by wrapping
a string around a three dimensional object, and that proving the conjecture
involved the application of a mathematical method called the Ricci Flow.27
All of this information was gleaned by Johnny (who is only beginning his
26Our italics.
27See Perelman (2002). For an overview of the Ricci Flow, developed by Richard Hamil-
ton, and its applications to the Poincaré conjecture, see Chow, Lu, and Ni (2006).
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maths degree) from an article in the New Yorker, written for a general audi-
ence.28
While Terence Tao and Johnny both understandGrigory Perelman proved
the Poincaré conjecture, Terence is in a much better position to see how the
constituents of this proposition hang together; (after all, Terence, unlike
Johnny, has the information necessary to appreciate a more specific sort of
thing that would be involved in developing a proof of the Poincaré conjecture).
Johnny’s comparatively impoverished understanding of the proposition is
betrayed by the fact that the information he possesses, and which bears on
his understanding the proposition, gives him a significantly less rich picture of
the subject matter of the proposition Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré
conjecture.
Not only can the understanding of a proposition (like understanding a
body of information) two individuals possess diverge along an informational
dimension (as we saw here) but it can do so as well along what we called
the action dimension. Just as, à la Elgin (2009), understanding geometry
allows one to do more with it than can one who merely knows axioms, main
theorems and their derivations, Terence Tao can do more with his under-
standing of Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture than Johnny
can. Terence’s, but not Johnny’s, understanding of the proposition that
Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture includes items of informa-
tion A, B, and C, where A, B, and C are pieces of information about what
Perelman must have proved to have proven the Poincaré conjecture. Terence,
but not Johnny, can use A, B and C as premises in his practical reasoning,
conditioned on his understanding that Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré
conjecture.
In yet another instance, then, objectual understanding and understanding
of a proposition fail to come apart. This concludes our argument for the
28Nasar, S., & Gruber, D. (2006). Manifold Destiny, The New Yorker. August, 28,
44-57.
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Stronger thesis: the kind of understanding we aim to have of propositions
is type-identical to the kind of understanding-as-grasping that contemporary
epistemologists call objectual understanding.
4 Linguistic understanding versus understand-
ing of a proposition
Since one of the main roles of propositions is “to be the meanings of sentences
(in context), or at least the contents expressible by sentences” (Collins, 2018,
3) it is fairly easy to confuse the type of understanding relation we have
to propositions with what is commonly discussed in philosophy of language
under the label linguistic understanding. These two types of understanding
are, however, importantly different.
Some popular recent theories identify linguistic understanding of an ut-
terance expressing p with: (i) knowledge that the speaker said that p (Evans,
1982, 311; Heck, 1995, 84), (ii) “conscious awareness” (Hunter, 1998, 560) or
“quasi-perception” (Fricker, 2003, 341) that the speaker said that p, (iii) a
belief that p (Millikan, 2004, 121; cf. Mandelbaum, 2014), or (iv) a state of
entertaining the content p (Longworth, 2018, 822).29
What is common to all these views is that they characterise linguistic
understanding as a mental state through which the hearer30 represents the
content of a linguistic utterance.31 An ability to understand an utterance
is thus an ability to recognize what is being said or what is the meaning
29It is not our goal in this chapter to discuss and assess these views. Even if neither of
them offers the accurate characterization of the phenomenon of linguistic understanding,
they are all on the right track and thus sufficient for our purposes. Limitations of these
views are discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
30For convenience, in most our examples we will focus on cases of hearing and linguistic
understanding of speech. All that we say is mutatis mutandis applicable to linguistic
understanding of written word, sign languages such as ASL, etc.
31The content is represented either directly, i.e., simply as p (Longworth, 2018; Millikan,
2004) or indirectly, i.e., as said by a given speaker (Evans 1982; Heck, 1995; Hunter, 1998;
Fricker, 2003).
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of a given utterance of a sentence in a language one knows. In the case
of assertoric utterances, it is an ability to recognize what proposition was
expressed through a given utterance.32
It is, thus, not difficult to demonstrate the difference between linguistic
understanding and understanding of a proposition. Let’s return again to our
example of the proposition Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture
(p). This proposition can be expressed by utterances of sentences of different
languages, in particular by an utterance of an English sentence (EN) and a
Polish sentence (PL).
(EN) Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré conjecture.
(PL) Grigorij Perelman udowodnił hipotezę Poincarégo.
To demonstrate that understanding a proposition and linguistic under-
standing are different phenomena, we will use a comparison class of four
protagonists: Terence Tao33, a monolingual English fourteen-year-old not
particularly interested in mathematics, a monolingual Polish mathematician
specializing in geometric topology, and a monolingual Polish fourteen-year-
old not particularly interested in mathematics.
As we argued in the previous section, both Tao and the Polish topologist
understand p. They grasp and can explain what the proof would require,
what light it sheds on various related problems in topology, etc. At the
same time, Tao lacks linguistic understanding of (PL) while the monolingual
Polish mathematician lacks linguistic understanding of (EN). Upon hearing
utterances of respective sentences in languages they do not speak, they would
not realise that what has been just said was p.
32Crucially, the minimal condition on linguistic understanding is stronger than mere
recognition of a linguistic form or recognition of an utterance of a sentence in a given
language as an utterance of a sentence in this language. One can, for example, recog-
nize utterances of French sentences (they can tell that someone speaks French) without
recognizing what is being said (without linguistic understanding of this utterances).
33We assume that Terence Tao does not speak Polish. If he does, let us think instead
about Tao’s counterpart (Tao-minus-Polish) who doesn’t.
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The situation is different in the case of monolingual teenagers. Let’s take
as an example the monolingual English teenager, Emily. Emily is capable
of linguistic understanding of (EN) but incapable of linguistic understanding
of (PL). Utterances of (PL) would sound to her like an incomprehensible
babble. Even if she were able to guess that what she heard was an utter-
ance of a sentence in a foreign language (as opposed to, say, gibberish), she
would have problems detecting word boundaries, not to mention retrieving
meanings of the words uttered or for that matter the whole utterance. Addi-
tionally, lacking any competence with geometric topology, Emily has no (or
only minimal) understanding of p. Nonetheless, upon hearing an utterance of
(EN), she recognises that what has been said was that one Grigory Perelman
(whoever that was) proved (whatever that takes) something called “Poincaré
conjecture.” Obviously, if she did not hear about Poincaré before, she would
not recognise his name in the sentence. She might take “poincare” to be the
proper name of the conjecture or, if this is the first time she encounters the
concept of CONJECTURE, she could have even falsely assume that what
Perelman proved was something called “Poincareconjecture.” Nevertheless,
she could later on use this information to start reading about the mysterious
things she has heard about and soon learn a lot about Perelman, Poincaré,
and geometric topology. After some time of devoted studies she could acquire
a rich understanding of p and the whole field of topology, possibly becoming
one of Tao’s most promising students.
To sum up. We demonstrated that it is possible to understand a proposi-
tion while being unable to linguistically understand utterances of sentences
of a given language which express this proposition. It is also possible to
linguistically understand utterances of sentences of a given language which
express a proposition but fail to understand (or have only a very minimal
understanding of) this proposition. This concludes our argument for the
divergence between linguistic understanding and understanding of a propo-
sition.
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5 Understanding a communicated thought
In Section 3 we have argued that the type of understanding we have of propo-
sitions is just a special case of objectual understanding, and in the previous
section, that it differs importantly from linguistic understanding. Neverthe-
less, the fact that these two types of understanding differ does not mean
that they do not often co-occur. In fact, cases in which they co-occur are
particularly interesting from the point of view of our successful and fruit-
ful communication.34 Arguably, interlocutors communicate most effectively
when they not only understand the linguistic expressions used by each other
but also understand the things being said, i.e., how the propositions expressed
represent the world. We call this understanding a communicated thought.35
If u is an utterance of a sentence in a given language, and p is the propo-
sition expressed by u in a given context:
Understanding a communicated thought requires:
a) linguistic understanding of u, and
b) (some level of)36 understanding of p
It is easy to apply this template account to the cases of our protagonists
from the previous sections. Our u will, again, be either (EN) or (PL), and our
p will be Grigory Perelman proved the Poincaré Conjecture. Tao will have
34We do not pretend that we provide here sufficient or even necessary conditions for
communicative success. All we say is that the type of understanding which we characterize
below is among the important factors contributing to communicative success (at least in
some situations).
35The phenomenon we characterize below could be more precisely called understanding
of a thought as communicated through a given utterance. As we have demonstrated above,
one could understand a communicated thought (e.g., p) but not as communicated through
a given utterance (compare Tao’s understanding of p as expressed by (EN) but not (PL)).
The more accurate name is, however, quite a mouthful, so we will stick to the shorter
version: understanding a communicated thought.
36As we argued in Section 3, understanding a proposition just like other kinds of objec-
tual understanding, is a gradable matter.
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rich understanding of the communicated thought if he hears (EN). He has
linguistic understanding of (EN) and rich understanding of the proposition
p. However, despite his deep understanding of p, Tao will not understand
the communicated thought if he hears (PL), because he does not understand
Polish. As we see, the first way in which one may fail to understand the
communicated thought is by failing to understand the utterance through
which a given thought was communicated.
There is, obviously, another way in which one might fail to understand
the communicated thought. It is demonstrated by the example of the En-
glish speaking teenager, Emily. Despite her linguistic understanding of (EN),
Emily barely understands the thought communicated through the use of (EN)
because she barely understands proposition p.
While arguing for the Stronger thesis in Section 3, we were comparing
Tao’s rich understanding of p with his first-year student’s (Johnny’s) un-
derstanding of the same proposition. Our definition accounts for the fact
that Johnny’s epistemic standing towards p as communicated through an
utterance of (EN) is different to both Tao’s as well as Emily’s. Unlike
Emily, Johnny has considerable understanding of the thought communicated
through the use of (EN) because he has a considerable degree of understand-
ing of p. Nevertheless, his understanding of a communicated thought is not as
rich as Tao’s because his understanding of the proposition p is not as rich as
Tao’s. Since, as we demonstrated in Section 3, the type of understanding we
have of propositions is gradable, and since it contributes to the understand-
ing of the communicated thought, the understanding of the communicated
thought is itself a gradable matter.
6 Concluding remarks
The goal of this chapter was twofold. First, we argued that the understand-
ing one has of a proposition or a propositional content of a representational
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vehicle is a type of what contemporary epistemologists characterize as ob-
jectual understanding. Second, we demonstrated that even though this type
of understanding differs from linguistic understanding, in many instances
of successful communication these two types of understanding jointly con-
tribute to understanding a communicated thought. At the same time, we
think that our discussion makes a case for a closer collaboration between
philosophers interested in communication (linguistic communication in par-
ticular) and epistemologists. It is through paying attention to both these
research fields at the same time that we will be able to tackle the knotty and
multidimensional problem of understanding in human interactions.
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Summary
In this thesis, I have presented and defended a series of claims regarding the
nature and epistemic role of linguistic understanding. Firstly, I have argued
that, besides the state- and disposition-sense of “linguistic understanding,”
quite commonly discussed in the philosophical debate, there is yet another,
often overlooked, process-sense. I have argued that characterizing linguistic
understanding as a process is not only justified from the philosophical point
of view (linguistic understanding, just like other processes, unfolds over time)
but also is very much in line with the current state of the art in empirical
language sciences.
Secondly, I have outlined a novel model of the representational structure
of linguistic understanding. I have argued that this structure consists of
at least three types of interdependent representations generated by a dual-
stream process. The model I have offered establishes a middle ground be-
tween two popular accounts of the relation between comprehension and ac-
ceptance: Cartesian, on which we are free to either accept or reject compre-
hended information, and Spinozan, on which we automatically accept every-
thing we comprehend. On my account, we automatically accept everything
that passes the content-oriented filter (so-called validation), i.e., everything
that is not in obvious tension with our easily accessible background knowl-
edge.
Thirdly, I discussed the justification of comprehension-based beliefs, i.e.,
the beliefs about what other people say. I have argued that this justifica-
124
tion is non-inferential, i.e., that it does not depend on the justification of
other beliefs, such as the beliefs about what words the speaker uttered or
what sounds they produced. Instead of defending the most common version
of non-inferentialism about the justification of comprehension-based beliefs,
i.e., a view on which these beliefs are prima facie justified by seemings that
the speaker said so and so, I have offered a competitive account. On my
account, which I call teleological comprehension-process reliabilism: (i) be-
liefs are prima facie justified if they are produced by a process that has
forming true beliefs reliably as a function, and (ii) language comprehension
is a process that has forming true comprehension-based beliefs reliably as a
function.
Fourthly, I have argued that despite what is assumed by many partici-
pants in the debate, we are not equipped with a mechanism that allows us
to react discriminately to particular instances of untrustworthy testimony,
i.e., to prevent the formation of beliefs based on such testimony. However,
the fact that all, at least all adult members of our linguistic community are
vigilant towards the signs of untrustworthiness, and that liars meet social
retribution, brings the long-term benefit of decreasing the number of false-
hoods and lies we encounter. This account of the psychosocial mechanisms
involved in filtering of the comprehended content provides support for the
strong anti-reductionism about testimonial entitlement, i.e., the view that
we are prima facie entitled to believe whatever we are being told.
Finally, together with the coauthors of Chapter 5: J. Adam Carter and
Emma C. Gordon, I have argued that understanding a proposition, com-
monly identified with linguistic understanding, is a distinct phenomenon.
More specifically, it is a type of objectual understanding, which is grad-
able, consistent with epistemic luck, and based on a subject’s grasping of the
coherence-making relation between the elements of a given subject matter.
Nevertheless, both linguistic understanding and understanding a proposition
play an important role in our everyday communication. In typical cases of
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successful linguistic communication, we understand communicated thought,
i.e., we understand both what proposition has been expressed by the use of
a given utterance (linguistic understanding), and this proposition itself.
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